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From the 1950s to the 1970s, Bogotá, Colombia was one of the fastest growing 
cities in the world. During this period, the city became characterized by extreme social and 
geographic polarization between rural migrants and urban elites. This polarization was 
caused by a lack of development control as well as planning policies that encouraged social 
and spatial segregation. Social elites primarily lived in suburban neighborhoods in the north 
of Bogotá, which were well served by municipal infrastructure and enjoying easy access 
to services and employment opportunities. Low-skilled rural migrants settled in informal 
neighborhoods in the south that had poor municipal services and were close to 
environmentally polluted areas and far from the central business districts. Faced with the 
prospect of continuing, ungovernable urban sprawl led by both the formal and informal 
sector, in 1979 the city implemented a set of growth control and densification policies. 
However, thirty-five years later these policies have failed to halt or reverse the 
uneven development of the city. I argue that the unintended outcomes of the growth 
management policies are largely due to private sector interests and actions, which in turn 
 vi 
are influenced by social equity policies. To demonstrate this, I correlated the recent 
densification projects with the so-called Stratification system. This system separates the 
city into six levels based on built form characteristics to identify groups with different 
income levels, providing a proxy for the analysis of socio-spatial segregation patterns. In 
addition, I explored the behaviors and attitudes of urban development agents through 
interviews and analysis of planning documents. 
I found that there is a statistically significant correlation between the Stratification 
zones and the densification patterns shaped, in part, by the influence of the private sector 
over local land-use and density regulations. This influence of developers has led to a 
transformation of the built form that is distinguished by uneven density levels, access to 
services and employment, and concentrations of poverty. Because of this complex 
articulation of planning and social policies with private sector interests and actions, 
Bogotá’s low income residents are experiencing unpredictable patterns of disinvestment, 
overcrowding, revitalization or dislocation in their neighborhoods. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Juntos pero no revueltos is a phrase widely used in Latin America. It means 
together but not scrambled, and clearly describes the everyday landscape in Bogotá. As a 
first time foreign visitor to the city, a person may be overwhelmed by its density and 
congestion, but also surprised by its diversity. People with different income levels, different 
ethnicities, races, ages, and genders appear to live closely in harmony. However, a closer 
look reveals countless inequalities. Notwithstanding the density levels, there are 
differences in how these individuals, with different education levels, income and ethnicities 
move, where they live, the places they visit, and how they look at each other, and these 
differences eventually influence the opportunities they have in their lives.  
In this dissertation, I explore the historical role urban planning has had in 
reinforcing such social differences by fostering uneven urban development in the city. I 
argue that over time, approaches to urban planning have been shaped by social, political, 
and economic conditions, complex international discourses about planning, and the 
interests of powerful developers and landowners. Despite the best intentions of planners, 
these factors have perpetuated spatial disparity in the distribution of jobs, services, and 
affordable housing, in turn perpetuating a system of socio-spatial segregation. However, 
this case also illustrates how the same private sector forces that complicated planners’ 
urban growth strategies may also constitute an opportunity to overcome the social 
challenges stemming from such spatial disparities.  
INTRODUCTION TO BOGOTÁ AND ITS SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIVISIONS 
Bogotá is located close to the geographical center of Colombia, more than 800 
kilometers away from both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. The city occupies 
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about a quarter of a high altitude plateau at 2,600 meters above sea level, on the eastern 
most branch of the Andes mountains, that split in three as they traverse Colombia from 
south to north. The polluted Bogotá River halves this plateau, known as Sabana de Bogotá 
[Bogotá’s savanna], which is bordered also by steep mountain ranges on the south and east. 
Locals refer to the steep range along the east as the Cerros Orientales [Eastern Hills]; they 
are a natural reserve since 1973 and constitute the main geographical feature of the city. 
To the west, the Bogotá River constitutes the administrative limit of the city, and to the 
north, it opens to the rural green plains of the savanna. I provide in Figure 1 a map with the 
detailed location of Bogotá and its surrounding area. 
The Spanish founded Bogotá in 1538 and later made it the capital of the Viceroyalty 
of New Granada. In 1810, the descendants of Spanish, or criollos [creoles] declared their 
independence from Spain and founded the Republic of Colombia. Independence, however, 
did not end the nearly three hundred years of social divisions that had developed under 
colonial rule. The extensive uncontrolled urban growth of the city soon combined the 
colonial social differences with the geographically heterogeneous environment of the 
savanna, shaping an enduring pattern of socio-spatial division. As a result, the city is now 
divided into three socially and geographically differentiated regions: the North, the South, 
and the West. Different social groups living in different structures occupy each zone, where 
each group enjoys different amenities and services and has little interaction with other 
groups.  
The North, along the piedmont protected from seasonal floods and close to the 
green and fertile lands of the savanna, became the site where the affluent traditionally live. 
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Figure 1: Map of Bogotá and the savanna region. 
Illustration by the author. Sources: IDECA, CAR, DANE; Background Images: Google 
Maps and ASTER GDEM, a product of METI and NASA. 
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The higher classes in Bogotá have their roots among the white descendants of the creoles 
and other groups of European or Middle-Eastern migrants that came to the country during 
the twentieth century. These groups originally settled in the main core of the colonial city, 
close to the main plaza and market. Nonetheless, from the 1910s onwards, they migrated 
north along the piedmont of the Eastern Hills, first into the streetcar suburbs in the area 
that became known as Chapinero, and then further into the northern town of Usaquén. The 
cable car suburbs where they first settled were fashioned as British garden cities, with 
townhouses of Tudor Revival style and streets lined with trees. Later they began moving 
northward into areas resembling a scaled-down version of sprawling suburbia of postwar 
North America. Highways, shopping malls, universities, clinics, and parks are located in 
the wealthy northern areas, where the affluent can move around conveniently by driving 
short distances.  
An industrial area separates the South, home of the lower classes, from the North, 
home of the wealthier. This elongated industrial area constitutes a physical barrier, 
following an axis that starts in the colonial center and goes towards the west following the 
main road that connects Bogotá with Facatativá, and further on with the seaports. Beyond 
this barrier, the South is scattered with industrial sites and reaches its limits in the barren 
and drier steep terrain at the southern tip of the savanna. The polluted Fucha and Tunjuelo 
rivers traverse the South as they flow into the Bogotá River and until recently, they 
seasonally flooded several neighborhoods. In contrast with the North, communities living 
in the South have their roots among the “Muiscas,” a native tribe that lived in the savanna 
before the arrival of the Spanish, and in the descendants of the colonial artisan class—
called mestizos—who are descendants of whites and natives, and are the predominant 
ethnic group in Colombia. The descendants of the Muiscas were the first group to inhabit 
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the South. The municipal authorities relocated them from the fringes of the colonial center 
during the first “slum removal” program during the 1930s. Soon after, the South also 
became the entry-point for various waves of impoverished migrants from the countryside, 
mostly mestizo peasants displaced by the long enduring armed conflicts of Colombia. As 
a result, the South became consolidated as a low-income class enclave, by residents with 
strong social identities associated with both the Muiscas and with mestizo groups from 
neighboring regions of the savanna, and were thus still very much attached to Colombian 
rural culture.  
Development in the West, which was once a system of marshlands in the watershed 
of the Bogotá River, is more recent. The area was urbanized through the development of 
large-scale multifamily apartment towers and compounds of row houses starting in the late 
1970s. These developments were made possible by the introduction of the Unidad de Poder 
Adquisitivo Constante (UPAC). This mortgage system made equity available for the 
emerging middle classes of Bogotá to purchase their first houses. These large housing 
compounds share the West with other large-scale public urban interventions. Examples of 
these include the Ciudad Salitre, an infill mixed-use planned development; the affordable 
housing projects in the corridor of Calle 80 developed by the Instituto de Crédito 
Territorial—the disbanded public entity in charge of the construction of affordable housing 
in Colombia—the Centro Administrativo Nacional, seat of most of the ministries; and the 
international airport, Eldorado. These large housing complexes and large public 
infrastructures have made the West currently the most economically dynamic and socially 
mixed area of the city. 
As the city has grown and densified, these social and geographic divisions have 
become more acute. The traditional affluent lands in the North have become more 
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expensive and socially segregated as they densify and improve their infrastructures and 
urban services. Conversely, the poorer areas in the South have not developed at the same 
pace, and currently are suffering from pollution, a clogged transit system, poor 
infrastructure, and high crime levels. The southern localities have become more violent 
and socially unstable, signaling concentrated poverty and ghettoization. These spatial 
imbalances have been rooted and aggravated in different ways by the land-use and growth 
management policies applied in the city since the early twentieth century. 
A HISTORY OF URBAN GROWTH SHAPED BY SOCIAL AND SPATIAL SEGREGATION 
Before the 1970s, successive zoning ordinances with exclusionary characteristics 
governed urban growth in Bogotá. These ordinances set differing built form standards for 
each of the socio-geographic zones of the city. As a result, they indirectly determined land 
prices and the quality of services for each of these zones. Examples of these differing 
standards of built form across the city include the differing maximum limits on building 
footprints and dwelling densities, and differing minimums on road widths, setbacks and 
parking spaces in the North, the South, and the West.  
Originally, city authorities introduced these zoning ordinances as urgent attempts 
to control the unruly development that was happening in the city. As a result, the ordinances 
were not comprehensive: they neither integrated the urban ecological, social, and mobility 
systems, nor encouraged sustainable city growth. Instead, in practice these ordinances 
mostly legalized and facilitated development as dictated by the private sector, land markets, 
and the traditional social segregation patterns in Bogotá (Salazar-Ferro 2007). Figure 2 
provides a detailed map of Bogotá’s localities, and patterns of growth throughout the 
history. Additionally the map indicates the areas of informal settlement, later legalized by 
the authorities.   
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Figure 2: Map of historical patterns of development in Bogotá 
Illustration by the author. Sources: IDECA, CAR, DANE; Background Images: Google 
Maps and ASTER GDEM, a product of METI and NASA. 
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The municipality introduced the first system of social segregation through density 
and land-use norms during the 1940s. Before then, planners were debating whether the city 
should follow “City Beautiful” standards or other norms based on the precepts established 
by the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM).1 Some years before, the 
Austrian planner Karl Brunner became the first chair of the city’s urban planning office, 
originally known as the Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital (DAPD) 
and later as the Secretaría Distrital de Planeación (SDP). Brunner introduced the first 
European models of “urbanism” during the 1930s. They were based on the public sector 
having a leading role in designing the city, mostly following the normative ideals of good 
city form. However, the increasing migration of impoverished peasants from the 
countryside into the city soon challenged Brunner’s urbanist approach. Outpaced by the 
growth of the city, the city phased out the normative approaches and adopted a planning 
model based on urban development led by the private sector, modeled on North American 
approaches to zoning and road plans.  
Although local planners and architects mostly advocated for urbanist approaches, 
politicians considered that the rapid growth and socio-economic realities of the country 
required more liberal and laissez-faire policies. Into this debate, local architects brought 
international planning celebrity Le Corbusier to draft an ambitious comprehensive plan for 
the city, a master plan that later was deemed impossible to enforce. As a result, in 1944, 
the mayor passed the first zoning and road plan of the city in the statute known as Plan 
Soto-Bateman. This ordinance separated the city into different land-use zones: in the North, 
                                                 
1 CIAM was an organization responsible for a series of events and congresses arranged across Europe by 
the most prominent architects of the time, with the objective of spreading the principles of the Modern 
Movement, and focusing on all the main domains of architecture (such as landscape architecture, urbanism, 
industrial design, and many others). 
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it delineated a zone of exclusive residential land use, and in the South, a working class area. 
Zoning in the North encouraged larger plots, lower densities, and exclusive residential land 
uses. In the working class zones, on the other hand, the ordinance dictated smaller plots, 
with little or no setbacks, and it allowed commercial and light industrial activities in 
addition to residential use.  
At the same time, the city authorities tolerated the informal subdivision of rural 
properties in the urban fringes that, in the absence of adequate public housing programs, 
became the only housing options for the very poor. Landowners and developers, operating 
at the margins of legality, systematically sold very small un-serviced plots to impoverished 
migrants from the countryside. These neighborhoods quickly turned into slums. 
Developers vanished, leaving these communities, mostly comprised of persons with low 
levels of literacy, to deal on their own with infrastructure problems and conflicts over legal 
ownership. This pattern of residential segregation and uncontrolled informal urbanization 
of the fringes continued well into the 1970s.  
By 1979 the city authorities aimed to regain control of urban development 
following consultation with international firms that conducted a study called Fase 2 [Phase 
2] (Llewelyn-Davies Weeks Forestier-Walker & Bor et al. 1972). This study was the basis 
for the ordinance known as Acuerdo 7. Acuerdo 7 introduced a set of tools to control urban 
growth. The first of them was an Urban Services Boundary (USB), which was to act as a 
growth control limit, known as Perímetro de Servicios. The intention was to preserve the 
natural environments of the northern Savanna, but also to impede informal development 
on the steep slopes of the South and on the Eastern Hills where roads, running water, and 
sewage services were difficult to provide. Inside the USB, areas were set aside for future 
growth. These areas were proposed for both the development of multi-family housing 
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compounds for the working classes and for projects of serviced-plots and self-help housing 
for the poorest families.  
Inside the city, Acuerdo 7 introduced a system known locally as densificación lote 
a lote [lot-by-lot densification, hereafter referred to as incremental densification]. This 
process was meant to accommodate urban growth in the already serviced inner-city areas, 
aiming to house a growing middle and elite classes without expanding into the savanna. 
Densificación lote a lote is the process of redeveloping a property, such as a two-story 
townhouse, by building a multiple story residential building on the same site, following 
upgrades in the dwelling density zoning limitations. For that purpose, Acuerdo 7 provided 
a planning framework to facilitate incremental densification by separating the city in 
different zones called tratamientos [treatments]. Planners delineated these tratamientos 
according to the different ages and conditions of existing developments and buildings in 
different neighborhoods, and then established different guidelines for each based on a 
market rationale. For instance, they set higher height limits and less land-use restrictions 
in the older areas of the central city in order to encourage redevelopment by densification 
conducted by the private sector. Although Acuerdo 7 was a short-term plan—meant 
originally only to define the growth of the city up to the mid-1980s—the main proposals 
of the ordinance continued in use, under different circumstances, in subsequent plans up to 
the 2010s. Today, thirty-five years after the 1979 ordinance, the USB and the tratamientos 
continue in effect with few changes.  
As a result, in recent years, as the city exhausts the expansion areas defined by 
Acuerdo 7, the inflexibility of the tratamientos system and traditional segregation patterns 
have fostered speculation and higher land prices inside the city. Neoliberal land markets 
have led to conflicts over prime areas that are located close to services and sources of 
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employment, and the competition over these properties has led to rising land and housing 
prices, which in turn, perpetuate social and spatial inequalities and harm the very poor. 
Today, for instance, it is hard for a working class family to afford rents within the city 
core—even in highly densified neighborhoods of informal origin—and it is almost 
impossible for them to find housing affordable enough to purchase inside the city.           
THE CURRENT URBAN CRISIS AND PERSISTENT IMBALANCES 
Each of the planning studies conducted in the city since the 1970s has diagnosed 
similar problems related to an unequal distribution of urban services and employment 
sources across the city (Llewelyn-Davies Weeks Forestier-Walker & Bor et al. 1972; 
DAPD 1981, 2000a). In Bogotá, economic activities and services are concentrated only in 
the North where the most affluent residents live, and thereby the lower classes are 
condemned to living the South and in parts of the West, which requires them to endure 
tortuous daily commutes in a clogged transit system. At the same time, hazardous industrial 
and commercial use of land for things such as bars, car mechanic workshops, waste 
deposits, and artisan industries, invades the few centrally located areas that are inhabited 
by the poor, thereby servicing the affluent while simultaneously lowering the quality of life 
for the lower-class people who inhabit them.  
The patterns of location of new constructions in the city show this imbalance. In 
2015, the northern localities of Usaquén, Chapinero, and Suba together total more than half 
of the new residential and commercial construction projects in the city. Conversely, the 
production of affordable housing continues to decline and is now located almost 
exclusively in the localities of Ciudad Bolívar and Usme, and in the municipality of 
Soacha, all on the southern fringes of Bogotá (Bustamante-Palma 2015). This disparity has 
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caused the provision of urban services such as public space, education, security, and 
transportation to continue to be very uneven across the city.  
For instance, data from Bogotá’s environmental protection agency (SDA 2016) 
shows that each inhabitant of the northern localities of Teusaquillo, Chapinero and 
Usaquén enjoy more than 20 square meters of public space—including parks, plazas, roads 
and bike paths—while in the southern localities of Ciudad Bolívar and Bosa, each person 
have less than 13 square meters available. The last urban development report published by 
city authorities (2015) shows that while daycare for children under three years of age is 
available to half of the children living in Chapinero and Barrios Unidos, it is only available 
for a fifth of the children in the southern localities of Kennedy, Bosa, and Ciudad Bolívar. 
Residents of the South also have less access to basic education, as it is available to only 
70–80 percent of the school-age population in Ciudad Bolívar and Usme. At the same time, 
placement of children in schools is high in the North. Public schools in the South are also 
under-performing compared to those in the North. In Ciudad Bolívar, San Cristóbal, and 
Usme, on average less than half of the schools make high scores on the national 
standardized exams, while the public schools in Suba and Usaquén in the North score in 
the 90th percentile.  
Crime levels are also very uneven across the city. Localities in the North such as 
Usaquén, Suba, Teusaquillo, and Barrios Unidos have murder rates below 20 per 100,000 
persons—close to the murder rates of cities such as Philadelphia, Miami, or Atlanta. 
Localities in the South have higher murder rates of 30 to 50 per 100,000 persons—
comparable to the most violent cities in the United States, such as Saint Louis, Baltimore, 
Detroit, and New Orleans. Pollution levels are also very uneven. Specifically, the levels of 
airborne particulate matter are very different in the North and South. In the wealthy 
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northern localities of Usaquén and Chapinero, the average daily level of particles less than 
ten microns in diameter (PM10) is between 22 and 27 micrograms per cubic meter, which 
is mostly within the recommended limit of 25 micrograms per cubic meter set by the World 
Health Organization (WHO 2005). However, in the southern localities of Kennedy and 
Bosa the average daily level of particulate matter smaller than ten microns in diameter 
reaches 75 to 80 micrograms per cubic meter.  
The patterns of mobility in these areas also reflect the social and geographical 
disparities of the city and particularly affect the lower classes. The northern localities of 
Usaquén, Chapinero, Suba, and Teusaquillo have the highest levels of car ownership, 
reaching more than 250 cars per 1,000 persons, while in the southern localities of Usme, 
Ciudad Bolívar, and Bosa there are fewer than 100 cars per 1,000 persons. This makes 
modal transportation share distribution different across the city: the affluent use private 
vehicles for more than half of their trips, while the lower classes predominantly use public 
transportation and walk to their destinations. The number of people who walk to their daily 
destinations, however, has been decreasing in recent years, demonstrating that the lower 
classes are now more mobile, and increasingly require vehicular transportation to access 
distant jobs and leisure destinations. Paradoxically, the number of people walking and 
biking has increased among the higher-income group, indicating how they now have easier 
access to jobs and services (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Transconsult, and Infométrica 
2015). As a result, the deficiencies of the transit systems disproportionally affect lower 
income groups. Trips in public mass transportation take longer than in any other 
transportation mode, more than 70 minutes on average in increasingly overcrowded Bus 
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Rapid Transit (BRT)2 buses. As many as eight passengers are fitted per square meter on 
each bus, and they have to transfer through congested stations (Sierra et al. 2014). 
Consequently, almost every week in Bogotá, angry passengers initiate spontaneous 
blockades and bring the BRT system to a standstill. 
These inequalities are not new. Since the 1970s, consultants have proposed that the 
city be decentralized through the consolidation of sub-centers for services and 
employment, which would be scattered across the urban area to reduce the daily movement 
of the population and the concentration of both employment and poverty. However, only a 
few of the proposed sub-centers have been consolidated, and those rarely break the patterns 
of social segregation. In the best cases, these sub-centers have become commercial hubs 
for local communities, but they fail to draw the educated higher-class groups into living in 
areas outside the North. This pattern has been the result of a continuous misalignment of 
the urban development objectives of the public and the private sectors. While the public 
sector has set goals for city structure and introduced planning tools to desegregate the city, 
the private sector often acts as a loose wheel, and goes against the planning objectives set 
by the municipal authorities.  
This research seeks to use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to demonstrate 
this misalignment between the public and the private sector in urban planning policy. I will 
triangulate geographical information data with historical documents, behaviors and 
perspectives from interviews with agents of city development, using as proxy the so-called 
Estratificación [Stratification] system.   
                                                 
2 Bogotá’s BRT system moves the largest number of passengers of any bus system in the world. The 
system, called “Transmilenio,” opened in 1999, and currently uses 113 kilometers of exclusive lanes on 
Bogotá’s main roads.  
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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE INEQUALITIES 
Stratification is a national policy that was initiated as a social equity tool for 
distributing cross-subsidies among people in different income groups. By the 1970s, 
infrastructure was still meager within informal settlements, which accounted for more than 
a third of the area of the city. Unpaved roads, no sewage, and unstable sources of water 
and electricity condemned inhabitants of those settlements to live in conditions of extreme 
poverty. At the time, budget constraints made it difficult for the public sector to bear the 
costs of the infrastructure upgrades that were necessary to bring utilities to informal 
settlements. Policy-makers then proposed that members of the higher classes should 
contribute to the necessary improvements through their monthly utilities charges. 
However, at the time, the required data regarding the income levels of the population, such 
as property appraisals and tax assessments, were not entirely reliable. As a consequence, 
policy makers decided to rely on the differing built form across the city to determine 
residents’ income levels.  As a result, during the 1980s, Bogotá was divided into six income 
areas, called Estratos [strata]. Strata 1 and 2 were delineated in the neighborhoods of 
informal origin where the very poor lived. Stratum 3 was defined in the areas where the 
state or non-profits had developed affordable housing projects where they believed were 
living people of emerging middle classes. Finally, strata 4, 5 and 6 were the areas developed 
by the private sector. These were mostly areas of suburban single housing or high-rise 
condominiums, where the most affluent and the upper-middle classes lived. These areas 
were located almost exclusively in the North.  
After some years, the Stratification system proved to be a success as a social equity 
policy. Through it, the public sector raised the revenue necessary to subsidize the 
infrastructure needed in informal neighborhoods. This greatly improved the quality of life 
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of the poorest residents of Bogotá. However, the Stratification system’s more negative 
effects outside the utilities realm eclipsed its successes. Sociological research suggests that 
Stratification has perpetuated social segregation, which is rooted in colonial social 
hierarchies and aggravated by the twentieth century’s system of social segregation through 
density and land-use norms. Sociologists point out how Stratification has been adopted into 
the local culture, exacerbating the perception of wealth differentiation between different 
urban areas with severe social, political, and economic implications that include 
generational social immobility and concentration of poverty (Uribe-Mallarino 2008). 
In this research, I will use the Stratification zones as a lens to observe the recent 
urban development patterns of the city. My argument is that the Stratification zones provide 
a useful tool to discover the social injustices of the planning system at different levels. 
These zones are based on the differences of the built form at the block level in the existing 
developments. Each stratum has different architectural typologies, street layouts, and 
supply of parks, plazas and pedestrian infrastructure. As a result, the strata system is the 
outcome of more than 70 years of social segregation based on land-use and density 
regulations. In other words, I am not suggesting that social differences and differences in 
built form have emerged from the Stratification system per-se. Instead, the Stratification 
system is the outcome of historical planning processes, behaviors and perspectives of city 
development agents, and the actions of the private section. Consequently, I use 
Stratification as a means to measure and bring to light the inherent, structural inequalities 
of the planning system in Bogotá.  
This research points out that the built form differences reinforce the perceived 
social differences between strata, and hence shape perceptions of appropriate, future 
development. These perceptions are, in part, the result of a lack of consideration for socio-
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spatial differences in public planning policies. These policies, in turn, have facilitated 
private sector influence over the drafting of local density and land-use regulations, often in 
contradiction with broader policy objectives. The consequences of these processes have 
been mixed. On the one hand, the city has seen increasing segregation in some areas, and 
gentrification and dislocation in other areas. On the other hand, uneven built form patterns 
have been perpetuated in some parts of the city; other areas have seen aggressive 
transformations in the built form. These contradictory processes have led to a great deal of 
uncertainty, making it difficult for planners to address the deficit in transit and roads 
infrastructure and to forecast future development, thus perpetuating the uneven distribution 
of employment opportunities, services, and housing supply. 
In order to discover these patterns, I used a pragmatic mixed-method approach. 
Firstly, I gathered data from the new spatial database of building permits, which the SDP 
has digitally catalogued since 2010, and socio-demographic data from the latest 
multipurpose surveys conducted in the city by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional 
de Estadística (DANE). Secondly, I interviewed private sector developers, urban policy 
makers, and local academics. By triangulating this quantitative and qualitative data, I found 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between the incremental densification 
patterns and the Stratification policy. Two interconnected strategies moderate this 
relationship. First, social perceptions and attitudes among planners and developers inform 
discourse about real estate as well as investment decisions. Second, developers influence 
the drafting and passage of planning ordinances at the local scale both through participatory 
planning processes and by directly informing policy decisions. Nonetheless, I also found 
that there is an emerging class of young or grassroots developers, which are modifying the 
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environment of the neighborhoods of informal origin and disrupting traditional segregation 
patterns. 
DENSIFICATION AND PRIVATE SECTOR IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
I used three different bodies of theory to situate this research within an overarching 
planning debate and to inform my understanding of the intertwined relationships among 
the densification discourses, the patterns of social segregation, and the role of the private 
sector within a Latin American planning framework. First, in order to trace the roots of the 
growth management and densification policies introduced to Bogotá by Fase 2 study 
(which was the basis for Acuerdo 7), I reviewed the literature that emerged in the 1960s 
that engaged with the relationships among built form, urban design, and urban planning. 
This work often took a normative stance, calling for greater urban density and a compact 
urban form to mitigate environmental and social concerns wrought by urban sprawl and 
modernist, large-scale planning interventions. Since the 1970s, urban design and urban 
planning practitioners have transformed these densification discourses into growth 
management policies throughout the world.  
Initially, ideas favoring compact cities were triggered by the writings of Jane Jacobs 
(1961), who advocated that urban design return to a traditional pre-modern city form, an 
approach that privileged dense small-scale piecemeal development, the mixing of social 
classes, and pedestrian circulation. Over time, influential authors within the urban design 
and architecture fields, such as Krier (1984) and Alexander (1966; 1977; 1987) initially, 
and later others within the New Urbanism movement (CNU and Talen 1999; Calthorpe 
2009; Talen and Duany 2013), operationalized and disseminated these discourses through 
planning strategies premised on the densification of the central city. Another examples of 
the push toward compact cities is the incorporation into urban planning of the “Smart 
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Growth” discourse, created as response to the challenges of the environmental 
sustainability of cities (M. Newman 2005); and the commodification of housing in 
accordance with the global shift in urban policy to encourage development led by the 
private sector (Chapin 2012). 
However, the implementation of densification policies also had unintended 
consequences. Paradoxically, some of the policies aggravated social segregation and 
increased the displacement of vulnerable communities from the central cities, even though 
Jacobs aimed for them to do the opposite. A group of scholars has exposed these unintended 
effects in recent decades by evaluating the theory and practice of densification that uses 
form-based codes. For instance, they questioned the assumption that density in cities 
enables social mixture and the peaceful interaction of people with different backgrounds 
(Fainstein 2005; Harvey 1997; Day 2003; Brain 2005). They also have pointed out the 
problematic theoretical underpinning of form-based planning approaches that emerge from 
disciplines such as architecture and urban design, and are coopted by the private sector 
(Gunder 2011; Tafuri 1976; Cuthbert 2008). On the other hand, empirical research has 
proven the weak association between urban form and the social sustainability performance 
of cities (Burton 2000; Talen 2006; Bramley et al. 2009; Pendall and Carruthers 2003). I 
am using this scholarly debate to argue how the growth control and incremental 
densification policies established in Bogotá in 1979 by Acuerdo 7 responded initially to an 
international densification discourse that was imported into Bogotá. As in other places, the 
case of Bogotá may be an example of the unintended effects of densification and growth 
control that were caused by the influence of the private sector in city development.  
Second, I identified an absence of in-depth, critical reviews of urban planning in 
the literature on Latin American urban morphology (Almandoz 2006). Because of this, I 
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reviewed literature that analyzes urban growth and social segregation in Latin America 
from a sociological perspective. I am using this literature as a way to approach the urban 
growth in Bogotá, while also contributing to it with a perspective that considers historical 
zoning regulations. Sociologists in the region have coined the terms “polarization” and 
“fragmentation” to describe two different phases of urbanization in the region during the 
second part of the twentieth century. Griffin and Ford (1980) coined the term “polarization” 
to describe the unique urban growth patterns that responded to the deep social and ethnic 
divisions in the region. Scholars identify the poles of social divisions with the educated 
elites of European ancestry who most frequently have held power on one extreme, and the 
mostly illiterate population migrating from the countryside on the other extreme. 
According to sociologists, these divisions were made manifest in the built environment of 
cities during the twentieth century as the region was urbanized. Contemporary scholars, 
however, argue that the neoliberal reforms that have been implemented in the region since 
the late 1980s have disrupted this traditional pattern of polarization. The new growth 
pattern became known as “fragmentation,” a form of urban sprawl distinguished by the 
appearance of fragments, or urban islands populated by different social groups that live in 
proximity to one another, but each enclosed by man-made security borders, such as fences 
or gates (Borsdorf and Hidalgo 2010; Thibert and Osorio 2014; Janoschka 2002). 
Numerous scholars are analyzing the social patterns of exchange between social groups 
that formerly were living on opposite sides of cities and are now living in close proximity. 
Some experience these new exchanges as positive (Sabatini and Brain 2008; Sabatini and 
Salcedo 2007; Salcedo 2010; Rasse 2015) and others experience them as negative 
(Janoschka and Sequera 2016; Ruiz-Tagle 2015).  
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Finally, I draw on research in urban governance in Latin America, in particular the 
work of Koch (2015). He introduced the term “Arranged Urbanism” to describe the private 
sector influence over the public sector, arguing that imbalance of power between the two 
shapes the cities in the region. Koch points to the role of neoliberal mechanisms of 
governance in causing increasing segregation inside urban areas, and for ultimately 
undermining democratic control over the process of city construction. I am using his 
discourse to understand the historical planning regulations, and the arguments of local 
developers I interviewed and those in local real estate discourse. Based on my findings, I 
argue that to moderate city development, instead of following public planning rules, the 
private sector follows the rules of social segregation that are embedded in the Stratification 
policy.  
SUMMARY REVIEW OF CHAPTERS    
I will present the methods, theory and results of this investigation in nine chapters. 
In Chapter 2, which follows this one, I will narrate my motivations for this research through 
my personal experiences in two different Bogotá neighborhoods. They provide examples 
of the effects on local communities of conflicts over densification and social segregation 
and illustrate the complexity of the intersections between local planning ordinances, the 
private sector, and the Stratification system. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the theoretical 
framework that grounds this research. I will explain the origins and theoretical basis of the 
international discourse on densification and, recent critiques to it based on evidence found 
through scholarly research. In addition, I will explain the traditional and new patterns of 
residential segregation in Latin America, and how those relate to city growth in the region. 
Finally, I will address the power of the private sector in urban development in Latin 
America and its different mechanisms of influence over the development of public policy.   
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In Chapter 4, I will present my research questions and explain the mixed-methods 
approach that I am using, and discuss the pitfalls of using only either quantitative or 
qualitative methods. I am also presenting the advantages and disadvantages of my 
positionality with regard to my research, writing both as a “Bogotano” and about Bogotá. 
I will explain how I have lived most of my life in Bogotá, while also extensively studying 
abroad, and I will discuss the contradictions in the fact that I am both a practitioner of 
architecture and urban design and a scholar of urban planning. In Chapter 5, I review the 
planning history of Bogotá, arguing that the city has seen four planning phases. A first 
foundational phase lasted up to the 1940s in which planners focused on normative aesthetic 
interventions that were brought by European practitioners of urban design such as Karl 
Brunner and Le Corbusier. Although these men contributed to the professionalization of 
local planning practice, they overlooked the complex problem of social segregation 
between the elites and illiterate migrants from the countryside. A second phase followed 
when, in the 1960s, these social conflicts erupted into a planning crisis that led to the 
enactment of procedural policies that made development rules more flexible, and aimed to 
solve housing deficits through the action of the private formal and informal construction 
sector. I propose that a third planning phase started in the early 1970s with the Fase 2 study 
and was enacted with Acuerdo 7 in 1979, when uncontrolled sprawl again motivated the 
introduction of normative rules based on foreign theories for controlling city growth. I 
argue that the planning framework introduced during this phase continues in force today. 
However, I recognize a fourth phase of planning history beginning in the 2000s, when 
planning ordinances started to regulate processes of urban development rather than city 
form in order to address social equity challenges. Nevertheless, I argue that the turn to this 
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progressive framework has failed due to pressure from the private sector construction 
industry.  
In Chapter 6, I explain in detail the Stratification system, the policy that embodies 
the patterns of socio-spatial segregation. I will discuss its methodology and the various 
scholarly critiques of it and its social consequences, while explaining the recent local 
debate about its elimination. In Chapter 7, I will use quantitative methods, specifically 
Geographical Information System (GIS) data from 2010 to 2015, to statistically assess the 
relationship between incremental densification and the Stratification system. Specifically, 
I will use a simplified regression model to relate the size of incremental densification 
projects with the strata, controlling for location and physical characteristics of the parcels. 
In addition, I will relate incremental densification patterns with the changes in social 
segregation in the city during the period 2007–2014.  
In Chapter 8, I will explain the mechanisms that facilitate private sector influence 
over urban planning and their relationship with the Stratification policy. I will develop this 
argument through analysis of thirteen in-depth interviews that I conducted with local 
construction firms of different sizes and policy-makers at the SDP. In addition, I will 
compare the interviews with an analysis of the real estate discourse in the literature written 
in Colombia. Finally, in Chapter 9, I will discuss my findings and their contribution to 
broader theoretical debates in planning and the current planning practice in Bogotá.  
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Chapter 2: Two illustrative cases of densification from Bogotá 
In Bogotá, although planning ordinances have encouraged the densification of the 
central city since 1979, it was not until the 2000s, in the face of a scarcity of empty lots for 
development, that communities began feeling pressures from developers in the land 
markets. These market pressures are increasingly dislocating neighborhoods with families 
of both middle and lower income located in prime central areas. As a result, local planners, 
activists, communities, and non-governmental organizations are concerned about these 
struggles over land for redevelopment. During my life and work as a planner in Bogotá, I 
witnessed many of these processes. However, it was only through the investigation 
discussed here that I was able to establish links between the observed struggles, broader 
planning theory, and local urban planning policy.   
This chapter emerges as a result of my own retrospect of different events of my life 
in Bogotá that I now relate to urban planning policy. I will recount stories of two different 
neighborhoods in the city where residents experienced conflicts brought by incremental 
densification policies. These examples illustrate in detail the complex role of private sector 
developers in influencing local land development policy and land markets. The result of 
these patterns, as the cases suggest, has been uneven and unplanned densification at the 
expense of the quality of life of existing communities. In addition, the case studies 
exemplify how developers’ decisions are not solely influenced by planning ordinances, but 
also by the Stratification policy, which reflects and reproduces the social divisions in the 
city. 
DENSIFICATION IN CEDRITOS: SUCCESS OR UNPLANNED URBANIZATION? 
One of the earliest memories of my childhood was growing up playing in the large 
green fields of the northern savanna. I remember very well getting dirty in its deep green 
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grass and muddy soils, a result of the almost daily rainfalls that distinguish Bogotá’s 
weather. I ran with my friends across the fields, along with farmers wandering with milking 
cows, playing with street dogs and trespassing the barbed wired fences. When we got tired, 
we returned to our houses located in a small subdivision in the middle of this sea of green 
pastures. We named the subdivision cuadra [block], and the cuadra was at that time the 
entire world we knew at our young age. My father moved from the city to the cuadra in 
search of clean air and empty space where his children could grow and play. He joined a 
handful of pioneers, acquiring a small plot of land to build a house with a front and back 
yard for the family. People called the larger area where our cuadra was located Cedritos, 
which was inspired by the name of a fancy gated subdivision that sprung up nearby. The 
name came from the cedar trees, meaning “little cedars,” and was associated with green 
space, trees, and nature, assets that were scarce in central Bogotá. 
As I was growing up, many families joined the first pioneers of the cuadra and 
bought many more plots in the subdivision to build single-family houses. Figure 3 shows 
a picture of how the cuadra looked back in the 1980s. Each neighbor built their home with 
a different design; however, most of them were inspired by Spanish colonial architecture 
with red tile roofs, white walls, and wooden window frames. At the same time, though, 
they tried to resemble the houses with garages and green front lawns that we saw in the TV 
shows from the United States. Other families with less money built their homes in an 
austere style with basic paint on the façade, cement roof tiles, and metallic framed 
windows. However, while in the United States plots were wide and houses were detached 
from one another, in our cuadra the developer had illegally subdivided each plot into two, 
and our homes were built one right next to the other, similar to townhouses. During this 
time, I remember that we left the green fields to play in the many construction sites that 
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sprung up everywhere. We broke into the sites during the night, climbed the wooden 
fences, and then played for hours with sand, cement, wheelbarrows, tools, and everything 
we could find as we ran around through the unfinished structures. 
I do not remember exactly when our cuadra stopped being a border area between 
the city and the savanna’s countryside, and started being a part of Bogotá, but I do 
remember several changes that came with this transition. As most of the plots in our 
subdivision were built out, we got our first bus route, which was served by small trucks 
called busetas that were adapted to carry passengers. They ran through the main street 
every fifteen minutes or so. Because this happened when I was becoming a teenager, the 
busetas allowed me to become more independent from my parents. Because I could ride 
the busetas, I did not require them to drive me everywhere and control my mobility. I used 
the busetas to go alone or with my brothers to the shopping mall or to visit the homes of 
school friends’ who lived in other neighborhoods.  
Unfortunately, with the city’s growth and the buseta routes, cuadra neighbors began 
to mistrust one another. One night someone broke into a house and stole something; another 
day, someone stole a radio from a car parked on our little street. Soon after, it was my 
family who was the victim of the crime wave. The night of December 23, 1989, my parents, 
my brothers and I went to see the Christmas lights downtown. When we got back, the TV 
and other appliances were missing, as well as some of my mom’s jewelry. Someone had 
broken into our home. This was a big shock for my father and it caused him to become 
very cautious. He built a fence in the front and the back of our house, and he restricted us 
from being outside at night. Our self-protective attitude may also have been fueled by the 
horrors we saw on Colombian television news. At the time, in the early 1990s, everyday 
there were news of kidnappings, murders, and bombs in the country. By the beginning of 
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the 2000s, the violence involved not only the usual drug barons, but also average 
Colombians, people like us.  
Paradoxically, my father also saw opportunity with the unexpected growth of the 
neighborhood. With the help of my aunts and uncles, he bought one of the last remaining 
plots in the cuadra to build a midrise multi-family condominium. While Cedritos had been 
since its origins a place of single-family houses, multi-family condominium buildings 
eventually became very popular. This type of buildings, with five floors, parking in the 
basement, and four to six apartments, were a good alternative to make a profit from 
booming housing markets and the safety concerns that became ubiquitous all around the 
city. They offered a second layer of security for their occupants. Families could control the 
entrance with a concierge or with electronic devices, while windows in condominiums 
were set higher and therefore the risks for someone breaking in were lower. My father’s 
building had very few architectural qualities as it was mostly designed by the construction 
chief, or maestro, who had much empirical knowledge of construction but had never gone 
to a training school. My father also complained that workers were constantly stealing 
materials and building poor quality constructions. Nevertheless, in a few years he had built 
not just one but two small condominium buildings in our cuadra. After all this work, he 
was able to keep one of the apartments, and with the money he earned, he bought a car. 
The car was later stolen while it was parked in front of the church, but the rent from the 
apartment helped our family for many years. 
Many other neighbors and other small developers had ventures in the incremental 
densification of Cedritos. When I turned twenty-three years old and graduated with my 
bachelor’s degree in architecture, I left a neighborhood that was very different from the 
one in which I was born and raised. Only twenty years after the first families moved to 
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these green savanna fields, Cedritos became a fully serviced urban middle class enclave. 
The plains with milking cows and scattered suburban subdivisions were transformed into 
a mix of gated complexes of townhouses and five-story residential condominiums, with 
buseta routes everywhere that led to small commercial strips and shopping malls.  
When I graduated from college, I moved out of this middle class enclave to a shared 
apartment in the center of the city. This apartment was located very close to where my 
parents first lived after they got married; it felt as I was restarting a cycle. This area, called 
Teusaquillo, was more convenient to me as it was only a short buseta or taxi drive to my 
office. In addition, the apartment was closer to the bohemian central entertainment districts 
I was starting to frequent at that time.  
Some months after I moved out, I found an unusual article about my old 
neighborhood: 
[A modern and constantly developing sector. Cedritos is not just one more place 
on the map of Bogotá anymore. It is a necessary reference for urban development 
in the north of the city, because it possesses a combination of features that project 
it as a real estate investment point. At present, there are between fifteen and 
twenty housing projects, of which 80 percent have been sold over blueprints. 
People like the sector because it is recursive, modern and it is in constant 
development; to which must be added the plentiful access routes, which have now 
received more attention from the authorities.] (Redacción El Tiempo 2007b) 
Un sector moderno y en constante desarrollo. Cedritos no es una zona más en el 
mapa de Bogotá. Es referencia obligada del desarrollo urbano del norte de la 
ciudad y una combinación de factores que la proyectan como punto de inversión 
inmobiliaria. Actualmente, allí se encuentran entre 15 y 20 proyectos de vivienda, 
de los cuales 80 por ciento se ha vendido sobre planos. Y es que a la gente le 
gusta el sector porque es recursivo, moderno y está en desarrollo constante, a lo 
que se les deben sumar las vías de acceso, que ahora han tenido más atención por 
parte de las autoridades.                    
I was surprised at reading this article after living in Cedritos for more than two 
decades. I thought the image the article was portraying of my neighborhood was far from 
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reality. As I believed back then, Cedritos was a middle class suburban enclave, an 
affordable area with many parks but disconnected from central Bogotá, and it was therefore 
a good place for children to grow up, far from noise, pollution, and drug addicts. I never 
had considered Cedritos to be a modern new center and a pole of development of the city. 
However, to my surprise, other articles published soon after also contradicted my view of 
Cedritos: 
[It is estimated that 60 percent of the sector is urbanized with homes in Stratum 4, 
making it a good choice for newly married couples and college students or 
professionals entering the labor market. It is a traditional sector, and above all, a 
very residential site, which for twenty years the professionals have opted for. 
Because of features that are recurrent: the location and the stratum that allows 
them to live at a very high level in a more affordable way.] (Redacción El Tiempo 
2007a) 
Se calcula que el 60 por ciento del sector esta urbanizado con viviendas de 
Estrato 4, lo que lo convierte en una buena opción para parejas recién casadas y 
los universitarios o profesionales que están ingresando al mercado laboral. Es un 
sector tradicional y sobre todo un sitio muy residencial al que, desde hace veinte 
años le ha apostado la población profesional por factores que son recurrentes: la 
ubicación y el estrato que les permite vivir a un nivel muy alto de manera más 
económica.   
I knew construction firms probably paid to publish all of these articles in order to 
sell more condominiums in the area, but I was shocked by the arguments they were using, 
especially the one about Cedritos being a very well connected area. Cedritos grew in an 
unplanned way from a set of suburban subdivisions, which meant that there were few roads 
connecting the area to the center of the city. In fact, its first settlers, such as my father, 
moved to Cedritos in the first place precisely because of this disconnection. For five years 
when I was growing up, I had to suffer because of Cedritos’ isolation. Attending college 
downtown, I had to spend two hours daily in a buseta full of people in the middle of a 
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kilometer-long traffic jam. I felt sorry for those who read the article and moved to Cedritos 
confident that it is a “well connected area.”  
Nonetheless, I had to accept that the other terms they were using were more 
accurate. Cedritos was indeed a quiet residential area with few commercial land uses and 
no industries at all. The neighborhood was largely classified as Stratum 4, which meant 
middle class, or that people living in Cedritos were educated professionals, such as my 
parents, my brothers and I are. This seems to be very attractive in the real estate market of 
Bogotá as the neighborhoods classified as higher strata 4, 5, and 6 were very few, and most 
of the areas in strata 5 and 6 were very expensive. Therefore, if a family with a low income 
wanted to live in an area where their neighbors have a high level of education, Cedritos 
was the best option.   
As I was going to Cedritos weekly to visit my parents looking through the buseta 
window in the usual traffic jam, I started to see how old houses were being demolished to 
make way for new condominiums. However, this time they were not the usual midrise 
buildings, such as those my father had built some years before. This time the new buildings 
were high-rises occupying several plots in the old subdivisions and going up ten to twenty 
stories. Figure 4 shows how Cedritos looked in 2016. These towers sprung up everywhere, 
built after demolishing entire gated compounds that contained five to fifteen townhouses, 
or by joining a couple of lots in front of small streets. I was hearing unprecedented stories 
in the neighborhood, such as “Ms. X had a small house in the cuadra. She was offered a 
thousand million3 by the construction companies. She sold it and moved to a big mansion 
in the savanna.”   
                                                 
3 One thousand million pesos sum roughly USD $350,000 or 1,350 minimum monthly wages in Colombia 
in 2016. 
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Figure 3: Cedritos in the 1980s 
Source: Familia Yunda-Lozano 
 
Figure 4: Cedritos in 2016 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
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More people kept moving in and the prices on condominiums, which used to be 
more affordable than in downtown, continued to increase.  Soon they were as expensive as 
condominiums in more central areas, such as Chapinero. Newspaper articles were 
increasingly talking about the neighborhood. In 2009 there was one titled, “The multiple 
advantages of living in Cedritos;” in 2010 there was another titled, “Cedritos: integration 
between housing and commerce;” and in 2011 there was an article titled, “Cedritos, an area 
of great valorization.”  
As I would return every week to my parents’ home, the traffic became every day 
more chaotic. During my childhood, there were no traffic jams in Cedritos. Later, during 
my teenage years, the first traffic lights were installed, and with them, there formed small 
lines of four or five cars in the crossings. However, now I was spending fifteen minutes in 
the buseta at every single traffic light in the neighborhood. The densification of Cedritos 
seemed to be very illogical: roads were narrow, there was no mass transit to connect it with 
downtown, and the whole area was planned for two-story houses. The implications of this 
poor planning eventually became evident in the utility infrastructure. On September 24, 
2012, the city’s water and sewers utility sent a letter to all the Curadorías Urbanas, the 
private agencies in charge of granting the building permits in the city. The unprecedented 
letter said that the population increase in Cedritos was affecting the utility’s service to the 
neighborhood, which could potentially create a sanitary crisis in the area. Because of this, 
the letter asked the water and sewers utility to stop the granting of any more construction 
permits in the neighborhood, as the company did “not have the capacity to treat the sewage 
of the future population of Cedritos.” 
The image of Cedritos with its new fancy residential towers and new luxury shops 
flooded in its own sewage immediately shocked the neighbors. The community quickly 
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organized and went to the SDP to protest against the new construction. In 2012, the 
newspaper articles about the neighborhood suddenly changed tone: “In Cedritos, the utility 
network cannot cope with growth”; “There is no capacity for more users”; “Neighbors 
claim to not approve more construction permits.” The scandal about the sewers revealed 
the crisis about other infrastructure in the neighborhood. An article from 2013 was titled 
“The roads in Cedritos reached the limit” (Cante 2013):  
[According to mobility expert Eduardo Behrentz, Cedritos is the sector of the city 
that best reflects the consequences of what happens when the number of residents 
in a neighborhood increases without increasing the supply of roads, to withstand 
this load. ‘In Bogotá we have a concentration of very high density, 20,000 
inhabitants per square kilometer, when you have so many people living in such a 
small space the roads cannot cope with the demand,’ explained Behrentz]. 
El norte de la ciudad no ha sido ajeno a estos problemas, según el experto en 
movilidad Eduardo Behrentz, Cedritos es el sector de la ciudad que mejor refleja 
las consecuencias de lo que sucede cuando se incrementa la cantidad de 
residentes en un barrio sin que aumente la oferta de malla vial para soportar esta 
carga. “En Bogotá tenemos una concentración de densidad muy alta, 20,000 
habitantes por kilómetro cuadrado, cuando tienes tanta gente viviendo en un 
espacio tan pequeño las vías no dan abasto,” explicó Behrentz.  
Finally, by the end of 2012, the SDP prohibited the construction of buildings higher 
than six stories in Cedritos. However, at that point, more than 100 permits for high-rises 
had already been issued and remained valid. Negotiations ensued between the SDP, the 
water and sewer utility, and the construction firms. Eventually they announced: “Green 
light is given to 105 construction projects in the north of Bogotá” (Redacción Bogotá 
2012). However, they did not disclose details of how they were going to solve the problem 
of the sewer’s capacity or who was going to pay for the necessary infrastructure 
improvements. This episode related only to the sewers, but the population of Cedritos will 
have to deal in the future with the additional traffic, noise, and unwanted land uses that 
come from unplanned densification. Probably all residents will have to pay through public 
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funds for the improvement to the infrastructure in an area that hosts primarily an affluent 
population, thereby taking resources away from the poorest neighborhoods of the city. In 
2014, the chair of the SDP finally declared, “Densification in Cedritos was done in a 
disorderly way” (Aguilera-Jiménez 2014):  
[Gerardo Ardila, Secretary of Planning, said that the densification in these types 
of sectors, such as Cedritos, ‘is inconvenient because it was done in a disorderly 
and disjointed way. Little by little areas were created where there was no public 
space, and the one that was there was not respected.’ In addition, he explained 
that nobody thought about who should be responsible for the correct provision of 
public services.] 
Gerardo Ardila, secretario de Planeación, afirmó que la densificación en este 
tipo de sectores, como Cedritos, “es inconveniente porque se hizo de manera 
desordenada y desarticulada. Poco a poco se fueron creando zonas donde no 
había espacio público y el que había, no se respetó”. Además, explicó que nadie 
pensó en quién se debía responsabilizar por la correcta prestación de servicios 
públicos. 
This case of Cedritos illustrates how the private sector used the Stratification 
discourse to advertise and profit from the densification of a neighborhood, while 
conducting incremental densification processes without regard of planning policy at the 
larger level. This is exemplified by the words of the chair of the SDP, which show how 
policy makers and property owners are powerless in face of the power of the private 
development sector to determine the growth patterns of the city.   
DENSIFICATION IN LOS OLIVOS: DISLOCATION OR SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT? 
While the case of Cedritos is the case of unplanned densification that I felt most 
personally, there are many more in other parts of the city. Sometimes incremental 
densification has disrupted populations more vulnerable than the middle classes of the 
north of Bogotá. In 2011, I took my first planning job when I joined the SDP team in charge 
of zoning. We were in charge of updating the local land development codes in specific 
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neighborhoods of the city. This job took me to visit a set of neighborhoods of informal 
origin located in the steep cliffs of the Eastern Hills, in an area known as Chapinero Alto. 
These informal settlements are sandwiched in between the forest reserve and one of the 
most expensive areas of the city where luxury residential towers overlook the whole 
savanna. Figure 5 provides a view of Chapinero Alto, showing the mix of high-rises and 
informal settlements in the piedmont. 
One day, as I was conducting my fieldwork, taking notes and pictures, some of the 
residents in one of the settlements of informal origin, called “Los Olivos,” approached me. 
This was a small settlement, long and narrow, of about a hundred houses located along a 
small street that runs parallel to a ravine. The first residents of Los Olivos settled there 
illegally in the 1980s, and since then, they had acquired the provision of utilities, the titling 
of the lands, and the full legalization of the neighborhood. Los Olivos residents were 
concerned about a group of unknown agents that were buying up several properties in the 
area. I talked with members of the community, and at the beginning, it was very hard to 
tell what they were concerned about and what they wanted from the SDP and the local 
development code. Some complained about the massive buyouts and wanted to keep their 
neighborhood as it was, with the small self-built houses. Others who were aware of the 
small size of their properties seemed to want more development rights so that they could 
increase their property values and sell them off to developers. 
At the same time at the SDP offices, we received frequent visits from lawyers and 
realtors who seemed very interested in the revision of the land development code, 
specifically as it related to the Los Olivos neighborhood. They were telling us to keep some 
rights of way in the area, and asking that we include some odd references to older 
regulations in the new local land development code. After speaking with other more 
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experienced colleagues, the situation became clearer.  There was a division in the 
community between those who wanted to sell their lots and move somewhere else, and 
those who wanted to stay and keep the neighborhood as it was. Driving this conflict was a 
group of professionals that represented an investment firm. They wanted to buy the whole 
settlement and build luxury residential high-rise condominiums. The city regulations that 
promoted densification allowed very high densities in areas that were urbanized but not 
built, such as these border areas between the city and the Eastern Hills forest reserve. In 
fact, surrounding Los Olivos there were already many construction sites where towers were 
rising with more than fifteen stories. The loophole for redeveloping Los Olivos was an old 
regulation from the 1990s which considered areas that were informal settlements as unbuilt 
urbanized areas if someone acquired all the properties, demolished the structures, and 
relocated the population somewhere else.  
According to some residents, during the late 2000s the investment firm made an 
alliance with the leaders of the neighborhood association, the Junta de Acción Comunal 
[community action board], to convince the community members to sell their properties. 
Patricia Melo, a community activist, claimed in a meeting I attended: “They negotiated 
with the Junta de Acción Comunal, and their leaders received one million pesos4 for each 
family that sold their house.” In addition, she claimed the investment firm was also using 
the system of Stratification as a way to pressure the original settlers to leave.  
Los Olivos, as other areas of informal origin on the borders with the Eastern Hills, 
is classified as the lowest strata, stratum 1 or 2, and because of that, they receive the largest 
subsidies for utility payments. However, most of these areas of informal origin are small 
                                                 
4 One million pesos sum roughly USD $350 or 1.3 minimum monthly wages in Colombia in 2016. 
Accordingly, one thousand million pesos are roughly USD $350,000 in 2016 
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and they are surrounded by larger areas classified into the highest strata, 5 and 6. John 
Martínez, a resident, commented to the newspaper El Tiempo, “They say that the stratum 
will change, that we will have to pay property taxes that we cannot afford.” Other residents 
were more concerned with the prices the investors were offering for their properties, which 
they viewed as unfair, in comparison with the sky-high prices for luxury properties nearby. 
In the same news article, Hector Martínez was cited as saying, “Our opinion is not worth 
anything. Next to us there are condos that are worth more than 500 million, and to us, who 
are located where they need to grow upwards, they do not give us the right [to set the 
price]”... “[We claim] that they buy us at the right price. My property I do not sell it by the 
appraisal price, I sell the house. That's why my property is worth 1,500 million pesos” 
(Redacción Mi Zona 2013).    
Although some residents resisted the pressures, many others finally sold their 
properties. By 2014, most of the families living in the lowest part of the settlement had sold 
their properties, and the new owners were demolishing the houses and leaving piles of 
debris that gave a very grim image to the whole settlement, and according to members of 
the community, increased their sense of insecurity and the presence of rodents. Figure 6 
shows these demolitions as they were denounced in local newspaper articles. However, the 
representatives of the investment firm, on the contrary, argued that this real estate deal was 
actually done for the benefit of the community. Piedad Gómez, representing the investment 
firm, commented to the newspaper El Espectador that she had been working in the 
neighborhoods in the Eastern Hills for many years. At first she was advocating for the 
improvement of the infrastructure and living conditions. However, she realized that 
actually many families wanted to sell their plots and move somewhere else. She then started 
working with her husband, an economist, to find the investors and design the real estate 
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operation, which allowed the Stratum 1 communities from the Hills to improve by moving 
to neighborhoods of Stratum 3 in the West (Téllez-Oliveros 2015): 
[Then came Edmundo, who is an economist and banker, and he got an investor 
who paid very well to the inhabitants, sums that neither I, nor the owners dreamed 
of receiving for their properties. With that money, they were able to acquire 
houses in neighborhoods like the Minuto de Dios and they improve to Stratum 3. 
Almost all bought houses of two or three stories. We followed them up in their 
change of lives.] 
Después llegó Edmundo, que es economista y banquero, quien consiguió a un 
inversionista, que les pagó muy bien a los habitantes, sumas que ni yo ni los 
poseedores soñaron con recibir por su predio. Con ese dinero pudieron adquirir 
casas en barrios como el Minuto de Dios y pasaron a estrato tres. Casi todos 
compraron casas de dos o tres pisos. Nosotros hicimos ese seguimiento de su 
cambio de vida.  
In a response to the risk of displacement facing residents in Los Olivos, in 2015 the 
left-leaning mayoral administration of Gustavo Petro (2012-2015) declared Los Olivos an 
area of urban renewal under the Colombian Law of Urban Planning of 1997 (Ley 388). 
Under this law, assuming an agreement is reached with at least 51 percent of landowners; 
such a designation provides the local government with the first option to purchase houses 
to implement an urban renewal plan—called Plan Parcial de Renovación Urbana (PPRU). 
A PPRU bestows the municipality with the power of eminent domain to take the properties 
of those who refuse to sell. Following the designation of Los Olivos as a PPRU, the city of 
Bogotá used eminent domain to expropriate the parcels that the investment firm had already 
acquired and made offers to the remaining residents to acquire their houses. The city’s 
intention was to encourage current residents to remain in the community, using the PPRU 
to provide them with new apartments in exchange for their houses in a new, socially mixed 
housing development classified as strata 3 and 4.  
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Figure 5: Panorama of Chapinero Alto 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
 
Figure 6: Demolitions in Los Olivos 
Source: El Espectador (Hernández-Osorio 2015) 
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However, residents for the most part responded negatively to the city’s purchase 
offers, since the threat of expropriation meant that they could still be displaced, albeit by 
the state instead of developers. As a current resident of Los Olivos complained in an 
interview with the newspaper El Tiempo: 
[A developer with a land trust was going to pay us four and five million per 
square meter, and now Metrovivienda (Public land bank) is paying us 350.000 
pesos and less for the same area … You can’t imagine how abused and powerless 
we feel. Even with my land title, now my house is not mine anymore. That a state 
institution (Metrovivienda) is going to expropriate our houses, is astonishing.] 
Un señor privado con una fiduciaria nos estaba pagando cuatro y cinco millones 
de pesos el metro cuadrado y ahora apareció Metrovivienda y el alcalde y nos 
están pagando 350.000 pesos y menos el metro […] No se imagina el abuso y la 
impotencia de saber que la casa ya con escrituras no es mía sino de un ente que 
abusivamente va a expropiarnos nuestras casas, es impresionante 
The expropriations that took place in Los Olivos eventually led to a series of 
lawsuits that put a freeze on land transactions in the neighborhood. Developers sued the 
city government, arguing that Los Olivos was in fact located outside the area targeted for 
urban renewal by the SDP. The area could therefore not legally be set aside for a PPRU, 
rendering the expropriation of properties illegal. In response, the city filed suit against the 
developers, arguing that they had used threats and violence to facilitate their property 
buyouts in the 2000s and 2010s. By the end of 2015, however, Petro finished his term and 
it is still not known what approach the centrist mayor of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa (2016-
2019) who comes back after a fist term between 1998 and 2000, will take on this issue.  
The stories of Cedritos and Los Olivos illustrate the different social and spatial 
conflicts brought by densification in Bogotá. They also show how the Stratification policy 
becomes a principal driver behind the discourse of densification used by the private sector. 
In Cedritos, developers used the Stratum 4 discourse to consolidate the image of the 
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neighborhood as a middle class enclave, where the population has a high level of education 
and land uses were primarily residential, while still the area preserves some degree of 
affordability. This social discourse was developed by the private sector at the margins of 
any public sector process of planning, and thus did not foresee or prevent the burdens that 
densification puts on the existing urban infrastructure, which is very precarious. At the end 
of the day, the private agents captured most of the profits from the densification operation, 
while both the communities and the public sector had to bear the costs. 
On the other hand, the process in Los Olivos shows how the private sector also 
deploys densification as a mechanism of social cleansing mandated by the forces of the 
real estate market. Instead of focusing on the privileges brought by the potential 
complementarity of different strata areas, the evidence from the discussion in the media 
suggests that members of the public view Stratification as a way to legitimize social and 
spatial segregation. In this way, the general view is that the location of a lower strata 
neighborhood within a higher strata area is an anomaly, instead of a social opportunity. In 
this case, densification is used as a tool to “get things back to normal” as it allows the 
Eastern Hills to become homogeneously high strata and the lower income population to 
move to areas suited for their income levels, while still reaping some benefits from 
upgrading from Stratum 2 to Stratum 3. In this case, the private sector, including developers 
and property owners, reaps the most benefits from the real estate operation, while the city 
has to bear the costs of increasing social segregation and infrastructure needs. 
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Chapter 3: Growth management, densification, and private sector 
DENSIFICATION AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN URBAN PLANNING AND DESIGN  
Densification and other theories to shape urban form, such as the garden city or the 
city beautiful, are part of what scholars in planning identify as normative discourses of 
good city form. Planning scholars and practitioners have been developing these theories 
since the early days of planning to face different urban challenges throughout history, such 
as to preserve rural peripheries, eliminate disease, increase efficiency in transit or reduce 
pollution. In this section, I will provide a brief history of the evolution of the normative 
theories of good city form to situate densification among them, explaining the arguments 
that sustained the re-emergence of this approach, first in the urban design field during the 
1970s and then moving on into urban planning.    
Since the early days of urban planning in the late nineteenth century, planners have 
been modeling how cities “ought to be.” The work and proposals of Camillo Sitte (1889) 
in Austria, and Raymond Unwin (1909) in England are examples of these initial approaches 
to study the urban form. Sitte and Unwin introduced to urban planning different techniques 
of field research to sustain their theories. They used criteria such as aesthetics, cultural 
values, or visual comfort to draft a series of humanistic principles or codes for good urban 
environments to face the challenges of overcrowd and disease in the core of the industrial 
metropolises. Collectively these proposals were assimilated into a body of theory known 
as the normative theories of good city form (Lynch 1981).    
Normative ideas of good city form have been always popular among architects, 
landscape architects and urban designers, however not for urban planning scholars, who 
currently use other more humanistic schools of theory and practice. Planning theorists often 
criticize “formalist” approaches to the city, arguing that a reductionist study of form and 
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aesthetics ignore the complex social, political and economic processes involved in cities, 
and consequently overlook the outcomes of spatial proposals in terms of social justice. The 
root of this criticism comes from the revolutionary times of the 1960s. By then, the public 
had realized that the large-scale urban redevelopment projects led by the CIAM 
prescriptive urbanism with the objective of “improving” the urban form of cities were 
displacing minorities and vulnerable communities and promoting social segregation. 
Because of these contradictions, planning theorists and practitioners moved away from the 
physical side of cities to find solutions by exploring theories of politics, economy, and 
sociology (Hall 1988, 334).  
Urban planning entered a period of theoretical disciplinary diversity leading to the 
development of sub-fields such as advocacy, radical and communicative planning. This 
detachment of planning from the formal considerations to address social challenges in 
cities led to the introduction of new non-physical planning solutions to social problems, 
which addressed, among other issues, the enduring problems of concentrated poverty 
(Wilson 1990) and spatial mismatch5 (Kain 1968). Examples of these are inclusionary 
zoning ordinances and the shifting housing policies across the world from direct provision 
by the state in large-scale housing projects, to rental vouchers or demand-side subsidies for 
purchasing affordable housing units.  
However, the physical side of cities during the 1970s and 1980s continued to follow 
a sprawled model shaped by highways, gated communities and suburban shopping malls. 
The persistent problems of concentration of poverty and mismatch, together with the 
environmental discourse against urban sprawl, revived the inquiries on a normative 
                                                 
5 The Spatial Mismatch Theory addressed the challenges to access job opportunities facing impoverished 
minorities in the inner cities of the United States, leading in part to the movement to suburban areas starting 
in the 1960s. 
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approach to a more equitable physical side of urban development. These approaches were 
proposed from beyond the planning discipline, including from architecture and urban 
design (Gunder 2011).  
By the 1970s, densification became the preferred answer from design practitioners 
to solve both environmental and social justice problems at the same time. Important 
architecture and urban design thinkers such as Robert Venturi (born 1925), Aldo Rossi 
(1931-1997), Christopher Alexander (born 1936) and Leon Krier (born 1946), grounded 
these approaches within a body of theory in architecture that opposed the Modernist 
Movement, a theory that had dominated planning practice during the mid-century. They 
formed a new discourse, epitomized as Postmodernist Architecture by Venturi in his book 
“Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture” (1966). This started as a re-examination 
of traditional European city morphologies and architecture from before the twentieth 
century. They proposed that elements of the pre-industrial city, such as buildings with 
medium heights, continuous facades in the block fronts, pedestrian friendly environments, 
street vitality and cultural landmarks were key to improving the community life in cities, 
destroyed during the twentieth century by CIAM urbanism and the increasing suburban 
sprawl in form of auto-centric development. 
Their propositions echoed a renewed interest in Jane Jacobs’s influential book, 
“The death and life of great American cities,” (1961) which advocated for increasing street 
vitality in neighborhoods using urban design strategies such as improving sidewalks, 
incentivizing the mixed-use of buildings, and bringing more transparency to facades. An 
example of the current revitalized concern with these propositions is an emerging branch 
of empirical research that aims to prove the efficiency of these ideas (Sharifi and Murayama 
2013; Sung, Lee, and Cheon 2015; King 2013). 
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Ultimately, the combination of the normative theories of Jacobs about street vitality 
and the proposals of dense urban forms coming from postmodernist architects became the 
theoretical basis of influential urban planning and design movements emerging in the 
1980s (Smyth 1996, 88). One of the best known of these movements, which called for 
dense and compact urban design with neo-traditionalist characteristics, is the New 
Urbanism movement, formed in the United States around the 1990s. New urbanists argue 
that a dense city performs better environmentally than the sprawling suburbs and therefore 
is more sustainable: “the ecological footprint and environmental impacts of cities are larger 
than suburban sprawl per acre, but smaller per capita; and the benefits of cities with a 
grid/network are even greater than non-gridded, fragmented ones” (Talen and Duany 2013, 
59). 
Densification policies also have also the support of a branch of economists and 
environmentalists. The economic rationale of densification policies is that they will 
discourage the use of cars (P. Newman and Kenworthy 1989), save rural land, and use land 
and resources more efficiently, issues working towards a sustainable urban growth. It is 
assumed that the negative outcomes that come from densification in the local context are 
outweighed by the positive impacts at the global environmental scale (Evans 2004, 41). 
Further, on the housing market side, limiting densification with height restrictions may also 
mandate more expensive forms of housing. For instance, Mangin (2014) claims that the 
introduction of height restrictions are often results of “not in my backyard” attitudes in 
consolidated neighborhoods. This restrictions in practice turn cities into preserves for the 
wealthy, a phenomena that he refers to as a New Exclusionary Zoning.        
As a result, since the 1980s, the density and compactness of the urban form 
discourse conjoined rapidly in architecture and urban design, supported in turn by both 
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economists and environmentalists. These joining of forces eventually ended in an 
international consensus regarding a new normative ideal of a city, one that should be dense 
to manage growth efficiently and become sustainable. An example of this new consensus 
is the main urban design policy recommendation from the current United Nations Habitat’s 
International Guidelines for Urban and Territorial Planning:   
Equally important is clarity in the layout of the buildable blocks and plots, 
including appropriate compactness and mixed economic use of the built area, in 
order to reduce mobility needs and service delivery costs per capita. Finally, the 
design should facilitate the strengthening of the social mix and interaction and the 
cultural aspects of the city. (UN-Habitat 2015, 3) 
According to Chapin (2012), this consensus about the benefits of dense cities saw 
its early expression in planning through the growth management measures emerging in the 
United States in the 1960s, including growth control and USB responses to urban sprawl. 
He argues that the densification discourse was adapted to these growth control policies 
responding to the idea that planning should encourage a smarter way of urban growth, or 
“Smart Growth.” This movement advocated for growth control policies to transcend 
regulations concerned only to the urban fringes to encourage also redevelopment and place 
making using incentives to promote specific urban design features in the city core. Chapin 
(2012, 10) however, claims that behind these approaches was a change in mentality towards 
the public sector. Before the 1980s, the power of the public sector to delineate 
comprehensive plans was supported by the need to protect quality of life’s standards in 
cities, threatened by booming population growths. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s, facing 
unemployment, economic stagnation, and a fiscal crisis, the public opinion shifted to reject 
the large public urban planning interventions. The people and the politicians started to 
perceive the government policies as problems or obstacles for economic development and 
therefore policy approaches shifted to facilitate the intervention of the private sector. This 
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led to the rise of “public-private partnerships,” under the idea that these were more efficient 
to develop infrastructure, housing and redevelopment in cities.         
On the other hand, M. Newman (2005) claims that dense development was also 
introduced to urban planning as a result of its association with the concept of “sustainable 
growth.” He argues that studies backed by influential institutions such as the American 
Planning Association, the European Environmental Agency, and the Urban Land Institute 
promoted the association between sustainability and density. However, he criticizes the 
theoretical linkages used by these studies, arguing that planning scholarly research have 
inadequately defined the term “sustainability,” and thus, its association with the physical 
forms of the city constitutes a fallacy. He argues, by reviewing empirical data, that 
conceiving the city solely in terms of form is not sufficient to achieve the elusive goals of 
a sustainable city.  
As an alternative, M. Newman claims that an overarching review of the literature 
suggest sustainability is a concept closer to the terms capacity, fitness, resiliency, diversity 
and balance. He explains how the performance of these indicators in cities are more 
dependent in the “processes” to construct cities instead than on the forms. Hereby, he 
coincides with alternative views of the normative theories of good city form that 
incorporate values such as culture and site to promote that there are several different views 
of the “good city form” (Lynch 1981). These theoretical underpinnings have become the 
basis for a numerous criticism to density and compact city ideas within the practice of 
urban planning. In the next section, I will summarize some of these ideas.  
CRITICISM OF DENSIFICATION POLICIES WITHIN GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
Several planning scholars have criticized the premise that densification in urban 
growth management will increase social mixing; strengthen a sense of “community;” and 
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foster interaction between different people. Critics have deployed sociological and 
economic arguments to demonstrate that densification and compactness policies instead of 
improving the levels of social equity in cities, mostly produce gentrification, displacement, 
racism, and increase social segregation. Some of the criticism uses empirical evidence from 
field research, and some others use theory to both condemn the idea of density as an avenue 
to social mixing in neighborhoods, and its origins rooted in the architecture and urban 
design fields. 
Specifically regarding the empirical research, scholars challenge the theoretical 
association between the physical forms of the city and the characteristics of the 
communities that inhabit them, which grounds the purported social benefits of 
densification policies. Urban designers argue that through the means of controlling the 
urban form, planners can incentivize the proximity between different social groups and 
thus indirectly nurture local economies, tolerance, innovation and equity in the access to 
services and affordable housing (Calthorpe 2009; Florida 2002; CNU and Talen 1999; 
Krier 1984). Planning scholars, on the other hand, have proven that the relationship 
between urban form and social equity is more complex than one-size-fits-all, and density 
may often paradoxically not contribute to the social side of sustainability. 
For instance, Pendall and Carruthers (2003) found that the relationships between 
income diversity and density levels in the metropolitan areas of the United States are not 
linear and equal across all the cases. According to the authors, income diversity may 
depend more on local market forces and political landscapes than on density levels. Talen 
(2006), King (2013) and Dong & Zhu (2015) found strong relationships between social 
diversity with neighborhood’s age and location, independent of the built form 
characteristics. Burton (2000) found that in the United Kingdom increasing density 
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encourages the use of transit and improves the access to services, but it also limits the 
availability of affordable housing. Researchers in the United States and western Europe 
argue that the proliferation of New Urbanism ideas of compact city urban form that 
promote densification processes are encouraging gentrification, and racial or inter-age 
segregation (Day 2003; González and Lejano 2009; Lees 2003; Skovbro 2002; Venerandi 
et al. 2014).  
Scholars in the global south have also found contradictory relationships between 
density and social diversity. Studies in Mumbai (Dave 2011) and Santiago (Aquino and 
Gainza 2014) show that the potential relationship between density and social integration is 
overshadowed by traditional spatial separation among high and lower class neighborhoods. 
In the same way, Aguilar and Mateos (2011) proved that in Mexico City each social class 
occupies separated areas with different densities and urban forms. Therefore, evidence 
suggests that in the global south incentivizing densification will not necessarily affect the 
levels of social integration. Further, more recent studies have pointed out how densification 
in the central areas of Latin American cities have produced gentrification for the cases of 
Santiago (López-Morales 2016) and Mexico City (Delgadillo 2016).  
Other scholars have been undermining the consensus about the benefits of social 
mixture in neighborhoods brought by density. Fainstein, for instance, argues that diversity 
is one of the principles of the Just City, however is one that is constrained by scale.  
On the metropolitan scale it is appropriate to have places where different social 
groups can cluster, however, the intermixture of social conditions at the 
neighborhood scale may, in opposition, create environments of conflict, brought 
by gentrification, ethnic violence, or intergenerational incompatible lifestyles. 
(2010, 67) 
Other researchers have challenged the simplistic way the concepts of “diversity” 
and “community” may be used by urban design practitioners to justify densification 
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policies, often overlooking deeper social and political conflicts within cities (Bell and 
Hartmann 2007; Brain 2005; Harvey 1997; Talen 1999; Vanderbeek and Irazabal 2007).  
Some critics have grounded the conflicts of densification ideologies in their 
philosophical roots in the disciplines of architecture and urban design. During the second 
half of the twentieth century, the communicative branches of planning theory, procedural 
in nature, removed from the planning field the concerns about the urban form. As a result, 
architecture and urban design, disciplines with different systems of value than planning, 
started to monopolize the ways in which space was being developed (Gunder 2011; Talen 
and Ellis 2002). Gunder argues that urban design, for instance, is a field in which 
practitioners only focus on the economic factors, and have no regard for concepts of both 
social and environmental equity. He claims that urban designers have legitimate private 
goals that include economic gain, artistic expression, and professional fame, which are 
avaricious goals that are not appropriate for professional planning practice or beneficial for 
the public good (Gunder 2011, 184–85). On the other hand, in his book “Architecture and 
Utopia” (1976) Tafuri argues that architects as urban designers are functionally integrated 
into the ideological structure of capitalist enterprise, and therefore, is for them impossible 
to work against it. As such, the agents of urban development have largely rejected or 
adapted all of their utopian propositions to other purposes, and as a result, the urban design 
of the contemporary city is currently going through a “creative” crisis (Koolhaas 1994; 
Palermo 2014).  
The criticism presented in this section addresses how the current connections of 
both the architecture and urban design fields with the private sector interests may have 
induced the failure of the present physical planning approaches to cope with the challenges 
of social justice in cities. This point is of special importance when evaluating planning 
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policies in Latin America. The next section describes how the characteristics of the region’s 
social segregation patterns have a key role in determining urban growth. As I will explain, 
these patterns become more important to shape urban growth under the neoliberal urban 
governance that emerged in the Latin American region since the 1980s. 
THE STUDY OF GROWTH PATTERNS IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES 
According to Almandoz (2006), ideas and practitioners from Western Europe and 
North America provided the foundation of Latin American urban planning in the early 
twentieth century, including practitioners of Urbanisme in France and Staedtebau in the 
German speaking area (such as Jean-Claude Nicolas Forestier (1861-1930) working in 
Argentina and Cuba; and Karl Brunner (1887-1960) in Chile and Colombia). The practice 
that became known as Urbanismo is closer to what in the Anglo-American world is called 
“urban design,” than to planning. However, Almandoz explains that later, from the 1960s 
onwards, Urbanismo changed into a practice closer to the ideas of comprehensive planning 
and zoning rooted in North American urban planning. As the field changed under the 
influence of foreign consultants brought from the United States by different international 
cooperation agencies, it became known as Planificación.  
Almandoz suggests that this adaptation of foreign models in the practice of 
planning prevented it from addressing the concerns of the region, such as informal 
urbanization and socio-spatial inequalities. Consequently, research of local planning 
practices that critically analyzes the political and economic motivations behind the urban 
growth patterns is very scarce. Nevertheless, while the Latin American literature has 
traditionally focused on physical planning issues, scholars from sociology have intensively 
analyzed the urban growth in relation to the social segregation patterns and provided 
important lessons for the case of Bogotá.  
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Paradoxically, most urban sociology scholars studying growth patterns in Latin 
America write from a perspective that is also rooted in a foreign model, in this case the 
Chicago school of urban sociology. During the 1920s and 1930s, this school used 
ethnographic research to understand the patterns of interaction between social and physical 
structures producing neighborhood change and urban growth. The best known examples of 
growth theories emerging from this school are the “concentric zone model” proposed by 
Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925) and the “sector model” later proposed by Hoyt (1939). 
For instance, according to Hoyt’s sector model, growth in American cities took form of 
wedges growing from the center to the periphery following the different transit corridors. 
The social groups that occupied these wedges were dependent on the valuation or 
devaluation of land based fundamentally on the land uses. For instance, industries settled 
along railway corridors or water canals to facilitate trade. However, in the process, the 
pollution from these industries led to the devaluation of the surrounding areas. 
Consequently, the working classes moved into these areas finding not only attractive 
prices, but also proximity to their sources of employment. On the other hand, the middle 
and higher classes settled farther away, often along transit corridors, to avoid living in 
polluted industrial areas and in the proximity of the lower-income classes.   
 The study of Latin American metropolises using the Chicago school perspective 
started with a seminal paper by Griffin and Ford (1980). Instead of the sector model, they 
identified the pattern of urban growth in Latin American cities as “polarization,” defined 
as the spatial separation between the educated elite classes and the majority of low-skilled 
class groups, both spatially and based on their housing structures. According to Griffin and 
Ford, these differentiations shaped urban growth in the region. As Figure 7 suggest, cities 
grew following a spine that grew outwards from the Central Business District (CBD) 
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located in the old colonial core towards the suburban fringes. This spine contained the 
major commercial and institutional services of the city. The elites settled close-by and 
stayed there over generations, enjoying easy access to services and employment. The rest 
of the city, by contrast, grew concentrically from the CBD, mainly through informal 
urbanization and unregulated housing construction. Griffin and Ford argued that this 
unique pattern responded mainly to the absence of professional builders and large-scale 
financing for housing production aimed for the lower classes. As a result, Latin American 
rural migrants expanded the city as they needed without state oversight. 
The result of this process was that the lower class areas became homogeneous in 
terms of physical shape, typically following a repetitive pattern of small parcels and self-
help houses. Over time, an observer could only differentiate between neighborhoods by the 
different rate of consolidation of their constructions. For instance, newer houses were made 
mostly of reclaimed materials, wood, fabrics and zinc, whereas older residents often would 
have introduced walls made of brick, mortar and cement. Given this, an observer could 
identify the first inner-ring areas by their better materials and greater heights. Griffin and 
Ford identified the same pattern in the neighborhood’s infrastructural conditions: in the 
inner areas, all the streets had pavement, sewers, and access to services and urban 
amenities. By contrast, farther out, neighborhoods were in the midst of some form of 
consolidation process. Buildings were under constructions, some roads remained unpaved, 
and often construction materials sat exposed in public space. Finally, the fringes were the 
least consolidated areas, mainly occupied by squatter settlements built by recent migrants. 
In these zones, houses were made of waste materials, and the neighborhoods lacked all 
infrastructure.  
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Griffin and Ford used the case study of Bogotá as an example of their proposed 
geographical pattern (Figure 8). They explained how the commercial spine developed in 
Bogotá along the trolley lines expanding to the suburb of Chapinero. According to their 
study, elites had been progressively moving northwards along this axis, as the traditional 
center became an area of social unrest. In addition, the introduction of foreign architectural 
styles from abroad, such as townhouses of Tudor-revival style during the 1930s, required 
much larger properties, rare in a city core made up by traditional Spanish colonial courtyard 
houses. By contrast, people of modest means occupied the outlying areas to the south and 
west in small single-story self-made houses. In the traditional core, people lived in 
neighborhoods made up of old colonial houses intertwined with retail and small artisan 
industries. Griffin and Ford highlighted how these areas have reached stability and 
experienced little change overtime—particularly when juxtaposed with the outer informal 
fringes in Bogotá, which during the 1980s were undergoing substantial change.  
Explaining this process, Griffin and Ford argued that because of lack of private 
capital investment, the central areas did not densify. People then responded to this lack of 
suitable housing offer in the formal market by moving and squatting on the urban fringes. 
The authors describe how people occupied steep cliffs and swamps, areas otherwise 
deemed unsuitable for urbanization. Nevertheless, people showed their optimism despite 
the precariousness of these settlements. They were eager to improve their communities, in 
the hope of one day becoming fully integrated into the formal city and fulfilling the middle 
class dream of owning a house in the suburbs. 
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Figure 7: Latin American City Structure diagram 
Source: A Model of Latin American City Structure (Griffin and Ford 1980) 
 
Figure 8: Structure of the city applied to Bogotá 
Source: A Model of Latin American City Structure (Griffin and Ford 1980) 
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More recently, however, scholars suggest that polarized urban growth has changed 
into a pattern called “Fragmentation.” Janoschka (2002) explains that fragmentation define 
the unique pattern of urban sprawl that Latin American cities experienced since the 1990s, 
distinguished by the consolidation of urban islands connected by highways in the former 
mostly rural peripheries. This model resembled the North American sprawl but with a 
structural difference: while urban islands in the United States are mainly car-oriented 
middle class enclaves, in Latin America, social groups with different income levels settle 
isolated from one another within these islands. As a result, in the fringes, different urban 
forms and social groups co-habit. They could be upper-class security enclaves, mass-
produced housing for the lower classes, or isolated squatter settlements. Some of them are 
located in close proximity to one to another, but frequently with limited morphological and 
functional connectivity. There are many examples of scholars that identify and analyze this 
same pattern across the region. Caldeira (1996) and Irazábal (2006), suggest that in Brazil 
examples of fragmentation are the recent sprawling gated communities in the periphery of 
Sao Paulo and Curitiba. Schapira and Pineda (2008) identify fragmentation in the new 
developments at the fringes of Buenos Aires; while Borsdorf, Hidalgo and Sánchez (2007) 
recognize it in the peripheries of Santiago and Valparaiso. Santana-Rivas (2013) and 
Otálora-Moya (2014) have also recognized this same pattern of islands of wealth and 
poverty in the savanna of Bogotá.   
Other papers aim to offer explanations to the phenomenon of fragmentation in the 
region. Caldeira and Holston (2005) explain that fragmentation in Brazil was the result of 
the loosening of state control over land-use and urban morphology. They recount the 
experience of the Brazilian planning framework in its transition from a modernist to a 
neoliberal paradigm. In the past, top-down urban development shaped major urban areas 
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like Brasilia, using the centralized power and resources of an authoritarian government. 
Currently, however, states have retreated from direct intervention in city development, 
allowing private developers to control both the location and physical features of new 
settlements.  
Thibert and Osorio (2014) (citing Roberts (2005) and Borsdorf and Hidalgo (2010)) 
propose a comprehensive set of explanations for the fragmentation process from a political-
economic perspective. They explain that between the 1950s and 1970s, national 
governments in Latin America imposed the Import Substitution Industrialization system 
(ISI), an economic model focused on the replacement of imported goods with domestic 
production. According to the authors, this economic model was the main cause of the 
pattern of polarization in the Latin American cities, as it perpetuated the monopolistic 
practices of large landowners and industries or authoritarian governments controlled by 
elites. However, they argue that the widespread neoliberal reforms during the 1990s 
changed the social and spatial structure of the urban regions. During ISI, the closed 
economy guaranteed the social status of the elites and their physical location; but during 
the 1980s and 1990s, the reforms opened the door to global capital to invest in real estate 
and infrastructure development. As a result, these new policies triggered different changes 
and spatial transformations: Firstly, land markets were deregulated. During ISI, the control 
over the rural areas surrounding cities was tight, as government officials or powerful 
families—owners of large tracts of land in the peripheries—restrained any development 
that would put their social status in jeopardy. Neoliberalism loosened the control of both 
the oligarchy and state over rural lands, and consequently, unleashed massive speculation 
and development pressures on the urban fringes.  
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The second change that Thibert and Osorio mention was the increasing inequality 
that came with the flexibilization of labor markets. While this change allowed economic 
growth to become more dynamic, it also put unfamiliar pressures over the middle classes. 
People suddenly faced much more precarious employment stability, which further reduced 
their access to mortgages. As a result, rising property values displaced households from 
the city center. They relocated further out, often to areas still without proper urban services. 
Finally, the third change was the construction of highways around the core of many cities. 
Municipalities with more available capital invested primarily in private automobile transit 
infrastructure, mainly to emulate the urban policy focus and ways of life of North American 
cities. These investments have increased greatly the accessibility and value of former 
marginal areas in the urban peripheries.  
Thibert and Osorio explore three spatial trends that have resulted from 
fragmentation. First, the suburbanization of the elites, and increasingly the middle classes, 
has altered the traditional division between the core and the periphery, rooted in the 
polarization period. Second, the increase in the physical proximity of the elites and the 
lower income groups, as developers build new residential projects in the center and in the 
periphery in close proximity to traditionally poorer areas. Third, the increase in restricted-
entry areas, a byproduct of the fortification of the new high-end settlements in proximity 
with poorer areas. 
Whether the outcomes of these fragmentation processes are beneficial or harmful 
to Latin American societies divide scholars. Some argue that this recent transformations 
have hindered the social conditions of the urban poor. For instance, researchers in the 1960s 
and 1970s found in the shantytowns of Latin America a community with strong social ties 
and solidarity advancing itself through mutual aid (Gilbert and Ward 1985; Perlman 1976; 
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Turner 1976). Nevertheless, when some scholars revisited the same informal settlements, 
forty years later, they observed ubiquitous violence, social immobility, and persistent 
segregation (de la Rocha 2001; Eckstein 1990; Perlman 2010; Roberts 2011). Conversely, 
other researchers, specifically in the Chilean case, claim that the new proximity of high-
income groups to low income groups may also have brought unexpected benefits. Sabatini 
and Brain (2008) and Rasse (2015) claim that the colonization by the middle class of 
formerly impoverished ghettos in Santiago may be improving the conditions of those 
groups in poverty. They argue that for the urban poor, it is not enough to be property-
owners: they also need to be surrounded by a safe, diverse, and inclusive urban 
environment, an outcome that fragmentation is able to provide. Salcedo (2010), for 
instance, followed the struggle of a squatter community in “La Toma de Peñalolen,” in 
eastern Santiago, to avoid relocation to new houses in the periphery. Middle class 
communities currently surround their informal settlement once located in the fringes of the 
city, which brings them employment opportunities and better urban services. They 
succeeded in modifying the relocation project to stay in place, building a case model for a 
new approach to low-income housing policy in Chile. This Chilean group of scholars has 
criticized the consolidation of poverty ghettos in the periphery, a result of the neo-
liberalization of low-income housing policy. Instead, they have been introducing to Latin 
American housing research concepts such as mixed-income areas.  
These new models have empirically demonstrated that proximity between social 
classes may foster networks of mutual benefit. In the Bogotá case, scholars have explored 
the effects of improved transit systems in the patterns of fragmentation. Bocarejo et al. 
(2016) conducted a study to evaluate if the new infrastructure implemented for the BRT 
had disturbed the traditional segregation patterns of the city. They found no evidence up to 
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2005 that the implementation of the transit system had made the central areas of Bogotá 
more fragmented. However, they found some evidence that social fragmentation increased 
in the peripheral areas served by local feeder routes. 
While the bodies of literature that deal with polarization and fragmentation explain 
in detail the patterns, social consequences, opportunities, and political and economic causes 
of these phenomena, they do little to explain how polarization and fragmentation has been 
operationalized through the specific urban planning policies. Therefore, I incorporated to 
my review a set of research from the public policy perspective. This branch of literature, 
discussed in the next section, studies the interaction, interests and power relations between 
the public and private sector in developing urban policy. 
THE POWERFUL ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICAN PLANNING 
Different scholars have studied the private sector’s leading role in Latin American 
urban planning policy. In this section, I am highlighting the contribution of Koch (2015), 
who coined the term “Arranged Urbanism” defined as the “infiltration of formal 
institutions through informal practices and the exertion of different types of power.” Koch 
applies this definition to the private construction companies and large owners of properties 
influencing urban planning policy in cities. These practices are unwritten and hence 
informal, but they strongly shape the behavior of public officials and are therefore very 
controversial. Koch quotes Mac Leod and Jones (2011) to explain these contradictions, 
arguing that in Latin America informality is tolerated within powerful private sector 
groups, but it is criminalized when it occurs within vulnerable communities such as 
informal settlements.  
Koch’s Arranged Urbanism also fits within the literature that deals with the 
conflicts of weak or corrupt public institutions within neoliberal governance in Latin 
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American cities. Nuissi et al. (2012) studying the case of public-private partnerships in 
Chile, argue that one of the challenges of governments in the region is the primarily weak 
position of both local and regional authorities in face of powerful interest coalitions. This 
weak position of the institutions lead to different patterns of public policy tailored by the 
private sector. These behavior have been identified across the interventions of the public 
policy in different fields and typified by Levitsky and Helmke (2006) in the Mexican case, 
as “dedazo,” clintelism in Brazil, legislative ghost coalitions in Ecuador, and elite power-
sharing in Chile.  
Using the specific case of Barranquilla, Colombia, Koch describes how the private 
sector’s control of public policy under neoliberal governance shapes the urban form and 
thus becomes a type of “Urbanism.” He used the implementation of the Plan de 
Ordenamiento Territorial (POT) [territorial ordering plan] of 2000. His research found that 
authorities delineated this plan through informal recommendations from construction 
companies, mostly because of the absence of qualified professionals in the city. The result 
of this has been the development of a fragmentary built form, in direct contradiction with 
the initial ideology and goals of the plan presented to the public. Physically, this led to the 
development of socially selective walled enclaves and shopping malls in unplanned areas 
of the city. These architectural typologies have failed to connect with the existing city and 
have not created space for parks and other public amenities for the public good. I found 
another example of Arranged Urbanism in Bogotá, studied in the master’s thesis of 
Lozano-Triviño (2014). She analyzed the development of gated high-rise communities 
during the 2000s in a large in-fill area in the northwest, and found similar tailored 
requirements included in the urban regulations that obliged the development of a single 
architectural type. This type privileged the profit of large-scale construction firms, owners 
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of the land, but did not contributed to the improvement of the urban public spaces in the 
city. 
The work on fragmentation in Latin American cities Arranged Urbanism under 
neoliberal urban governance combine to frame my overarching argument. Starting in 1979, 
models of growth control and densification developed in the United States and Western 
Europe inspired planning approaches to control urban form in Bogotá. However, as urban 
sociologists suggest, unique Latin American patterns of social segregation largely shape 
urban growth, and thus the formal and imported approaches to planning policy fail to 
address the complexities of the region’s urban problems. This may contribute to forms of 
Arranged Urbanism, as neoliberal governance facilitates the control of urban policy by the 
interests of the private sector. The combination of growth control and arranged urbanism 
has produced incremental densification in ways that reflect local patterns of social 
segregation. 
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Chapter 4: Research methods 
DEFINITIONS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS PROPOSED  
In my investigation, I explore the relationship between a social equity policy, 
Stratification, and urban development in Bogotá. More specifically, because Stratification 
serves to cement patterns of social segregation in Bogotá, it may help explain changes in 
the built form and the social composition of neighborhoods. Stratification is a national 
policy that divides the city in six strata zones based on the built form characteristics of 
neighborhoods at the city block scale. The Colombian authorities developed this system 
during the 1970s and 1980s to distribute cross-subsidies for infrastructure improvements 
among people in various income groups, by charging a subsidy on utilities payments.  
Incremental densification is traditionally the most common process of 
redevelopment in the central areas of Bogotá (Rincón-Avellaneda 2004, 86–87). It works 
through the systematic replacement of low-rise row or detached houses with apartment 
condominiums, a process that responds to upgrades in the land development code. Under 
this system, city authorities first delineate areas suited for densification using the 
tratamientos system, and then private developers are encouraged to redevelop, for profit, 
properties in those areas in order to increase the population densities inside the city. 
However, private developers exercise a lot of control over the densification process, 
because they are free to choose the location of projects within the tratamientos. 
I developed a set of graphs to explain the complex articulations of planning, socio-
spatial segregation patterns, and private sector interest and actions. First, the diagram in 
the top of Figure 9 represents the “Sprawled City” which is the model of development that 
distinguished United States’ cities during the twentieth century and that was put into place 
in Bogotá between the 1940s and the 1970s. This model is based on the private sector 
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determining the growth patterns and the urban form. Later on, based on the private sector’s 
initiatives, the public sector sets land-use and density limits. In this case, the free market 
appraises the land based on its location in relation to infrastructure, environmental and 
social assets, and for-profit-developers determine the morphological characteristics of the 
city according to their own prediction of market demands. Codes incentivize economic 
development in the real estate industry in order to increase taxation for the city. The 
sprawled model, however, relies heavily on the fair competition between developers that 
offer a sufficient supply of housing products, and citizens’ demands, rationality, and 
“freedom to choose.” However, some in the United States argue that the sprawled model 
became unsustainable, in part because access to housing is limited by an individual’s 
capacity to spend what the market demands, and because the model incentivizes the 
consumption of land and resources to expand the urban infrastructure.   
Figure 9-bottom represents the European alternative to the sprawled city, which 
was partially implemented in Bogotá prior to the 1940s, and then again after the 1980s as 
a way to preserve the natural environment from urbanization and reduce socio-spatial 
segregation. I named this model of growth the “Compact City.” The compact city requires 
an inverse process from that of the sprawled city. In compact cities, the public sector 
produces a normative image of a city that controls expansion and uses resources more 
efficiently. The private sector develops the city in compliance with the public sector 
through stringent planning regulations and incentives. The most commonly used regulation 
are growth control measures, such as Urban Services Boundaries (USB), incremental 
densification policies, form-based codes or public-private partnerships. The private or 
public sector intervenes to accommodate new residents in the city by densifying the 
centrally located areas or transit oriented developments. 
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Figure 9: Diagrams explaining the Sprawled and Compact city. 
Illustration by the author. 
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This allows for the implementation of energy-efficient transit systems, making air cleaner 
and people healthier as they reduce the distances travelled by private vehicles and 
incentivize walking and biking. Some argue that this form also increases social equity, 
incentivizing the interaction of different social groups by compelling them to live in 
proximity.  
However, growing cities with stark social inequalities and local governments prone 
to cooptation by private sector interests face challenges that neither the United States nor 
the European model predicts. For instance, as Figure 10 suggests, in the “Uneven City” the 
public sector may attempt to establish a growth boundary to decrease the supply of land 
and incentivize densification; however, facing booming population growth and stark 
private forces, the public sector is unable to control urban development. As a response, the 
private sector set its own growth patterns informally at the margin of public sector control. 
These growth patterns are moderated by social class differences, determining urban forms 
and land uses.  
As a result, peripheral developments often either take the form of gated communities for 
the wealthy, or substandard, illegal settlements for the very poor. In the central city, 
densification is uneven; it can take the form of multi-family luxury condominiums for the 
wealthy or incremental self-help housing for the very poor. This causes urban development 
to become ungovernable and unpredictable. Therefore, planners in the uneven city are 
unable to predict the location, amount, or form of housing or economic opportunities. They 
are therefore unable to predict and provide needed infrastructure and as a result, life quality 
decreases. 
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Figure 10: Diagram explaining the case of Bogotá. 
Illustration by the author. 
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 At the neighborhood scale, such biased land markets reproduce inequalities in the 
built form as illustrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12. Following what I observed in the case 
of Bogotá, the evolution of the urban form is different between higher- and lower-income 
neighborhoods. Figure 11 follows the historical evolution of an archetypical high-income 
block, classified as stratum 4, 5, or 6. While the plots start as suburban housing, the 
successive upgrades in the land development code transform them first to mid-rise 
condominiums and later into high-rises. This evolution does not respond to an overarching 
policy objective but rather to a real estate rationale based on the maximization of profit. In 
this case, authorities upgrade or restrict the code based on the influences of landowners and 
developers that are seeking to maximize their returns at any specific point of time. These 
controls incentivize monopolistic practices in real estate by restricting the supply of land 
deemed for densification. 
On the other hand, Figure 12 represents the historical evolution of a lower-income 
block, classified as stratum 1, 2 or 3. In this case, facing the unavailability of resources, 
zoning codes are manipulated to remain flexible. While in expansion areas this flexibility 
allows the production of housing through “sweat equity” that is very affordable, in the 
consolidated areas the freedom to build anything facilitates the action of slum lords that 
produce poor living conditions and overcrowd, leading to neighborhood decay, vacancy, 
and the invasion of unwanted land uses. Alternatively, these processes lead to speculation 
with land prices and gentrification in well-located areas.   
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1. In Bogotá, during the 1960s, according to the zoning plans of the 1940s and 1960s, the areas 
in the north were initially built as high-income single-family homes. 
  
2. The regulations of the 1990s allowed moderate densification to turn single-family houses into 
multifamily mid-rise condominiums 
  
3. Zoning regulations in the 2000s further allowed more densification in already consolidated 
properties to maximize profits from land markets. 
Figure 11: Densification pattern for areas of high income in Bogotá 
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1. The ordinances of the 1940s and 1960s delineated working-class neighborhoods with high 
densities, minimum lot sizes, and poor infrastructure standards. 
  
2. The areas soon were densified through self-help expansion of the houses and changes of use 
in the face of height limitations and little oversight from the municipality. 
  
3. Currently, neighborhoods are experiencing further densification and/or decay. Some are 
experiencing built-form transformations from invading commercial or light industry land uses. 
Figure 12: Densification pattern for areas of low income in Bogotá 
  
71 
With these definitions in mind, my hypothesis is that Bogotá follows the “Uneven 
City” model. Specifically, the Stratification policy not only embodies and reproduces the 
system of socio-spatial segregation: Stratification also influences the decision-making of 
private sector developers and therefore serves to shape the incremental densification 
patterns in Bogotá.  To study this phenomenon, I set out to address the overarching 
question, Does urban densification in Bogotá relates to the policy of Stratification?  To 
answer this question, I proposed the following research objectives: 
1) Determine if a relationship exists between incremental densification and 
Stratification.  
2) Identify the consequences of this relationship in terms of spatial disparities in the 
production of new areas of housing and nonresidential use. 
3) Identify the consequences of this relationship in terms of socio-spatial segregation. 
4) Explore the mechanisms that facilitate this relationship.  
In order to answer the proposed research questions I used a “convergent parallel 
mixed methods” approach. Creswell defines this method in the following way:  
Convergent parallel mixed methods is a form of mixed methods design in which 
the researcher converges or merges quantitative and qualitative data in order to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. In this design, the 
investigator typically collects both forms of data at roughly the same time and 
then integrates the information in the interpretation of the overall results. 
Contradictions or incongruent findings are explained or further probed in this 
design. (2013, 46) 
I believe this approach to mixed methods design was most appropriate to address 
the research problem, as it calls for a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data 
to explore the findings from different sources. As I learned during my preliminary 
interviews, the location of incremental densification projects in Bogotá depends on 
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quantifiable variables such as the location of the project in relation to the physical features 
of the lot, the neighborhood, and the accessibility to transportation systems. However, it 
also depends on qualitative phenomena such as the historical development of the local 
zoning ordinances and the social perceptions about the site, which deeply influence the 
local housing market. 
For these reasons, in order to address my first two research objectives “1) determine 
if a relationship exists between incremental densification and Stratification;” and “2) 
identify the consequences of this relationship in terms of spatial disparities in the 
production of new areas of housing and nonresidential land-use” I used quantitative 
methods. Specifically, I based my analysis on the data of building permits granted in the 
period 2010 to 2015 in Bogotá compiled by the Direction of Information, Cartography, and 
Statistics at the SDP. This database includes information about each permit’s location, date, 
and the approved use, height, and total area.  
To address my third research objective, to “identify the consequences of this 
relationship in terms of socio-spatial segregation,” I relied on quantitative socio-economic 
data from the multipurpose surveys that the DANE conducts every seven years. Finally, to 
meet my fourth objective to explore the mechanisms that facilitate the relationship between 
incremental densification and Stratification, I relied on qualitative data. First, in order to 
get the perspectives of agents of urban development, during the summer of 2016 I 
conducted and recorded thirteen anonymous in-depth interviews. Second, I reviewed the 
comprehensive city plans that were approved since 1979, the Stratification regulations, and 
other historical planning documents and local literature.  
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THE MIXED-METHODS APPROACH IN URBAN PLANNING RESEARCH 
Planners have borrowed research methods from many disciplines (Dandekar 1986, 
42). They use research approaches to obtain information to advance the field both in theory 
and in praxis. Creswell defines research approaches as “plans and the procedures for 
research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detail methods of data collection, 
analysis and interpretation” (2013, 33). Scholars define them as quantitative or qualitative 
in nature; however, some have been suggesting a third approach called mixed methods. In 
planning and other disciplines, the concept of mixed methods challenges the idea that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are mutually exclusive and a researcher must choose 
to use only one of the approaches in a project. Creswell, for instance, claims that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are the two extremes of a continuum on which mixed 
methods stands in the middle (2013, 34).  
This idea that mixed methods holds the middle ground is recent. It was only in the 
late twentieth century that methodologists accepted the mixed methods approach as a valid 
type of research. According to Friedmann, the planning field was born during the 
eighteenth century from the concept that scientifically based knowledge could be applied 
for society’s improvement (1987, 51). In the early twentieth century, this concept enjoyed 
remarkable success with Taylor’s theories of scientific management, which attracted even 
the most radical to observe society as a large workshop and planning as a form of social 
engineering (1987, 56). However, in planning as in many other fields, the social revolutions 
of the 1960s led to the recognition of methods that previously had been considered 
unscientific, invalid, and inconsistent. For instance, Davidoff (1965) made the discipline 
recognize that there are different groups in society with different needs that may result in 
different ways of planning. At the time, Altshuler (1965) also advocated that planners 
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recognize their own limitations that were affecting their pursuit and conception of “the 
common good.” In response, qualitative methods became well suited to account for these 
different social dimensions and planners’ limitations and egalitarian goals (Silverman 
2015). Consequently, these new theoretical underpinnings and the revived interest in 
qualitative methods, as well as other forms of planning, such as advocacy, radical, and 
communicative planning emerged, and shifted the planning discipline from physical-
technical plan making, to policy analysis that had a primary concern with social systems. 
Peter Hall described this sudden shift:  
In 1955, the typical newly graduated planner was at the drawing board, producing 
a diagram of desired land uses; in 1965, s/he was analyzing computer output of 
traffic patterns; in 1975, the same person was talking late into the night with 
community groups, in an attempt to organize against hostile forces in the world 
outside (1988, 334). 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) claim that a new revolution in research methods 
is currently underway. The mixed methods approach is gaining in popularity as a 
framework that incorporates the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative designs. 
More importantly, it allows researchers to select different approaches “with respect to the 
underlying research questions, rather than with regard to some preconceived biases about 
which research paradigm should have hegemony in social science research” (2004, 23–24). 
Dandekar (1986) argues that planners often have misconceptions about the 
relationship between quantitative and qualitative research approaches. The first is that the 
use of one excludes the use of the other, and that a planner has to choose between becoming 
either a quantitative or a qualitative researcher. Dandekar opines that there is no reason that 
both approaches should be mutually exclusive, but rather they are complementary. He 
points out that the decision to choose one approach or the other should be based on the 
reasons for collecting information. If a planner wants to claim that his data is representative 
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of a population, s/he must choose a quantitative approach. If, on the contrary, s/he wants 
to gain understanding of a process and how that process is connected to a system, a 
qualitative approach would be more suitable. 
In this case, following Dandekar’s ideas, I am using the mixed methods approach 
because I want to understand the process of densification in Bogotá and connect it to local 
patterns of socio-spatial segregation. However, in order to increase the validity of these 
claims, I must also use quantitative data to show the patterns and their effects in space. 
This use of mixed methods research also has the advantage of protecting the investigation 
against the pitfalls of using quantitative or qualitative methods only, which I will address 
next.  
Scholars, especially after the 1950s, have identified multiple pitfalls to quantitative 
research. Quantitative research has been defined as an approach that tests objective theories 
by examining the relationships among variables. These variables should be measured 
numerically in order to be analyzed through statistical procedures. The analysis is 
performed in a deductive manner to gather specific conclusions from more general data. 
Quantitative researchers set up their studies to avoid biases to the greatest extent possible. 
They use strategies to ensure the validity and reliability of the procedures and thereby 
protect the integrity of the research and control for alternative explanations. Research is 
required to be specific enough to allow for the replicability and generalizability of results. 
Traditional quantitative research methods include surveys and experiments (Creswell 
2013).  
Although quantitative analysis was designed to be objective and protect against 
biases, it does not always do so. Krenz and Sax (1986) critiqued the assumption that 
quantitative methods are always objective, since the intrinsic biases in researchers’ 
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preconceptions always influence the results of an experiment. The usual example of this 
problem is the racist biases that commonly influenced quantitative research done before 
the 1960s. Krenz and Sax’s second critique was that quantitative experiments are unable 
to yield truth. The post-positivist principle that there are no absolute truths leads to a 
situation in which quantitative experiments may be used just to determine evidence for 
either rejecting or not rejecting a hypothesis. Therefore, through a quantitative approach 
science cannot advance on solid ground to build theory. 
Krenz and Sax point out several additional issues that they perceive as failures of 
the quantitative approach. Firstly, they claim that too often quantitative analysis is poorly 
done. A researcher can control mathematically the results of an experiment, for instance 
by increasing the universe of individuals included, or by asking trivial questions just for 
the sake of gaining statistical significance. This is a problem, because through these 
methods a researcher can influence the results of an experiment. Secondly, they argue that 
quantitative researchers poorly understood causality. Often researchers using such methods 
are unable to distinguish complex relationships. The authors provide the following 
example: for many years medieval physicians believed that malaria was caused by bad air 
in the lowlands, and that therefore individuals that built in the hilltops were immune to the 
disease. With the discovery of the parasite that caused malaria and its transmission by the 
Anopheles mosquito the true cause of the disease was uncovered. However, contemporary 
scientists know that is not only the presence of the mosquito that triggers a malaria 
epidemic; there is also a set of social and economic conditions that facilitate the 
transmission of the disease; for instance, improper sewage systems or bad cleaning habits 
in residential areas. Krenz and Sax attribute misconceptions like those stated to the 
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“infrequency with which [quantitative] researchers think about important epistemological 
issues” (1986, 67). 
On the other hand, qualitative research also has been the focus of scholarly critique. 
In qualitative research, investigators seek to understand the meanings that individuals and 
groups ascribe to human issues and problems. The process of research involves an 
inductive analysis through which more general patterns are observed in specific data, and 
it is best employed in the analysis of emerging or past questions and procedures. It focuses 
on the meaning of a situation in order to render its complexity. Qualitative methods include 
narrative research, grounded theory, ethnographies, and case studies (Creswell 2013).  
Dandekar (1986) advocated for employing more qualitative research in planning. 
He claimed that it offers planning researchers advantages over quantitative methods in that 
qualitative research can be effective when data sets are scarce. Planning, as an action-
oriented discipline, needs methods that are scientific, but it often does not allow the time 
and resources to gather quantitative data sets that are specific enough to be used in all 
situations. Such situations include research in remote communities where there is no 
available complete or up-to-date information about the conditions of the population or 
about the built environment. In addition, databases might not contain the particular 
qualitative factors, such as values, biases, attitudes, and historical, political, or cultural 
precedents that are needed to understand a problem. Finally, as in research in the 
humanities, planners have to take into account that public agencies might not adequately 
collect data or informants might not provide accurate information about the conditions they 
experience.  
The case of Stratification in Bogotá provides a good example of how a single 
approach using only either quantitative of qualitative methods may mislead an 
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investigation. Many local research projects use the strata as a proxy for the income levels 
of city residents, employing this indicator for analysis in different fields. These analyses 
infer that population characteristics are different between each of the six strata. However, 
they overlook the fact that the Stratification indicator is not constructed with income 
information, but rather it is based on the physical form of the city. In this investigation, I 
found that the education levels of the population are very similar within strata 1 and 2—in 
which residents have mostly elementary or high school only—and within strata 4, 5, and 
6—where most residents are college educated. This renders the separation into six levels 
arbitrary. It is evident then, that complex social perceptions among city residents and 
officials play a strong role in this system and they must not be disregarded. Even though 
the strata do not account for levels of income or education, every Bogotano perceives that 
these variables are associated with the place one lives, and therefore the Stratification 
indicator is present in every viewpoint, decision, or evaluation that city residents conduct 
in their everyday lives. This point is proven in the common use of expressions such as, ¡Se 
le salió el estrato! [Your stratum was revealed!], which describes when a person behaved 
in a way that is associated with a lower education or income level to which s/he belongs. 
Alternatively, we say, Se cree de mejor estrato [S/he believes herself/himself of a better 
stratum], when a person behaves in a manner associated with a higher income/education 
s/he has. We also inquire about the stratum of a place when we visit a site and are delighted 
or annoyed by its aesthetic qualities, and when we aim to live and attend sites with people 
of the same stratum as ours.  
In addition, it is common for people to look for a partner of “the same stratum” and 
to feel awkward about being friends or going to school with people living in a lower 
stratum. This does not mean that people of different strata do not interact with each other, 
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but that the Stratification system is important for the people because it represents the 
differences of income, education level, and cultural background in a single indicator. This 
shows how perceived social class is something very important for the Bogotanos. These 
contradictions support my claim that in order to understand any phenomena, in such a 
complex context, it is necessary to maintain a critical view. I believe cross validating both 
the quantitative and qualitative evidence helps in this respect 
THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS USED 
As my first step, I gathered quantitative information and triangulated it with initial 
qualitative findings. In January 2016, I visited the SDP where I met with former colleagues 
and discussed the best sources of information. They recommended that I use the latest 
version of the Mapa de Referencia [reference map], which was published in December, 
2015. This map uses a GIS database compiled by the Infraestructura de Datos Espaciales 
del Distrito Capital (IDECA), and contains vector information on streets, city blocks, 
parcels, and building footprints for Bogotá, and is publicly available online. I combined 
this information with that I pulled from the database of building permits from 2010 
(provided by the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics at the SDP), and used 
ArcGIS to conduct statistical and spatial analyses and produce my own maps.  
 To obtain information regarding the social and economic characteristics of the 
population, beyond that provided by the stratum indicator, and facing the outdated 
information from the 2005 census, I used the projections of population per block for the 
year 2011 that were elaborated by the SDP and the DANE. For the social and economic 
data, I used the multipurpose surveys, Encuesta Multipropósito (EM) [multipurpose 
survey] for the years 2007 and 2014, which I obtained from the DANE website. I performed 
social segregation assessments using the open-source software Geo-Segregation Analyzer 
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(Apparicio et al. 2014). Finally, I combined all the information into in a single database 
and ran an econometric analysis using the software R and ArcGIS. The main limitation of 
the quantitative data was the short time period for which information was available. To 
work around this, I triangulated the results of my database analysis with qualitative sources 
of information. 
Consequently, during my second stage of fieldwork during the summer 2016, I 
gathered qualitative data. I conducted thirteen anonymous in-depth interviews. Four of 
these were interviews with policy makers working in the management of Stratification and 
zoning, and in the team working on the new comprehensive plan at the SDP. I conducted 
another five interviews with urban planning scholars working in different local universities, 
and one with a locally recognized senior urban planning consultant with more than thirty 
years of experience. Finally, I conducted three audio-recorded in-depth interviews with 
developers who work at different scales in the city, and I had several informal 
conversations with others who declined to give formal interviews.  
I used the database of construction permits obtained for the quantitative part to 
identify which developers were working in different areas of the city, so that I could 
approach developers working across different strata. Very few of the developer firms 
contacted responded positively to my phone calls requesting formal interviews. Those 
persons who responded positively were primarily those working in large construction firms 
located in the North of the city. The firms involved in projects in the Center and South, 
mostly small or single person firms, responded negatively to my calls. They said they were 
not interested in an interview, deliberately delayed our meeting dates, or simply not show 
up to the appointments we set. As an alternative research strategy, I visited new building 
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projects and had informal discussions with the persons in charge of showing condominiums 
to potential customers. In several projects, these were the developers themselves. 
The other agents of city development that I interviewed were urban planning 
professionals with several years of experience who often move between the private sector, 
the public sector, and academia. In the local context, the differences between these sectors 
are blurred since the same professionals alternate between jobs in these different sectors. 
For instance, academics and private consultants in urban planning become public officials 
when their political party is in power, and they leave office when there is a change in the 
municipal administration, at which point they go back to work in academia or the private 
real estate industry. As an example, currently under Mayor Peñalosa’s administration, the 
chair of the SDP is the former head of the private urban planning consulting firm Contexto 
Urbano, and many of the directors appointed in the SDP’s departments are former 
employees of the same firm. In the same way, under the previous administration of leftist 
Mayor Petro, the head of the SDP was the former chair of the Instituto de Estudios Urbanos 
[Urban Studies Institute] of the National University in Bogotá. When Petro left office, he 
re-assumed his academic appointment. I contacted the urban planning professionals, 
academics, or independent consultants by prioritizing those who had worked in the POT or 
on the local land development codes in each of the Unidades de Planeación Zonal [zonal 
planning units] (UPZs). I also reviewed the academic literature and contacted scholars who 
had published academic papers about real estate development, zoning, and Stratification in 
the city.  
After conducting the interviews, I transcribed their audio recordings. The consent 
of the interviews, as required by the Institutional Review Board of The University of Texas 
at Austin, includes the guarantee that I will not disclose the identity of any of the 
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interviewees. I will therefore identify them only by their job in either the public sector, the 
private sector, or academia, and their approximate years of experience in the field. In cases 
where personal names were mentioned in the interviews, I will represent them only with 
randomly selected initials. I finally coded the transcripts of the interviews and my notes to 
identify behavioral patterns and perceptions that explain the information drawn from the 
quantitative part.  
Additionally, in order to complement the interviews, I conducted several field 
surveys in different parts of the city, documenting with pictures and notes the location of 
incremental densification projects, their surroundings, and architectural characteristics. 
These surveys helped me understand the physical changes in neighborhoods introduced by 
the densification projects. To complement the surveys, I also searched for newspaper 
articles published during the last fifteen years that addressed social conflicts brought about 
by development, as well as pieces advertising densification projects.  
The primary limitation of the qualitative part was the small number of interviews I 
was able to conduct with developers. This responded to the sensitivity of the issues 
addressed and to the difficulties in reaching out to this relatively inaccessible community 
of individuals. Most of the time developers did not respond to my telephone calls, stood 
me up in our scheduled meetings, or outright declined to meet. I often got these kind of 
responses when I visited or called developers: ‘We are busy and working now, call us 
maybe next week’ or ‘I am out of town now and cannot answer any question.’ Another 
response I received was: ‘We don’t talk with anyone about our work or this project, we 
have been visited by people from the municipality, students, the DANE and so forth but 
we have not talked with anyone. We are acting according to the law’ (Field notes June 
2016).  
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However, most of the time my working hypothesis aligned with the responses I 
received in the few both formal and informal conversations I had with developers. 
Therefore, I decided to continue the research with the small sample of conversations, 
suspecting that I would be able to triangulate their responses with data from other sources. 
As expected, later I found in the local real estate discourse an important source of 
information that complemented the developers’ perspectives. Consequently, I explored the 
university libraries in Bogotá for every publication on real estate, appraisals, and the 
construction industry.  
For the historical section, I visited the SDP’s library and the main public archives 
of Bogotá. In these, I reviewed the zoning and land development codes of the city from the 
years 1944, 1961, 1967, 1979, 1990, and the current land-use and height ordinances 
approved for the 117 UPZs. I also reviewed the official Stratification regulations and 
updates from the years 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2013. I provide in Figure 
13 a graphic explanation of the methodology I used.  
MY POSITIONALITY AS PLANNING PRACTITIONER AND COMMUNITY MEMBER 
My position as a native of Bogotá and a practitioner of both architecture and urban 
planning in the city brought me into a complex position related to the insider/outsider status 
that is discussed so much in social science research theory. According to Gair:  
The notion of insider/outsider status is understood to mean the degree to which a 
researcher is located either within or outside a group being researched, because of 
her or his common lived experience or status as member of that group. (2012, 
137) 
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Figure 13: Diagram of the convergent parallel mixed-methods approach 
Illustration by the author. 
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In the humanities, scholars believe that being either an insider or an outsider brings 
certain advantages and disadvantages in the objectivity of the research. I think my case in 
this research is precisely an example of this current critical debate about the complexity of 
this traditional insider/outsider perspective. While scholars in earlier discussions assumed 
that a researcher was either an insider or an outsider, more recent theoretical underpinnings 
of insider/outsider status have revealed the complexity and blurred boundaries that are 
often encountered by researchers between both positions (Merriam et al. 2001). I identify 
myself as both insider and outsider in my social position with regard to local Stratification 
and the transformations of the built form.  
In terms of social background, I feel I am insider in Bogotá firstly because I was 
born in the city and lived there most of my life. This condition situates me inside the social 
and political context of the subject being studied. Specifically, regarding the system of 
Stratification, I was born in a family belonging to Bogotá’s middle class, and lived my 
whole life considering myself as a member of this middle social class—or Stratum 4. In 
this position, I have been alienated from both the lower classes living in lower strata areas, 
whom I perceive as foreign, but for whom I also feel empathy for their conditions of 
disadvantage. In addition, I grew up separated from the higher classes in strata 5 and 6; 
nevertheless, I have always been aware throughout my life of their position of privilege 
because they have access to better urban services, jobs, and educational opportunities. 
However, I may be also taking an outsider perspective with regard to the same 
issues because of my experiences living abroad for extended periods, mainly in countries 
with social and spatial systems that are very different from those of my country of origin. 
I have lived for extensive periods in societies, such as the German and the Austrian, where 
the social and spatial differences among members of the population are less pronounced 
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than they are in Colombia. In those contexts I experienced the advantages of everyday life 
in societies that do not explicitly separate their citizens according to income level, as 
Stratification does in my country. In addition, those countries have stronger welfare 
housing systems that prevent the urban forms and neighborhoods from becoming socially 
and physically fragmented, as they have in Bogotá, and they thus avoid the stark forms of 
concentrated poverty and urban violence that I experienced when I was growing up.  
I also lived in China and the United States, places with increasing social 
differentiation that are different from those of my country, but have their own 
characteristics that also influenced my judgment and positions with regard to social 
transformations. In China, I lived in Shanghai where the social and spatial structures were 
undergoing rapid changes. They were moving from a former urban position of social and 
physical horizontality to a state of difference built on newly created income inequalities. I 
remember being shocked by the rapid urban transformations in Shanghai, where older 
neighborhoods and traditional communities were being displaced en masse to make way 
for taller structures and newly rich inhabitants in the older city core. 
In the United States, although at the physical level cities are very homogeneous, 
race is the main determining factor of social and spatial differentiation. While traditionally 
most of the population live in suburban neighborhoods of detached single family houses, I 
have been experiencing how in the United States, as in China, a transitional phase of 
increasing social differentiation currently follows transformations in built form. The spread 
and influence of the new social desire to live in dense and compact cities is changing the 
landscape of cities across the United States. The White higher classes are moving to 
condominiums in high rises located in refurbished downtown areas, often at the cost of 
displacing minorities of color to the peripheral areas—as is the case in Austin, the city 
  
87 
where I live. I believe my experiences living and observing—as an outsider—social groups 
and physical changes in cities across the world have enriched my research perspective by 
providing insightful critical views to my insider perspective as a native of Bogotá. 
On the other hand, I also face the philosophical disciplinary differences between 
the normative stance of the field of architecture and the social science approach of urban 
planning. I was educated in architecture at the National University in Bogotá. My education 
there was based on a perspective that has privileged physical interventions above critical 
thinking, aiming for physical interventions to solve social equity struggles. This situates 
me in an outsider position with regard to the field of planning, which is currently 
theoretically based in the social sciences. Nevertheless, my recent education as an urban 
planner in the United States has given me an insider’s perspective on this field.  
My years of studies for my Doctor of Philosophy degree in Community and 
Regional Planning have led me to question my original thinking regarding the built form 
and social justice, which came from a discipline closer to engineering and the arts. For 
instance, my education in architecture and urban design through design studios taught me 
that social outcomes could be achieved by physical interventions. However, the lessons I 
have learned from the planning literature warns that the urban form have a complex 
relationship with social justice (Talen 2006). To that end, my education in planning has 
provided me critical knowledge from the social sciences and led me to a more holistic 
understanding of urban problems. As in my social insider/outsider perspective described 
before, I believe that the disciplinary contradictions I have encountered in my education 
and experience, rather than being a disadvantage, have enriched my research and 
understanding of planning problems by providing me with multiple viewpoints. 
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However, the insider/outsider perspectives described above come also with 
limitations. These limitations were specifically evident in the process of interviewing 
informants. I had positive experiences accessing people in academia and some members of 
the developers’ community because of my studies in architecture in a local university and 
my work as planner for the city. However, I had problems pursuing interviews with people 
who were outside of the mainstream local architecture and construction practices. This was 
a problem particularly in the South, where local private developers often have not attended 
the traditional universities and they are not members of the larger developers’ associations. 
As I approached these individuals, they perceived me as an architect, a member of a higher 
privileged stratum of Bogotá society. In these cases, my local networks and roots became 
obstacles for my investigation. I tried my best to approach this community through field 
research and through informal conversations. I visited several construction sites in the 
South and spoke with the persons in charge, often the developers themselves. This method 
helped me to make a neutral approach to the interviewees, and that improved their 
perceptions of me. I documented these conversations and my insights in my field notes.     
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Chapter 5: Historical planning policies and socio-spatial segregation 
Bogotá is one of the largest cities in Latin America, and in recent years, it has been 
emerging as an important center of trade and innovation on a global scale. Nonetheless, a 
large share of the population has low levels of education and strong rural attachments. 
While the population of Bogotá’s city core currently surpasses 8 million inhabitants (SDP, 
n.d.), only half were born in the city; the rest are migrants from the countryside. Most 
migrants came from the neighboring departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Boyacá, 
while less than 1 percent of the population was born abroad. In terms of education, about 
two thirds of the population only reached elementary or high school, while only a quarter 
have professional degrees from a college or university (DANE 2010).  
Because of its location away from the sea, Bogotá’s economic development was 
traditionally limited to agricultural production in the fertile surrounding areas, national 
government offices, and a small industrial base. In recent years, however, the city has 
developed a large service and trade sector related to the growth of oil production in the 
country, the international Eldorado Airport—the third busiest of Latin America—and a 
growing financial sector. This new service sector now accounts for more than 80 percent 
of the economic activity in Bogotá. The city hosts the headquarters of a handful of large 
financial, transportation, and trade conglomerates, operating not only in Colombia but also 
in the Andean region and Central America. 
The economic development leading to urban growth has traditionally raised 
concerns in the city because of its traditional unruly spillover into the surrounding savanna 
region. The city shares the flat lands of the savanna with another 35 municipalities in the 
Cundinamarca department. Most of them have small urban centers and extensive rural 
areas. Pasture, flowers, and crops grow in these rural lands, and they are the traditional 
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recreational site of Bogotá’s elites, as they own large country houses and social clubs 
scattered across the plain. Locals are very proud of the fertility and beautiful natural 
landscapes of the savanna. They refer to Bogotá’s savanna as having “the best agricultural 
lands of Colombia” and frequently advocate for its environmental conservation. 
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, municipalities closer to Bogotá, such as Chía, Cota, Funza, 
Mosquera and Soacha, are experiencing exponential urban growth, and consequently, 
property owners are intensively transforming agricultural lands into large housing 
settlements or industrial warehouses. This phenomenon is not new, as the city has a long 
history of rapid ungovernable growth.  
By the early twentieth century, when Latin American metropolises such as Buenos 
Aires, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro were rising powerhouses in trade and industry, 
Bogotá was an isolated city in the interior of the continent with no more than a hundred 
thousand inhabitants. Nevertheless, by mid-century, the city rapidly reached a population 
of half a million, setting an alarming pattern of rapid growth into the future. As a result, 
from the 1940s onwards, managing urban growth became a central topic in the agenda of 
the local government. By 1953, in order to control the unruly development of the savanna, 
a short-lived military government took the opportunity to annex to Bogotá seven 
municipalities at the time bordering the city: Usaquén, Suba, Engativá, Fontibón, Bosa, 
Usme and Sumapaz. They became localities of the new especial district of the capital city 
of Colombia, later known as Distrito Capital. As urban growth happened in these new 
areas, the traditional patterns of geographical social segregation of Bogotá soon expanded 
into them. Usaquén and Suba in the North became expansion areas for the wealthy, while 
Bosa and Usme in the South became large areas where impoverished migrants lived in 
settlements of informal origin. 
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As a result, today this large number of neighborhoods developed at different levels 
of informality has become a major physical characteristic of the city. This scale of informal 
sprawling urbanization has brought permanent challenges for public policy as it has 
perpetuated the social inequities inside the city. According to the city data, the share of the 
population living in settlements of informal origin can account for 30 percent of the total 
(DAPD 2000b, 158). However, these communities live with many disadvantages in 
comparison with the rest of the city; for instance, they have few connecting roads and poor 
transit infrastructure, which makes access to jobs and services very difficult. In addition, 
the private urban development industry neglect these the informal areas, perpetuating their 
state of marginality. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the planning history of the city demonstrates how 
changing approaches to growth management unintentionally laid the foundations for the 
socially segregated morphology that characterizes the city today. In order to prove this 
point, I will separate the local historical planning approaches in four different phases that 
respond to the changes of approaches between the United States model of “Sprawled City” 
and the normative “Compact City” approach rooted in Europe. Through these phases, I will 
show how foreign models of planning, mostly aimed to shape a specific normative idea of 
good city form have been implemented in the city by the influence of foreign practitioners 
and consultancy firms. In addition, in other times, there has been an adaptation of other 
more “procedural” policy approaches to urban planning in order to address urgent local 
social challenges. Later, I will suggest that the policy approaches since the late 1970s, 
responding to the latest international paradigms of planning, have aimed to change the 
traditional pattern of social and spatial segregation by regulating urban form and promoting 
densification. However, in the context of a limited implementation of a newest policy 
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approach since the 2000s intended to correct them, the formal approaches from the late 
twentieth century have led to effective but uneven patterns of densification across the city. 
Finally, I will show how the current land-use and density regulations of the city do not 
respond to the overarching policy objectives, but instead respond to the patterns of social 
segregation embedded in the Stratification system. 
I am basing this historical review on two major works in the literature about local 
urban development. First, Alberto Saldarriaga-Roa’s Bogotá Siglo XX (2000), which 
compiles a detailed review of the urban planning and housing policy history of the city. 
Secondly, Rodrigo Cortes-Solano’s Del Urbanismo a la Planificación en Bogotá 1900-
1990 (2007), which provides an insightful analysis of the private interests and public 
ideologies behind the zoning ordinances produced in the city. I am also reviewing directly 
the different decrees, statutes, and ordinances that have set the urban development of the 
city, specifically focusing on Acuerdo 21 of 1944 (Plan Soto-Bateman); Acuerdo 65 of 
1967; Acuerdo 7 of 1979; Acuerdo 6 of 1990; and Decreto 190 of 2004 (POT).  
1920S TO 1940S: NORMATIVE IDEAS OF URBANISM AND FOREIGN PRACTITIONERS 
The first approach to urban planning in the history of the city was an expansion 
plan: Bogotá Futuro introduced in 1923. This plan was inspired in the city beautiful 
movement and it was fashioned by early architects in the city resembling the 1860s 
Ensanche plan by Idelfons Cerdá in Barcelona, and the Burnham plan of Chicago of 1909. 
However, Bogotá Futuro was only concerned with the future urban design and size of the 
city. First, it set a pattern of urban growth towards the north on account of the local 
geographical constraints, such as the hills to the east and south, and the marshlands in the 
west. Then, it proposed a street geometry consistent of a grid of orthogonal streets crossed 
by a network of diagonal avenues, with urban services such as churches, parks and schools 
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located at the crossroads. Bogotá Futuro was however never enforced, the city at the time 
lacked a regulatory framework that obliged developers to follow any delineated plan, and 
therefore, apart from two isolated neighborhoods, nothing remains today of this first 
attempt at urban planning.  
It was only with the arrival to the country of the Austrian urbanist Karl Brunner and 
his appointment as chair of the new urban planning department in 1934 that neighborhoods 
in the city started to follow a certain preconceived design. Brunner deployed the rules of 
City Planning According to Artistic Principles (Sitte 1889) to delineate a set of 
neighborhoods of great urban quality in the outskirts of the city, between the colonial center 
and the emerging suburban development of Chapinero. As head of urban planning in the 
city, he also conducted the first slum removal and resettlement project of the city. The plan 
aimed to create a parkway, the Paseo Bolívar, to set the limit of the city with the Eastern 
Hills and become a place of recreation for the citizens. Many families of native indigenous 
origin lived in shacks on the lands of the future Paseo Bolívar since the colonial time. The 
authorities resettled these groups in the first social housing urbanization project delineated 
in undeveloped sites at the south of the city. This project initially was conceived as a semi-
urban settlement but eventually became the consolidated neighborhoods of Restrepo and 
Centenario.  
Brunner carefully designed these neighborhoods to represented ideas of pedestrian 
scale, sinuosity of streets, vistas, and the importance of the elements of nature. The houses 
were built detached from one another, each on a large parcel that allowed a family to 
develop small gardens to grow food and maintain livestock. Only twenty years later, 
however, many of these parcels were converted informally into multi-story dwellings and 
artisan industries due to the pressure of a growing city, and today very few houses conserve 
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the ample gardens that Brunner envisioned (Pulgarín-Osorio 2009). Overall, Brunner’s 
urban planning in Bogotá relied on a set of independent interventions, as he disliked 
engaging with urban plans at the city scale. 
By the 1940s, local architects, some fresh from the recently created Architecture 
program at the Universidad Nacional, began to criticize Brunner’s piecemeal approach to 
urban planning. Educated in new European ideas about the international style in 
architecture and the principles of rational planning from the CIAM, they classified 
Brunner’s work as fragmentary and old fashioned, referring to it as “feudal urbanism.” 
Because of their influence, the Mayor removed Brunner from the head planner post and the 
city departed from a school of planning based on the aesthetics of the city beautiful to 
follow a newer aesthetic movement of urbanism emerging in Western Europe at the time. 
The local architects impersonated by the newly created Colombian Society of 
Architects pushed forward the commissioning of a brand new city master plan to the 
renowned international firm Town Planning Associates in 1948. This firm was at the time 
one of the major planning firms in the world, led by the Catalonian Josep Lluís Sert,—
president of the CIAM and later dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design. Sert 
brought in the Swiss architect Le Corbusier—by the time already a world-famous celebrity 
in architecture and urban planning—to delineate Bogotá’s plan. The plan was first denoted 
Plan Piloto and later Plan Director after Le Corbusier’s involvement ended. Historians 
recall that Le Corbusier was surprised by the city. He could not understand how the Spanish 
and later the Colombians picked such an odd place to build the capital of the country. 
Bogotá is isolated at the top of the Andes, 2,600 meters above the sea and more than 500 
kilometers away from the nearest port. As a result, he determined that the city had no 
chance of future large industrial and commercial development. He therefore laid the plan 
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expecting that the city would merely grow from half a million people in 1947 to triple that 
size by the year 2000. In reality, it took just twenty years for the city’s population to surpass 
the mark set by Le Corbusier. By 1960, Bogotá was growing to reach two million persons. 
Le Corbusier’s plan followed a functional approach, integrating ecological systems, 
transit, and land uses into a single vision of a city. He envisioned a city with wide avenues 
and high-rise residential complexes with a strict separation of land uses. For that purpose, 
the Plan Piloto recommended containing the growth of the city toward the west, site of 
sensitive wetlands, and instead proposed to focus growth along the north-south axis at the 
foothills where land was more suited for urbanization. Cortés-Solano suggest that the Plan 
Director had two main practical contributions to the future planning of the city: It 
introduced the hierarchical classification of the avenues, and the separation of uses into 
sectors, both principles derived from CIAM’s Athens Charter (Le Corbusier and CIAM 
1943). These two approaches were included in all of Bogotá’s planning regulations until 
the 2000s. Other important subjects included but not adopted were the protection of 
environmental elements and the provisions of social housing that were innovative for the 
time. In terms of urban form, the plan proposed the demolition of large areas in the center 
of the city to give way to high multi-family towers inside green mega-blocks, and approach 
that was highly criticized at the time and impossible to fund. 
Although the city intended to introduce new planning ordinances to implement the 
proposals of the Plan Piloto, these were interrupted in 1953 with the instauration of General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla as military dictator of the country (1953-1957). This short-lived 
military government engaged instead in a series of major public works such as a new 
airport, the construction of highways, and the development of a new public administration 
center. The design and location of these projects did not follow the suggestions of any 
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previous study. The authorities simply placed the projects where land was readily available 
for urbanization—mostly in the fringes by desiccating the wetlands to the west. In addition, 
as mentioned before, the dictatorship also enacted the annexation to Bogotá of six 
surrounding municipalities (Usaquén, Suba, Engativá, Fontibón, Bosa and Usme), to halt 
their unruly urban development, but also opening the door for further sprawl as the city 
with this move increased six times in size. 
1950S TO 1970S: SOCIAL SEGREGATION THROUGH DENSITY AND LAND-USE NORMS 
Salazar-Ferro (2007) explains that during the 1940s the city authorities debated 
strongly between implementing the European normative approaches or the United States’ 
model of planning—established by the Standard Zoning Enabling Act in 1924. This model 
was based on the development of land-use and road plans to moderate city development by 
controlling indirectly the interventions of the private sector. At the time, the city was 
growing very rapidly and the authorities had to respond to increasing pressures from 
landowners and private sector developers. As a result, the authorities moved on to adapt 
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act to the local context, which proved to be a more practical 
solution. This first United States inspired zoning plan of the city was passed during the 
administration of Mayor Jorge Soto del Corral (1944-1944) with the contribution of his 
secretary of public works, Alfredo Bateman, and therefore became known as the Plan Soto-
Bateman (El Consejo de Bogotá 1944).  
The Plan Soto-Bateman, as shown in Figure 14, instead of focusing on designing 
specific urban growth projects—as Brunner and Le Corbusier proposed—established a 
separation of the city into seven zones: commercial and civic; mixed-use; central 
residential; exclusive residential; working-class residential; industry; and forest reserve. 
Each zone had a strictly differentiated level of land use mix and density maximums to be 
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followed by the landowners aiming to develop a parcel. The plan established a physical 
difference between the residential “elite” areas located in the North and the “working” class 
residential areas primarily located in the South, and thus became a platform for social 
segregation through density and land-use norms.  
In the residential areas of the North, the plan prohibited any industrial or large-scale 
commercial activity, while setting high standards for the urban form. For instance, the norm 
required minimum lot fronts between 10 to 12 meters, building footprints of maximum 50 
percent to 60 percent of the lot, setbacks between 3.5 to 5 meters, and a maximum height 
of three floors. Conversely, in the working class residential areas the rules were much less 
strict, as it allowed the same activities than in the mixed-use zones, such as industry, heavy 
retail, and warehousing. In terms of building envelope, the plan set a minimum parcel area 
of a 150 square meters, with a minimum lot front of 7.5 meters, two floors of height and 
no setbacks. In this way, the Plan Soto-Bateman intended to reduce the price of 
development in the city, facilitating the creation of housing supply in the working class 
areas, but at the same time it strengthened the polarized shape that the city had adopted. 
Eventually, the Plan Soto-Bateman became very important for the current city morphology 
as the authorities enacted it during a period of exponential growth and the interrupted 
adoption of the Plan Director. 
Upon the return to democracy, the president appointed Jorge Gaitán as the mayor 
of Bogotá (1961-1966). He wanted to re-institute a democratic framework for urban 
planning in the city after the dictatorship. According to Cortés-Solano, Gaitán understood 
that the rapid growth of the city impeded the enforcement of a normative planning platform 
such as Le Corbusier had envisioned. Bogotá’s population growth rate during the 1950s 
and the 1960s was almost 7 percent annually—among the highest in the world. As a result, 
  
98 
mayor Gaitán introduced the notion of a “flexible” plan. This new approach provided a set 
of rules for city expansion based on market demands, while also creating a Planning 
Commission to negotiate the norms with property owners in a case-by-case basis (El 
Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá 1963). These market friendly reforms further 
facilitated the development of rural lands in the periphery, thus benefiting a handful of 
large-scale property owners in the savanna. 
Gaitán’s planning tools to manage growth in the city were a new road plan and a 
new zoning code that continued the patterns set by the Plan Soto-Bateman, while also 
adopting some details from the Plan Director. While in the 1950s planners focused on 
environmental concerns, such as the preservation of the wetlands in the west and promoting 
a compact city growth, by the 1960s, the urbanization of the periphery was a de-facto 
reality, motivated largely by the annexation of the surrounding municipalities and the 
construction of roads. This led development to sprawl uncontrollably along the access 
roads, forming an octopus-shaped city. Gaitán’s road plan, or Acuerdo 38, enacted in 1961 
(El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá 1961b), aimed to organize this growth by 
linking the satellite areas through ring-roads that encouraged infill development.  
At the same time, the city was receiving alarming levels of migration from 
impoverished peasants displaced by violence and the poor economic opportunities in the 
countryside. Migrants in need of housing were occupying public lands, but more often, 
they were acquiring small lots in illegal subdivisions of peripheral rural lands with no 
access roads or utilities. Individuals that became known as Urbanizadores Piratas [pirate 
developers] promoted these illegal subdivisions. They often disappeared after they sold the 
properties and left the communities to fend for themselves for the provision of utilities and 
against the eviction attempts of the municipal authorities. The overwhelming scale of these 
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emerging informal settlements in the peripheries made the administration during the 1960s 
to try different administrative processes to recognize the settlements and open the doors 
for the public sector to invest in their improvement.  
Acuerdo 30 (El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá 1961a), and later Acuerdo 
65 (El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá 1967) introduced a new set of urban form 
regulations aimed to update the norms of 1944 and cope with the new challenges of 
informal urbanization. These new regulations changed the approach of the Plan Soto-
Bateman, which divided the city between wealthy and working class areas, and instead 
introduced density levels to classify the residential areas. However, in the practice, the 
division of the city among areas with different dwelling densities masked a way to preserve 
the system of socially segregated development, as Figure 15 suggests. The new regulations 
divided the city in areas of low, middle, and high density, and later created some new 
special categories, named Residencial Obrero [working-class residential] in the Acuerdo 
30—later renamed Residencial Especial [special residential] in Acuerdo 65—that were 
implemented to delimit areas in which illegal subdivisions were tolerated. 
In the newer Acuerdo 65, this category further decreased the required standards of 
urbanization, by introducing new minimum standards to regulate self-help housing and 
control the action of the Urbanizadores Piratas. These became known as the Normas 
Mínimas [minimum norms]. These norms set minimum lot areas at 65 square meters, and 
reduced minimum lot fronts to 5 meters.  
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Figure 14: Land-use plan Soto-Bateman Figure 15: Land-use plan DAPD 1960 
Source: Adapted from Bogotá Siglo XX 
(Saldarriaga-Roa 2000) 
Source: Adapted from Bogotá Siglo XX 
(Saldarriaga-Roa 2000) 
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New settlements in the Residencial Especial zones were only required to have a 
delineated area for the roads, street lighting, a water fountain and a public telephone to 
service the community, and individual latrines for each parcel. These new ordinances 
further increased the differentiation in the physical shape of the residential areas in the 
North and the South. By the 1970s, the North took a shape similar to North-American 
suburbia, with wide roads, large houses, front yards and parks, as shown in Figure 16, while 
small parcels, no green areas, narrow unpaved roads, and poor services distinguished the 
South, pictured in Figure 17. 
These conditions of marginality in the South soon turned many informal 
settlements into slums where poverty and disease were widespread. Motivated by this, 
during the 1970s, major international development agencies proposed to implement a set 
of slum improvement projects in the city, such as the Planes de Desarrollo de Emergencia 
[urgent development plans], proposed by the ECLAC6 and funded by the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Most of the times, the country’s receipt of international funds for urban 
development was made contingent upon their acceptance of these plans, often designed 
from abroad by foreign professionals.  
During these years, the Colombian president created the Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación (DNP) [national department of planning] and appointed the Canadian 
Lauchlin Currie as the first director. The President assigned Currie the task of drafting the 
first national development plan to cope with the urbanization challenges.   
 
                                                 
6 Acronym for the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Figure 16: Residential subdivisions in the north of Bogotá in the 1960s 
Source: Bogotá vuelo al pasado (Villegas 2010). 
 
Figure 17: Informal settlements in the south of Bogotá in the 1960s 
Source: Bogotá vuelo al pasado (Villegas 2010). 
  
  
103 
Currie was alarmed by Colombia’s extremely rapid urbanization rates and 
preoccupied with the growth of informal settlements. His solution was to cope with both 
challenges at the same time, by using what he called an “accelerating growth” strategy. He 
proposed that the national government financed the construction of affordable housing, 
both to create millions of low-skilled jobs for rural migrants through the construction sector 
and to relieve the increasing housing shortages. This would change urban growth patterns 
in the city from the traditional process of illegal subdivision of rural lands by 
Urbanizadores Piratas to growth by the construction of large-scale multifamily residential 
compounds—resembling those Le Corbusier proposed twenty years before. For that 
purpose, the government created the UPAC that facilitated access to mortgages for the 
lower and middle classes and channeled public resources to both public and private 
construction firms.  
The changes introduced by Currie encouraged the rapid development of large-scale 
projects of affordable housing at the district scale. This focus on the lower scale eventually 
eclipsed new attempts to draft an updated comprehensive plan at the larger city scale. 
District plans were drafted everywhere where land became available or where people were 
settling informally. The first project of this kind was the affordable housing plan Ciudad 
Kennedy, funded by the Alliance for Progress.7 Some other projects were the slum-
improvement plan PIDUZOB I in the eastern foothills, and the large-scale serviced plots 
for self-help housing initiative named PIDUZOB II or Ciudad Bolívar in the southern hills, 
both financed by the Inter-American Development Bank. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Instituto de Crédito Territorial implemented other district-scale housing projects and 
                                                 
7 The Alliance for Progress was a program initiated by U.S. president John F. Kennedy in 1961 to fund 
development initiatives in Latin America. 
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experimented with different approaches to construction, such as prefabricated housing, 
serviced plots, and incremental solutions, all along the Calle 80 corridor. National or 
international institutions designed and implemented these plans with little connection to 
any city-level comprehensive plan. 
While Currie’s policies for the middle urban scale were based on the rapid 
development of large tracts of land with high density or self-help housing, on the smaller 
scale, his policies were different—though also primarily based on the rules of market. 
Cortés-Solano pays close attention to these changes from the late 1960s onwards, a period 
he calls the “liberalization” of the city. He explains that the intense pressure of population 
growth led technocrats to recommend abolishing the heights and density limitations in the 
city included in Acuerdo 65. This shift coincided with a critique of comprehensive planning 
and zoning that was emerging worldwide. In the United States and Europe, voices within 
the field were proposing the phasing out of traditional approaches to separating land uses, 
while environmentalists argued that cities should control growth to protect the natural 
environment, while increasing densities in the central areas to make cities more energy 
efficient. Professionals from these fields proposed that the environmental and social 
challenges of cities could be overcome by changing the approach of zoning from regulating 
land-use and densities into normatively regulating the urban form. Planners and policy 
makers in Bogotá were receptive to these changes in the international paradigms, 
eventually enacting a new plan that would radically change the density and land-use norms 
that had dominated the city since the 1940s.    
1980S TO 1990S: GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND INCREMENTAL DENSIFICATION 
Thibert and Osorio (2014) argue that the annexation of peripheral municipalities in 
1953 and the development-friendly reforms introduced by economist Lauchlin Currie in 
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the 1970s, made Bogotá develop a neoliberal model of urban development much earlier 
than other Latin American cities. This is supported by Saldarriaga-Roa (2000) and Cortés-
Solano (2007), who describe how neoliberal policies and the private sector have been 
shaping the land-use and building regulations across the city’s history, but strongly after 
the 1970s. Saldarriaga-Roa identifies this period as La Ciudad Inmobiliaria [real estate 
city] and sets Acuerdo 7 enacted in 1979 (El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá 1979) 
as the first regulation to operationalize private sector control over city planning. This was 
due in large part to the power gained by private developers over the economy, facilitated 
by the introduction of the mortgage system UPAC. The UPAC system detached mortgage 
debt from the Colombian currency—which at the time was devaluating rapidly—and 
instead created a parallel unit of constant value only to be used for mortgage-lending, thus 
offering homebuyers stable monthly payments. The system was a huge success and 
triggered the growth of the local housing market at an unprecedented scale, while directing 
large funds to the private sector construction industry.  
The Acuerdo 7 revolutionized the way urban development was being conducted in 
the city by changing planning from focusing on zoning areas to focus on the control of the 
urban form. However, this transition facilitated the liberalization of urban planning norms 
and prompted the emergence of the construction industry as a principal driver of urban 
development. All these changes happened without regard for the interests of the 
municipality or of those of existing communities. In Cortes-Solano’s words (2007, 198): 
[(Acuerdo 7) as a transitional document that, clearly inserted in a perspective of 
deregulation to permit the free action of developers in the construction of the city. 
It took refuge in the urban design, a discipline erected as an alternative to the 
crisis of Planning, and that appears as the only possibility that has remained for 
acting on the urban form.] 
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 [El Acuerdo 7] como documento de transición que, al estar claramente inserto 
en una perspectiva de desregulación para permitir la libre acción de los 
promotores en la construcción de la ciudad, se refugió en el diseño urbano, 
disciplina eregida como alternativa a la crisis del planning, y que aparece como 
la única posibilidad que ha quedado para actuar sobre la forma urbana. 
 The Acuerdo 7 was based in Fase 2, an urban development study financed by the 
United Nations Development Programme. Fase 2 was commissioned to the British and 
Canadian firms Llewelyn-Davis Weeks Forestier-Waker & Bor, Kates Peat Marwick & 
Co. and Coopers & Lybrand, in partnership with the Colombian Consultécnicos Ltda. 
(1973). Fase 2 analyzed the city growth during the 1960s, highlighting that Bogotá was a 
rapidly growing city reaching three and a half million inhabitants, most of whom were low-
skilled recent migrants from the countryside who were living in conditions of poverty. The 
consultants determined that the density of the city was very high, reaching 179 persons per 
hectare, due to overcrowding in small structures in the informal settlements in the South, 
and in newer settlements emerging also in the West. Fase 2 also found that the central areas 
of the city were progressively loosing population. This was due to incremental colonization 
of the older residential neighborhoods by heavy commercial and industrial land uses. 
Paradoxically, this trend produced decay and blight in areas with high levels of 
connectivity and provision of services. 
Based on this assessment, the Fase 2 team in 1973 predicted a rapid future growth 
of the city, to reach five million persons in 1980 and eight and a half million inhabitants 
by 1990. According to this forecast, they proposed a set of growth scenarios for 2000: In 
the first scenario, they envisioned a pattern of growth with no state intervention. They 
argued that the concentration of investment, employment, and services exclusively in the 
central core—or in the affluent neighborhoods in the North—would keep putting a burden 
on the mobility system. This will keep affecting the quality of affordable housing and 
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public spaces for the lower and middle-income people—who were living in the inner-ring 
suburbs in the South and West.  
As an alternative, the Fase 2 study proposed another approach to reorient urban 
growth. Instead of disorderly urban growth following the present access roads into the 
peripheral municipalities in the savanna—thus extending the current patterns of social 
segregation—they proposed to consolidate the existing city by achieving a rounded shape. 
The consultants thought that in this way growth would be less land consuming and decrease 
the levels of social segregation. To achieve this pattern, urban growth had to be reoriented 
into infill areas, decentralizing jobs and services in a set of sub-centers connected with each 
other by transit, and located in close proximity to the bulk of the residential areas. 
Specifically, in the South and West, the sub-centers would reduce the mobility needs and 
increase the economic opportunities of the lower income population living in slums. They 
called this strategy of creating sub-centers Ciudades dentro de la Ciudad [cities inside 
cities].  
The city introduced Acuerdo 7 in 1979 to operationalize the proposals included in 
the Fase 2 study, with a short-term scope from 1980 to 1985, forecasting population growth 
that would reach six million in 1985. In order to operationalize the Ciudades dentro de la 
Ciudad concept, the city administration had to contain urban sprawl, focus new 
development in the infill areas, and densify the inner city and the sub-centers. Accordingly, 
Acuerdo 7 introduced three unprecedented strategies. The first was the incorporation of a 
USB to act as a growth control measure. The second strategy was to incentivize 
development in the infill by liberalizing density controls for new residential projects within 
the USB. However, according to the Acuerdo 7, these new projects were set primarily to 
serve for affordable housing via multi-family housing blocks or serviced sites programs. 
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The new middle and high-class residential developments should instead be conducted 
through the incremental densification of the central city. This led to the third strategy, a 
framework for the incremental densification. This strategy incentivized the incremental 
densification in existing neighborhoods by delineating micro-zones that responded the 
rationale of the profit from real estate development. These micro-zones became the 
tratamientos and classified neighborhoods depending upon their age, location, and current 
physical characteristics using the tax assessment as a measure tool. The different 
tratamientos responded to different levels of land use mix, existing heights, existing 
setbacks, building footprints and age, and social decay of each neighborhood.  
Acuerdo 7 created three main tratamientos. The first was Rehabilitación, which was 
applied to neighborhoods in high demand by the real estate market to incentivize 
developers to acquire properties with small structures and invest in densification projects. 
The second Tratamiento was Redesarollo, which was meant to encourage redevelopment 
by aggressively liberalizing the height limits, to encourage the private sector to invest in 
areas undergoing urban decay. The third Tratamiento was Conservación, which applied in 
neighborhoods that were more recent or in areas under historic preservation where 
densification was not allowed.  
Following the proposal of Fase 2, Acuerdo 7 delineated the mega-core of the city, 
along the foothills from the southern neighborhood of Restrepo to the northern area of 
Chicó, as a Tratamiento de Rehabilitación and Redesarrollo in order to incentivize 
densification. The plan also created a set of sub-centers in the peripheral areas (as seen in 
Figure 18) where densification was also allowed. In terms of social segregation through 
density and land-use norms, Acuerdo 7 abolished the practice of urban form differentiation 
according to social groups or densities from the previous regulations; however, it 
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introduced the use of the system of Stratification to determine parking requirements. At the 
time, the Stratification was a new tool introduced by utility companies following a mandate 
from 1968 (El Presidente de la República de Colombia 1968). Specifically, Acuerdo 7 set 
a minimum of a single parking space per each ten units for strata 1 and 2; one per three 
units for strata 3 and 4; and one to one in strata 5 and 6. In this way, the Acuerdo 7 was not 
explicitly using the social strata as a determinant of the physical form of the city, but it was 
implicitly forcing the construction of different housing typologies in the different strata to 
comply with the parking minimums. 
In addition, while Acuerdo 7 allowed incremental densification in all the 
neighborhoods included in the mega-core—equally in both its northern and southern 
sections— the Decreto 1025 of 1987 and Decreto 067 of 1988 instituted differing height 
restrictions. These ordinances privileged densification in the Chapinero area, allowing even 
higher structures in the place where most development at the time was taking place. 
According to Decreto 1025, elements such as the potential for mobility, utilities supply, 
soil characteristics, and the dimension of the lots justified this move. However, soon after, 
the Decreto 067 in 1988 further modified most of the height and land-use regulations of 
several neighborhoods north of Chapinero, those that the Acuerdo 7 set to preserve their 
built form characteristics. It reclassified them from Conservación into Rehabilitación, in 
this way almost duplicating the area for densification in the city (Rincón-Avellaneda 2006). 
Because of this, Cortés-Solano suggests that the Acuerdo 7 was subordinate to the 
real estate market, as it set land-use and height regulations according to the levels of profit 
that developers could obtain from any parcel (2007, 195). He further argues that the loose 
regulations in the numerous new areas denoted as mixed-use in Acuerdo 7 were, in 
practice, a recognition by the state that the real estate market was the “natural” instrument 
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to produce suitable urban spaces to meet local housing demands (2007, 198). Cortés-
Solano suggests that private sector profit-based urbanism in Bogotá since Acuerdo 7 
produced the soaring density increases in the city. He proves this fact by showing that 
density in the city rose from 295 persons per hectare in 1985, to 389 persons per hectare in 
1993.   
Recently, two different studies using satellite imagery demonstrate the unusually 
high density of Bogotá. The first study by Inostroza, Baur and Csaplovitz (2013) used 
satellite images to measure the expansion of ten Latin American cities over a period of 
approximately twenty years (1988-2010). Bogotá was one of the cities they selected for 
this analysis. Results showed that the capital of Colombia was the largest outlier among 
the cities analyzed in both density levels and expansion patterns. With 213.8 persons per 
hectare, it was the densest of all, almost twice as dense as the cities below it on the list, 
which were Lima with 133.1, La Paz with 112.1 and Santiago with 107.5 persons per 
hectare. Bogotá is today six times smaller in area than Buenos Aires, but with half the 
population. A second study by Parés Ramos, Álvarez Berríos and Mitchell (2013) used 
night-time satellite imagery between 1992 and 2009 from eight Latin American cities, 
including Bogotá, to assess urban density. The results revealed that Colombian cities 
(Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali) experienced the most compact densification, as determined 
by the growing intensity of nighttime lights in the timeframe analyzed. Based on this 
analysis, the authors claim that Colombian cities are among the densest in the world, 
comparable to Asian cities such as Mumbai and Hong Kong.  
However, density levels are unequal across the city. Rincón-Avellaneda (2004) 
demonstrated that density levels in Bogotá were much higher in the peripheral localities in 
the South and West than in the central areas and the North. She proposed that these uneven 
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densities reflected different densification processes. According to Rincón-Avellaneda, in 
Bogotá there is a difference between the levels of density of the built form—taller versus 
smaller buildings—and the differences between the densities of population—the amount 
of persons living inside a unit of area. Higher income neighborhoods are denser in terms 
of built form as a result intensive investment in real estate. However, lower income areas 
are denser in terms of population—there are more people in the same unit of area—
reflecting overcrowding of precarious and small self-help structures. These differences in 
density levels heighten the uneven access to urban services, public spaces and recreation 
areas and worsen the congestion in the city. 
Soon after their implementation, and after many building permits were granted, 
Acuerdo 6 in 1990 replaced Decreto 1025 and Decreto 067. This new statute for the 
physical ordering of the city aimed to correct the excess of these previous regulations. This 
new statute modified the scope and scale of the tratamientos, accepting the idea that the 
city had developed as a collection of fragments instead of following a single normative 
master plan. Specifically, it introduced the concept of “local zoning”. According to this 
discourse, the land-use and height regulations should comply with the “physical values” 
and origins of each neighborhood, mostly to respond to concerns that the community was 
raising against densification processes. Nonetheless, the plan kept employing criteria for 
the determination of the areas suited for densification based on the real estate market. 
As a result, Acuerdo 6 restricted heights in many neighborhoods included in the 
densification decree 067. However, many of these neighborhoods were located in the South 
of the city and of little interest to private developers. At the same time, the Acuerdo further 
increased the heights limits in the neighborhoods that the private sector was transforming 
in the North, specifically in the localities of Chapinero, and Usaquén. An example of this 
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was the increase in the height limits in an area of detached single-family houses along the 
Calle 100 to allow for office and retail use in higher structures that developers were pushing 
for. This regulation caused the displacement northwards of the financial center of the city, 
located on Calle 72 in Chapinero, to Calle 100 in Usaquén. These changes made Acuerdo 
6 blur the mega-core and sub-center model of Fase 2 and Acuerdo 7 via a set of local zoning 
regulations, which ended up not complying with the overarching proposed urban structure. 
Overall, the market friendly approaches taken by Acuerdo 7 and Acuerdo 6 reduced 
the power of central planning in the city. During the 1980s and 1990s, the city planning 
office progressively lost power vis a vis private developers, to the point that its role was 
reduced to performing only menial bureaucratic functions. At the time, the city council was 
highly permeated by the interests of the construction chamber and large scale property 
owners, and because of this, the mayor’s ability to pursue clientelist practices was limited 
(Gilbert 2015). To make matters worse, during the late 1980s the national government 
faced a deep social and economic crisis wrought by violence stemming from the drug 
cartels, the leftist guerrillas, and a local fiscal crisis. This left the administration of Bogotá 
with scarce resources to intervene in the rising crime, chaotic traffic, informal urbanization, 
and the crisis facing utility companies in their struggle with powerful unions. Surprisingly, 
by the end of the 1990s, there were structural changes in public policy that allowed the 
public sector to retake control of the city and even bring urban improvement to worldwide 
attention during the 2000s. The next section explain those changes, but also how the 
promise of bringing social equity to urban planning practice, made in a subsequent plan, 
failed to deliver fifteen years later. 
  
113 
2000S: POT AND THE UPZS, BOTTOM-UP AGAINST TOP-DOWN PLANNING 
The first change that improved the administration of the city was the democratic 
election of mayors introduced in 1988. Previously, the president appointed them and their 
period was limited to two years. The second elected mayor, Jaime Castro (1992-1994), 
passed the Organic Statute in 1993 releasing the executive branch of government from the 
chains of the city council, unions, and the national government. Castro began a series of 
fiscal reforms that later allowed mayors Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003) and 
Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) to initiate the transformation of the city that has been so 
extensively documented by scholars (Beccassino and Peñalosa-Londoño 2000; Dávila 
2004; Gilbert and Dávila 2002; Gilbert and Garcés 2008). The second major change was 
the enactment of the National Law of Territorial Ordering in 1997, known as Ley 388, 
(Congreso de Colombia 1997). This law standardized all urban planning practices in the 
country under the principles of social equity, such as the “right to the city” and the “social 
purpose of the private property.” Ley 388 allowed mayors, communities, local planners, 
and developers to play under the same transparency rules, limiting the traditional obscure 
influences of private interests, clientelism and NIMBYsm8 in local urban planning. 
Bogotá used this new law to enact a new comprehensive plan (POT) approved in 
2000 and later compiled and updated in 2004 through Decreto 190 (Alcalde Mayor de 
Bogotá D.C. 2004). The mayor changes of Decreto 190 involved the introduction of 
institutional rules and planning tools for city and developers to share both costs and 
revenues of the urbanization activities across the city, under the principle of reparto 
equitativo de cargas y beneficios [equitable distribution of costs and revenues]. Under these 
                                                 
8 NIMBYsm comes from the acronym for the phrase "Not In My Back Yard”, or Nimby. It is a pejorative 
characterization of opposition by residents to a proposed new development or land use because it is close to 
them. 
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new rules, the city required that developers set aside land or money for affordable housing 
and infrastructure improvements before approving expansion and redevelopment projects. 
This framework was operationalized through a new planning tool named Planes Parciales 
(PPs), which was akin to the Planned Unit Development tool used in the United States. 
These reforms included in Decreto 190 were set to discourage further incremental 
densification, which according to its critics, had overly densified neighborhoods, only 
increasing profit for landowners without regard to the heavy impacts in existing roads, 
parks, and utility infrastructures. As mentioned in the study conducted for Decreto 190 
(DAPD 2000b, 75):  
[This densification and change of land use was not accompanied by the 
improvement of infrastructure networks, public spaces, and amenities. Densities 
10 or 20 times higher and new commercial and service uses were being supported 
by the preexisting urban space.] 
Esta densificación y cambio de uso no se acompañó por la adecuación de las 
redes de infraestructura, los espacios públicos y los equipamientos; densidades 
10 o 20 veces superiores y nuevos usos comerciales y de servicios fueron 
soportados por el espacio urbano preexistente. 
On the other hand, the studies that led to Decreto 190 had identified similar 
problems as those outlined in the Fase 2 study, which had been conducted more than 25 
years earlier. These persistent problems included strong socio-spatial segregation that was 
producing an unbalanced supply of urban services, unplanned growth patterns, and the 
deterioration of the residential areas through progressive invasion by office, retail, and 
industrial land uses.  
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Figure 18: Land-use plan Acuerdo 7 Figure 19: Spatial structure Decreto 190 
Source: Adapted from Ordenamiento y 
administración del espacio urbano en 
Bogotá (DAPD 1981) 
Source: Adapted from Decreto 190 
Documento resúmen (DAPD 2000a) 
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To address these challenges, Decreto 190 envisioned a new structure for Bogotá, 
shown in Figure 19, delineating a city based on three major sectors. The first sector was a 
central core with most of the employment activities and the urban services, including most 
of Acuerdo 7’s mega-core, and a large extension to the western peripheries to reach the 
airport covering most of the industrial sites of the city. The second sector was the residential 
areas in the North and South, which should be—as Acuerdo 7 proposed—structured around 
local sub-centers connected by high-capacity transit. The third sector were the expansion 
areas, which finally dismantled the USB, covering all the still rural plain areas of the 
savanna inside the Distrito Capital. They included the last empty lots prone to flooding in 
the south-west close to Bogotá River where most informal development was taking place 
at the time. In addition, this sector included the hilly area in between the USB and the 
southern town of Usme, and a large area in the north-west between the USB and the Bogotá 
River. The latter area is dominated by agricultural and recreational lands and its potential 
development has recently become a source of controversy between the municipal 
administration and environmentalist groups. 
In the central city, Decreto 190 offered a set of small scale planning tools as an 
alternative to the incremental densification model rooted in Acuerdo 7. The main one was 
Planes Parciales de Renovación Urbana (PPRUs)—mentioned previously in Chapter 2. 
These were planning tools that allowed private developers to set aside a consolidated 
neighborhood in delineated zones to formulate a local plan that could alter the property and 
street layout. The purpose was to generate new for-profit housing and retail areas, and new 
public spaces and affordable housing units. PPRUs planning process should be negotiated 
between the developers and the property owners, and requires the accord of at least 51 
percent of the owners to become approved by the city. If the city approves a PPRU, the 
  
117 
developers can exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the properties of those 
owners who refused to participate.  
Although private developers were initially enthusiastic about PPRUs, experience 
would show that they are very challenging processes. One example is the case of Los 
Olivos in Chapinero Alto. As explained previously in Chapter 2, a set of legal conflicts 
between the different landowners and the city halted this PPRU process indefinitely. There 
are many other cases across the city where protests and lawsuits among the different 
property owners and developers have also put a stop to PPRU processes. PPRUs have met 
stark opposition from neighborhoods associations, and negotiations to reach agreement 
with 51 percent of property owners have proven to be very difficult, lengthy and costly. 
The PPRUs that have been developed are of very small scale of two to four blocks, which 
has made the private sector to reluctant to invest in the formulation of new PPRUs.  
The other planning tool proposed by Decreto 190 to control densification and 
increase citizen oversight in the processes of redevelopment were the so-called UPZs. The 
city administration divided the city into 117 UPZs, which had to develop their own local 
land-use and density regulations in compliance with the larger structure set by Decreto 190. 
In practice, however, the UPZs were also areas delineated from the top that did not 
represent the consolidated communities of the city. As a result, the processes of formulating 
the norms for each UPZ atomized decision-making and undermined the broader city 
structure envisioned in the POT. Each of the UPZs was developed independently, often 
heavily influenced by private developers or by strong neighborhood associations motivated 
by NIMBYsm. As a result, fifteen years later, there are parts of the city that rapidly 
developed in contradiction to the structure delineated in the comprehensive plan. In other 
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areas, the UPZs regulation was never accepted and therefore development must still 
comply with the old regulations of Acuerdo 6. 
Acknowledging these problems, different city administrations attempted to abolish 
the UPZs system by revising Decreto 190. However, these attempts failed for different 
reasons. A first revision by the mayoral administration of Samuel Moreno (2008-2011) 
stalled because of the suspension of the mayor due to corruption charges. Mayor Petro 
made a second attempt, but his revision to the plan faced opposition from city council. 
Nevertheless, Petro later passed Decreto 562 in 2014 to abolish most of the UPZs and 
instead turning these areas into the tratamiento Renovación Urbana, a regulation that 
dismantled the height limitations, thus returning to a hyper-scaled version of the 
incremental densification model of Acuerdo 7. Petro’s Decreto 562 was motivated by the 
the continuing need to redevelop areas in the central city and the South that were rapidly 
losing population. However, the subsequent mayor Peñalosa abolished Decreto 562 in 
2016. Peñalosa, who in his first administration criticized the incremental densification 
model, argued that Decreto 562 created a disorderly model of city, overburdened the 
existing green and transit infrastructure, and was passed without any citizen participation. 
Nonetheless, the regulation of Decreto 562 was valid for about a year and the building 
permits granted in this period are still sound. 
ARRANGEMENTS AND SOCIAL SEGREGATION IN BOGOTÁ’S URBAN PLANNING 
This historical review illustrates how the density and land-use norms and the 
various approaches to densification approaches have reinforced the patterns of socio-
spatial segregation. The policies from the 1940s to the 1970s sought to facilitate private 
sector development to address urgent housing shortages, but in the process established a 
system of social segregation through density and land-use norms. After 1979, the 
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incremental densification policies, which were intended to transform the old segregationist 
model of planning, were able to control sprawl but failed to disrupt the system of social 
segregation. Instead, this approach increased heights in the wealthier areas in the North, 
while restricting heights and allowing hazardous and unwanted land uses in the South, 
further benefiting private sector developers and landowners while diminishing the quality 
of life for the majority of the population. This phenomenon heightened social injustices 
because these planning rules have disproportionally increased the value of land in the 
northern neighborhoods, while decreasing land values in the southern poorer areas.  
From Acuerdo 7 onwards, none of the planning ordinances sought to continue the 
segregationist approaches from the mid-twentieth century. On the contrary, all the plans 
aimed to de-concentrate the areas of employment and services from center-north axis along 
the piedmont, to encourage development in the western and southern peripheries. However, 
the transition from the top-bottom visions of urban development into small-scale 
approaches through local zoning codes has proven problematic. Local zoning approaches, 
including the UPZs, have impeded the consolidation of most of the sub-centers and have 
perpetuated the concentration of employment and services in the traditionally wealthier 
areas.  
The lack of transparency in planning and policy design processes has made it 
difficult for the public to contest these strategies. Even today, it is difficult for the public 
to access the official plans of density and land-use regulations for each of the UPZs. They 
are not available on the SDP website and citizens have to visit the planning offices in a 
particular day of the week to get access to them. Although the SDP established an online 
map to view the city’s planning norms (SINU-POT), the system only allows the user to 
view the rules for one property at the time, making it impossible to understand the larger 
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picture of local planning regulations. Therefore, for the analysis of the historical 
regulations I had to sum the fragmentary information of the SINU-POT with digital copies 
of the density and land-use regulations of Acuerdo 7, Acuerdo 6, and the UPZs, obtained 
directly at the SDP. I incorporated this information into a GIS to produce a set of maps of 
Bogotá that show the evolving patterns of maximum height limits in the periods 1979–
2015.  
Figure 20 shows a map with the heights limits of Acuerdo 7. The map shows how 
heights limits correlate with the mega-core and sub-centers, and illustrates the CBD located 
at the center of the city in Calle 26. However, this clear structure of Acuerdo 7 dissolves 
in further zoning ordinances. The next major zoning reform, Acuerdo 6, shown in Figure 
21, expanded the densification areas northwards, moving the CBD to Calle 100, in the 
limits of Chapinero with the locality of Usaquén. However, it maintained the height limits 
in the southern parts of the mega-core that were not of interest of developers. Finally, 
Figure 22 displays in a single map the joint height regulations independently produced by 
93 different participatory planning processes for each of the UPZs, following the mandate 
of the POT in 2000. There are 117 UPZs in Bogotá, but as of 2015, some of them had still 
not developed density and land-use regulations because they were part of zonal plans or 
include major infrastructure, such as the international airport, which required differentiated 
district planning processes. The map shows how the UPZs further expanded densification 
northwards, including higher heights limits in most of the localities of Chapinero and 
Usaquén. Specially, these regulations allowed the deregulation of heights in Cedritos (also 
explained in Chapter 2) introducing maximum Floor to Area Ratio (FAR) limits up to 5.5, 
the highest of the city.  
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Figure 20: Height limits in Acuerdo 7 of 1979 
Source: Adapted from official zoning map of Acuerdo 7 of 1979. Background Image: 
ASTER GDEM, a product of METI and NASA 
 
Calle 26 
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Figure 21: Height limits in Acuerdo 6 of 1990 
Source: Adapted from official zoning map of Acuerdo 6 of 1990. Background Image: 
ASTER GDEM, a product of METI and NASA 
  
Calle 100 
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Figure 22: Height limits in the UPZs 2004-2016 
Source: Adapted from SDP-SINUPOT. Background Image: ASTER GDEM, a product 
of METI and NASA 
  
Decreto 190 
Cedritos 
  
124 
This phenomenon presumably will lead to the consolidation of a new CBD of the city 
further northwards, away and disconnected from the majority of the working class 
population living in the South and West. 
Paradoxically, the private sector developers have not redirected development to 
profit from lower land values in the South, which as the maps suggest have maintained the 
heights constrains. Instead, the ordinances have periodically increased the height limits. 
These gradual increments kept housing prices high by maintaining a lid on the supply. 
Nonetheless, the local planning discourse has attributed this uneven densification to 
different causes, such as the wealthier neighborhoods having larger lot sizes, strong real 
estate markets, or better supply of jobs and services. However, all of these qualities of the 
northern areas are rooted in the segregationist zoning policies introduced in the city by 
planning ordinances from the 1940s to the 1960s, such as the Plan Soto-Bateman. 
This system however, has also been effective in maintaining a city with very high 
density levels.  Table 1 shows the historical population and area growth of the city 
according to the different national census. The table illustrates how the city has been 
permanently increasing its population density levels in the last 60 years, notwithstanding 
economic and population growth. The increase in densities from the 1980s to today may 
be attributed to the success of the incremental densification policies. In this period, the city 
went from densities below three hundred inhabitants per hectare to the current estimated 
average of around 350 persons per hectare, a compact density level in comparison with 
other cities in the world. The Density Atlas, an initiative of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, calculates similar densities in the blocks of the Ensanche in Barcelona at 359 
persons per hectare,9 which constitutes a well-regarded example of urban design.  
                                                 
9 Data obtained from http://densityatlas.org/ [Accessed, December 13, 2016]. 
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Table 1: Historical population, area and density in Bogotá 1950–2011 
Data Source: Bogotá, Ciudad de Estadísticas, Boletín 23, Población y Desarrollo Urbano  
(SDP 2010).  
Year Population Developed Area (Ha.) Density (Pop/Ha.) 
1950 648,424 4,091 159 
1964 1,697,311 6,875 247 
1973 2,571,548 9,144 281 
1985 3,982,941 12,805 311 
1993 4,945,458 15,658 316 
2005 6,778,691 21,107 321 
201110 7,980,001 22,912 348 
 
However, when I measured densities at the block level, I discovered that densities 
are very uneven across the city. I obtained from the SDP a database with the projection of 
population per block in the city for the year 2011 based on the information of the census 
2005. I used this data to produce two population density maps. The first map in Figure 23 
measures persons per hectare showing how densities are overall larger than 350 persons 
per hectare in the peripheries of the South and West of the city, while lower in the center 
and the North. In a second step, I used GIS data obtained from the SDP-IDECA website, 
which includes building footprints and heights, to calculate the built area per block. 
Afterwards I calculated the amount of square meters of built area per person using the data 
from the SDP; I show the results in Figure 24.  
.  
                                                 
10 For 2011, the information was drawn from the database of population projection per block obtained from 
the SDP based on the census 2005. 
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Figure 23: Population per hectare by block (2011) 
Source: Illustration by the author using the 2011 projections of population per block 
based on the census 2005 made by the SDP and the DANE. Background Image: ASTER 
GDEM, is a product of METI and NASA 
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Figure 24: M2 of built area per person by block (2011) 
Source: Illustration by the author using the 2011 projections of population per block 
based on the census 2005 made by the SDP and the DANE; and the construction 
footprints and heights database obtained from the IDECA. Background Image: ASTER 
GDEM, is a product of METI and NASA 
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The map shows how uneven the density levels are across the city. In the northern 
localities of Chapinero, Usaquén, Suba, and Teusaquillo, and in the central localities of 
Santa Fe and Los Mártires, the people in the majority of blocks have per capita built areas 
well above 75 square meters. These areas may include residential, parking, first floor retail 
and mixed use. In comparison, a large share of population in the South and West of the city 
has 30 square meters or less of per capita space. The current last phase of history shows 
that policy makers are aware of these unbalances, which reflect the influence of the real 
estate market on city planning authorities. 
While the government introduced Decreto 190 to change the incremental 
densification practices, as the map of heights in the UPZs shows, the private sector 
development forces have continued business as usual using the regulations drafted at the 
local scale. I argue that instead of using the policies in the comprehensive plans, private 
developers and the real estate discourse use the system of socio-spatial segregation, 
represented by Stratification as a de-facto planning tool. In the next chapter, I explain the 
Stratification system in greater detail and examine its role in urban development processes.   
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Chapter 6: Stratification system reinforcing historical spatial trends 
THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM ORIGINS AND POLICY DESIGN 
The Stratification policy has its roots in the unequal structure of Bogotá’s society 
and in the socio-geographic distribution of the population shaped by the historical planning 
regulations. In the 1960s and 1970s, policy makers became concerned with the unequal 
provision of public utilities such as water, sewage, and electricity in Bogotá. While the 
consolidated neighborhoods of the elites had high quality and a full supply of services, the 
majority of middle class and low-income settlements, mostly of informal origin, had no 
utilities or had precarious self-organized illegal connections. As a result, water supply for 
the majority of the population was scarce and polluted; sewage was non-existent, and 
electricity networks highly unreliable. Because of a lack of sewage or waste collection 
services, the lower income populations had greater incidences of disease, people had to 
spend more time accessing clean water, and they suffered from constant fires and damages 
brought by electricity overloads. These conditions were perpetuating the advantages of the 
elites and the conditions of poverty for the majority.  
Policy makers needed to develop a mechanism to bring equity to the utilities system 
by forcing the elites to subsidize the costs of infrastructure in the areas where the low-
income groups lived. In 1968, the government mandated via Decreto 3069 the 
establishment of differentiated utilities charges according to the different economic level 
of social groups (El Presidente de la República de Colombia 1968). However, information 
about both the elites and low-income groups was scarce. At that time, the state had very 
little information about how much households earned, who was rich, who was poor, and 
who deserved to be subsidized. As the tax assessment databases were of very poor quality, 
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each municipality established different stratification systems based on their own, often 
arbitrary, criteria.  
Aware of these problems, in 1994 the national government published an official 
Stratification methodology in Ley 142 (El Congreso de Colombia 1994), which mandated 
the use of this methodology in all the municipalities in the country. The methodology 
established by the DNP took into account the unreliability and unavailability of household 
income data, relying instead on the physical conditions of the buildings and neighborhoods 
to determine the economic level of households, such as indicated in Figure 25. They 
proposed the classification of all of the urban households in maximum six different socio-
economic strata—one being the lowest and six being the highest. Two sets of direct 
variables (DVs) delineated the strata: The first set of variables described the attributes of 
the building proper and its close surroundings, and the second set of variables described 
the urban characteristics of the neighborhood in which it was located. Table 2 shows the 
specific variables of each set. 
Table 2: Direct variables of Stratification according to DNP’s methodology.  
Data source: Sepúlveda Rico, López Camacho, and Gallego Acevedo (2014). Translated 
by the Author. 
 
Set 1: Attributes of the Building and Surroundings11 
Variable Options 
V1: There is a main entrance to the 
houses from the street front 
Yes 
No 
V2: Access roads (road to access 
the street front) 
Path 
Pedestrian road 
Vehicular road on dirt 
Vehicular road on gravel 
Vehicular road on asphalt or cobble 
                                                 
11 Translated by the author from Características de la vivienda y el entorno 
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Table 2 continued. 
 
 
V3: Prevailing size of the 
building’s front on the street access 
Up to 7 meters 
Between 7 and 9 meters 
Between 9 and 12 meters 
More than 12 meters 
V4: Sidewalk (prevailing state at 
the block front) 
Without Sidewalk 
Sidewalk without green area 
Sidewalk with green area 
V5: Setback (prevailing at the 
block front) 
With setback 
With small setback 
With moderate setback 
With large setback 
V6: Garages (prevailing state at the 
block front) 
Without garage or parking area 
With covered garaged used for other purposes 
With garage or parking area 
With garage attached to house 
With single garage part of the original house 
design 
With underground double garages  
V7: Facade material (prevailing at 
the block front) 
Bamboo, cane, mat, boards or waste material 
Without wall finishes: adobe, rammed earth, 
bricks, prefabricated board    
Plaster without paint 
Plaster with paint 
With wall finishes in masonry or wood 
V8: Roof material (prevailing at 
the block front) 
Waste material, asphalt fabric or pieces of 
roof tiles 
Floor plaque 
Roof terrace or simple cover 
Luxurious or ornamental 
Set 2: Urban Characteristics12 
Variable Options 
Zones determined by the habitat 
criteria in which the urban block is 
located 
Poverty area 
Red-light district 
Self-help housing without consolidation 
Urban blight 
Industrial 
Consolidated self-help housing 
Commercial predominant 
Intermediate Residential 
Commercial compatible 
Exclusive Residential 
Low-density Residential 
                                                 
12 Translated by the author from Contexto urbanístico 
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Table 2 continued. 
 
 Institutional 
Vacant 
Green area 
Following the mandate of Ley 142, the city of Bogotá conducted its first 
Stratification census in 1997. However, due to its size and complexity, Bogotá changed the 
methodology in three ways (Sepúlveda Rico, López Camacho, and Gallego Acevedo 
2014). First, while the DNP intended to assign a stratum to every building in small 
municipalities and to each street front in larger cities, in Bogotá, the stratum was assigned 
to the whole block. Second, in addition to the set of variables introduced by the DNP, 
Bogotá incorporated a set of new indicators abridged in the term Habitat Zones (HZ). This 
form of zoning classifies every block of the city in twenty different zones depending upon 
its physical and social characteristics. Table 3 shows the HZs in Bogotá. Thirdly, in order 
to incorporate the HZs into the DV methodology developed by the DNP, Bogotá used a 
Bivariate Dalenius statistical method. As a result, in order to determine the strata in Bogotá, 
the methodology combined the set of DVs and HZs in the following equation: 
Strata = DV + HZ     (Ibatá-Ceballos and Torres-Arias 2006, 215) 
The Ley 142 of 1994 and subsequent regulations also mandated that every 
municipality in Colombia update its Stratification every two to a maximum of four years. 
For that purpose, the law requires the creation of a Comité Permanente de Estratificación 
Socio-Económica [Permanent Committee of Socio-Economic Stratification] in every city, 
to advise the mayor on the application and update of DNP’s Stratification methodologies.  
Stratification’s updates may refer to the evaluation of citizen’s requests—if there is 
any—to modify the stratum of a determined area, or stratum assignation of new blocks in 
areas where new development—or redevelopment—is taking place. Between 1999 when 
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the first Stratification update took place and 2016, Bogotá has conducted six updates. The 
last dates from 2013, when 35,000 new houses were stratified and 37 blocks changed 
stratum. According to this latest update (Decreto 291 de 2013) shown in Figure 26, in 
Bogotá, 50 percent of the population lives in newer informal settlements or projects of 
affordable housing, classified as strata 1 and 2, and 36 percent live in areas of older and 
consolidated informal settlements or affordable housing multifamily blocks, classified as 
Stratum 3. AOnly 14 percent of the population live in neighborhoods product of single 
housing or multifamily formal subdivisions, classified as strata 4, 5 and 6, concentrated 
mostly in the North of the city. 
Table 3: Habitat Zones of Bogotá.  
( - ) Means less intensity, and ( + ) means more intensity of the land use. Data Source: 
Instituto de Estudios Urbanos (IEU). Translated by the Author 
 
1. Poverty ( - ) 11. Commercial ( + ) 
2. Poverty ( + ) 12. Intermediate Residential ( - ) 
3. Red-Light District 13. Intermediate Residential ( + ) 
4. Self-help housing not consolidated ( - ) 14. Commercial compatible 
5. Self-help housing not consolidated ( + ) 15. Exclusive Residential ( - ) 
6. Urban blight 16. Exclusive Residential ( + ) 
7. Industry 17. Low-density residential 
8. Self-help housing consolidated ( - ) 18. Institutional 
9. Self-help housing consolidated ( + ) 19. Vacant 
10. Commercial ( - ) 20. Green area 
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Figure 25: Examples of the built form differences among strata in Bogotá. 
Source: La Estratificación en Bogotá D.C. y Estudios Relacionados 1983-2004 (DAPD 
2004) 
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Figure 26: Latest map of the Stratification system in Bogotá. 
Source: Decreto 291 of 2013  
  
  
136 
CRITICISM OF THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM  
Despite its role in perpetuating spatial disparities, the Stratification system has been 
very successful in developing utility infrastructure for the very poor. However, local 
scholars have criticized the Stratification policy on methodological and social grounds. The 
general population and also many scholars and policy makers associate the Stratification 
with poverty levels, but data show that this relationship is complex. Figure 27 shows the 
percentage of total population in each stratum and Figure 28 shows the percentage of 
households in poverty in each stratum. The figures show that poverty levels are overall 
larger in the lower strata areas where the majority live than in the higher strata where a 
minority live, consistent with the policy assumptions. However, there are inconsistencies. 
For instance, not all the population in Stratum 1 lives in poverty. In Stratum 1, 50 percent 
live in poverty while 36 percent live in poverty in Stratum 2. The relationship becomes 
more complicated in higher strata areas. According to this official data, in Stratum 6—the 
highest—there is actually a larger percentage of population living in poverty that in Stratum 
5.  
The SDP conducted the first study that questioned the assumptions of Stratification 
in Bogotá (DAPD 2004). This study built statistical models based on surveys with socio-
economic data and found different pitfalls on the Stratification methodology. Regarding its 
capacity to predict the economic conditions of households, it outlined that, in reality, the 
regulation’s determination of six strata was arbitrary. According to the statistical models, 
there was a lag on the quantity of households both in the lowest stratum (1) and in the 
highest (6). This means that there is a large variability of income among households 
belonging to both the lowest and the highest strata. They recommended the creation of a 
new category at the highest level, Stratum 7. 
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Figure 27: Number and percentage of population per stratum (2013) 
Source: Illustration by the author with data from the website of the SDP: www.sdp.gov 
(Accessed, December 1st, 2016) 
 
Figure 28: Percentage of households in poverty per stratum (2011) 
Source: Illustration by the author with data from Ciudad de Estadísticas, Boletín No. 42 
(SDP 2011) 
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Later, Ibatá Ceballos and Torres Arias (2006) conducted the first study where the 
socio-economic statistics surveyed in the national census of 2005, together with data from 
the national survey of unsatisfied needs were compared with the Stratification zones in 
Bogotá. They found that actually there was a heterogeneity of household income levels 
inside each stratum. This meant that the Stratification zones—based on built form 
characteristics—were not an accurate predictor of income levels among the population. 
The authors suggested that the causes were that Stratification surveys to date have only 
stratified new developments, while avoiding the re-stratification of areas changing inside 
the city. The underlying causes of this, the authors pointed out, were that it is politically 
hard for a municipal administration to increase the official stratum of a neighborhood. 
These changes face strong opposition from communities that currently enjoy subsidies. In 
addition, when communities approach the administration to be re-stratified they only 
request to lower their current stratum and therefore enjoy a larger subsidy for utility 
payments. In consequence, the Stratification put in place in the early 1990s has hardly 
changed twenty years later. Regarding this point, during my fieldwork in the summer 2016, 
a city official at the Stratification management at the SDP told me: 
[The census was done and there was a result, afterwards there were the 
reclamations, at that time I was not here. As far as I know, the first update was 
done three years after the original, and from there forward a new update has been 
done every three or four years. However, it is more than anything to incorporate 
what is coming up, as the city is growing new neighborhoods are emerging. Every 
two or three years a new neighborhood is incorporated, and some small sectors 
are reviewed. In general, the majority of the city has the same stratum that was 
defined for it in the year 1996.] 
Se hizo el censo y pues hubo un resultado, después hubo las reclamaciones, en 
esa época yo no estaba acá. Por lo que sé, a los tres años se hizo la primera 
actualización y de ahí en adelante se han ido haciendo cada tres o cuatro años 
actualizaciones. Pero es para incorporar más que todo lo que va surgiendo pues 
la ciudad va creciendo y van apareciendo nuevos barrios, entonces cada dos o 
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tres años se incorpora el Nuevo barrio y se revisan algunos pequeños sectores. 
Pero en general, la mayoría de la ciudad tiene el mismo estrato que se le definió 
en el año 1996.  
Aliaga Linares and Alvarez Rivadulla (2010) performed a study where they 
associated, for the first time, residential segregation scores and Stratification in the city of 
Bogotá. They observed that there was great variability inside the stratum of socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals, like income and education. Therefore, the strata were not, as 
believed, homogeneous in the socio-economic characteristics of individuals inside each 
zone. The authors also claimed that the models of residential segregation when measured 
using stratum as the unit of analysis, indicated larger segregation scores than measured by 
each of Bogotá’s administrative districts—named Localities. This suggested that 
residential segregation within the strata is larger than between the strata in the city.  
The influence of Stratification in residential segregation has been explored largely 
using interviews and life stories by sociologist Uribe-Mallarino (2008). She found deep 
socially constructed differences in perceptions and behaviors among the individuals 
belonging to different strata. Individuals living in lower strata areas in Bogotá have settled 
in self-help houses mostly in urbanizations of informal origin, and individuals in the higher 
strata areas live mainly in apartments that offer higher social status and security. Research 
found that these urban form differences have influenced the patterns of social appropriation 
of the territory. As a result, people feel alienated if moving upwards into apartments or 
downward into self-help built houses, and thus prefer to stay in their own stratum. Among 
her interviewees, however, she also found strong geographical perceptions about the 
division North-South of the city. These perceptions even go beyond those in place by 
Stratification. Individuals, for instance, responded that a neighborhood of any stratum is 
“safer” if it is located in the North, rather than the South.  
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Mobility is another field where society builds separation according to stratum. 
When asked about places people want to visit for leisure, the majority of the population 
prefers places classified in their own stratum. This limits the chances of interaction among 
social classes. This phenomenon worsens when taking into account the acute differences 
in access to high quality education. People in Stratum 1 and Stratum 2, i.e. lower-income 
classes, send their children to public schools, while the higher levels (4, 5 and 6) use 
exclusively private education. However, Uribe-Mallarino also found evidence of social 
benefits in cases of proximity between higher and lower strata. Border areas, especially 
between strata 3 and 5, are places of interaction. Evidence indicate that individuals 
belonging to the higher strata in these cases prefer to walk and use local businesses located 
in the lower strata areas, instead of using the car to move to farther out locations for 
shopping. 
During the leftist administration of Mayor Petro the criticism of the Stratification 
system finally emerged from the academic debate and began to influence public policy. 
During this period, the local government funded several research initiatives to find new 
policies to replace Stratification. Petro also officially requested permission from the 
national government to eliminate the Stratification system in Bogotá. A significant 
outcome of these initiatives was a publically funded study led by professors of the School 
of Economics of the Universidad del Rosario. In the resulting book (Sepúlveda Rico, 
López Camacho, and Gallego Acevedo 2014), scholars argue that Bogotá’s tax assessment 
system, formerly very inaccurate, is already mature enough to take the place of 
Stratification as the method to distribute cross-subsidies for utility payments. As a result, 
the subsequent administration of Mayor Peñalosa passed a regulation that removed the 
  
141 
differentiated percentage according to the stratum over the appraisal value to charge the 
property tax, and instead set the tax bill based only on the appraisal values. 
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM AND URBAN PLANNING 
The Stratification system has an unclear relationship with planning ordinances. In 
the Ley 388 (Congreso de Colombia 1997), the term stratum, strata, or Stratification is only 
mentioned twice and only in articles that deal with the provision of public utilities. 
However, in the current comprehensive plan of the city, Stratification seems to have more 
importance. Decreto 190 mentions the policy as one of the variables to account for when 
drafting the UPZs’ land-use and development ordinances (Alcalde Mayor de Bogotá D.C. 
2004, Art. 50). However, these UPZs ordinances only have validity at the local scale, and 
actually only a few of the UPZs include neighborhoods of different strata. This limits any 
attempt to incorporate Stratification into any larger comprehensive physical planning 
initiative. 
In my conversations with planners who were drafting the new POT of the city, I 
found that they do not consider the social divisions or the Stratification system as an 
important planning variable. According to them, the physical characteristics of a site, such 
as large parcel sizes, are more important to incentivize densification in any area. They 
argue that Stratification does not affect land-use patterns, or the maximum height, density, 
or bulk of buildings in a neighborhood. They use Stratification only as a variable for 
diagnosis. Moreover, this variable will become irrelevant in the future, as “the social 
differentiations in the city have ceased to exist” (Notes on interview with policy maker at 
the SDP. June 2016). A planning scholar with forty years of experience working in the city 
explains about Stratification: 
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[No, it was not really a relevant indicator; mainly it was a complementary 
confirmation of the way we saw development taking place. It was fundamentally 
morphological, it was the configuration of that neighborhood, how it was 
connected, which was the main highway, does it connect or not connect, it was 
more that. That planning indicator has been important but more in terms of 
Catastro (tax assessment office), in terms of public billing services of 
companies… The public sector has seen it always as a result, but not as a policy 
instrument. As a result of a way of operationalizing the management of those 
areas, but not as a basis for making decisions.] 
No, realmente no era un dato relevante, principalmente era un complemento de 
confirmación de lo que veíamos de la manera a través de la cual estaba 
desarrollando, era fundamentalmente morfológico, era la configuración de ese 
barrio, cómo estaba conectado, cuál era la carretera principal, se conecta, no se 
conecta, era más eso. Ese dato a planeación le ha importado mucho pero en 
términos de Catastro, en términos de servicio público de cobro de las empresas… 
El sector público lo ha visto siempre como un resultado, pero no como 
instrumento de política. Como resultado de una manera de hacer operativo el 
manejo de esas áreas, pero no como un dato de base para tomar decisiones. 
In contradistinction, planners at the SDP believe that infrastructure is more 
important in triggering investments from the private sector. They provide as an example 
the new infill projects in the peripheral southwest of the city, where large new housing 
complexes are built within older neighborhoods of informal origin, mainly motivated by 
the introduction of the BRT system and new roads. An urban planner working in the new 
POT of the city explains:  
[As soon as the area got the Transmilenio (BRT transit system), all that filled up 
with projects of developers, and now it even has shopping malls. Therefore, it has 
to do more with existing attributes; builders obviously are not going to go where 
there is no infrastructure, where there is the risk of flooding, where there is no 
public transportation. As soon as they had it they arrived there, you can see it 
from the aerial photography and urban morphology, it is very clear, and if you 
look at historical pictures, you can see very clearly, let us say the (changing) 
vocation of the areas. That has nothing to do with Stratification as such; the city 
gave them a name and suddenly no one wants to live there? No, it has to do with 
the available infrastructure, living conditions, and urban services. As all of that 
changed, the area filled up with constructed projects.] 
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Apenas la zona tuvo Transmilenio todo eso se llenó de proyectos de constructores 
y ahora tiene centros comerciales. Entonces tiene que ver más con los atributos 
existentes, los constructores obviamente no van a llegar donde no hay 
infraestructura, donde hay condiciones de riesgo de inundación, donde no hay 
transporte público. Apenas lo hubo allí llegaron y tú lo puedes ver en las 
aerofotografías y la morfología urbana es muy clara, y si lo miras en fotos 
históricas puedes ver muy claramente digamos la vocación del sector. Eso no 
tiene nada que ver con la Estratificación propiamente dicha, la ciudad fue la que 
le puso ese nombre y pues ¿nadie quiere vivir allá? No, tiene que ver con la 
infraestructura disponible, las condiciones de habitabilidad y de soportes 
urbanos. Apenas eso cambió se llenó de proyectos construidos. 
However, when I inquired about incremental densification in central city areas, the 
clear relationship between infrastructures, transit improves, and new development became 
uncertain for the interviewees. Recent studies suggest that the relationship between 
infrastructure and urban development is very complex and not homogeneous inside 
Bogotá. A study by Munoz-Raskin (2010) found that the social stratum was an important 
factor that influenced the change in value of lands in the proximity of BRT stations. While 
in the middle strata areas, the lands in proximity with BRT stations increased their value 
after the system was put in place, in the lower strata areas, properties located close to 
stations decreased in value. In the same way, other researchers found in Bogotá that the 
introduction of the BRT corridors had complex and context dependent impacts in the 
surrounding built environment (Rodríguez, Vergel-Tovar, and Camargo 2016). This 
suggests that infrastructure improvements are not the only variable to take into account to 
explain the patterns of densification inside the city. The findings of this study confirm that 
the importance of Stratification in restricting or encouraging densification may depend on 
the type and location of development. Stratification seems to be an important variable in 
predicting densification in the central city and consolidated areas, while it is not relevant 
for newly built densification projects located in the in-fill or expansion areas. This is 
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because the in-fill and expansion areas are not stratified until after they are developed, and 
thus are perceived by the public as open and virgin areas.  
Viewing Stratification as an irrelevant variable for physical planning may also lead 
to a neglect of social differences. Feminist scholar Iris Marion Young (1990, 164–65) 
claimed that policies that ignore social differences as a means to achieve greater equality 
may have oppressive consequences. Young explains that oppressed social groups often 
have to prove themselves as equals by achieving high standards, previously set by the 
dominant group or by those who arrived first. As a result, minorities or newcomers are in 
a disadvantaged position, making it difficult for them to achieve those standards, thus 
perpetuating their oppression. The uneven urban form of Bogotá illustrates how these high 
standards, derived from the Stratification system, serve to perpetuate social divides. 
As explained in the previous chapter, during the 1950s, one of the major obstacles 
to legalize the informal neighborhoods was the urbanization standards set by the city. These 
standards required specific lot sizes and a high level of infrastructure and provision of 
utilities before awarding urbanization permits. Policy makers solved this obstacle when 
they passed the regulation that set the Normas Mínimas. Confronting the high rates of 
migration and housing deficits of the time, these rules allowed the already built informal 
settlements to be legalized. However, the Normas Mínimas also encouraged the 
development of new informal settlements as they provided legal grounds for the action of 
illegal developers. The result of these processes is that the city was divided between areas 
of formal origin with larger property sizes and better infrastructure, and areas of informal 
origin that barely comply with the Normas Mínimas, with smaller lot sizes and no utilities 
or urban services. Years later, Stratification became a policy that achieved a large social 
benefit by highlighting these differences in the urban form to develop a system of cross-
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subsidies between social classes. This system facilitated the funding of the infrastructure 
needed to upgrade the utilities into the settlements of informal origin. 
However, while policy makers enthusiastically implemented Stratification 
nationwide as a utility policy, they never clearly related Stratification to the physical 
planning ordinances. This placed the neighborhoods of informal origin at a disadvantage 
against the formal city in terms of land market values. For instance, the urban treatments 
set in Decreto 190 encouraged incremental densification by allowing increasing height and 
FAR limits in areas where lots were larger—classifying them in the more beneficial 
treatments of Densificación Moderada and Cambio de Patrón.  
On the other hand, the Decreto 190 classified informal settlements that have gone 
through legalization and tenure programs as Mejoramiento Integral. This tratamiento 
designation allows only limited heights because of the smaller lot sizes and lack of 
infrastructure. This lack of parity between zoning ordinances led to the multiplication of 
land values in the formal areas while freezing land values in the neighborhoods of informal 
origin. As a result, the size of the lots becomes the standard set by the dominant group—
city planners—over the vulnerable—owners of properties in informal settlements. Policy 
makers in Bogotá are aware of this paradox, but they appear to have not found a fair policy 
solution to it. A senior policy maker involved in the process of the Decreto 190 explains:  
[What happens with those areas (neighborhoods of informal origin) is that they 
have problems in instituting the zoning ordinances. They are very complicated 
because the standard that was being applied to these neighborhoods, which were 
legalized, was a standard very similar to that for the other neighborhoods, which 
people did not meet. They do not have yards, or setbacks; those were useless 
prehistoric standards. People continued to build as they liked, occupying a 100 
percent of the lots. These lots are occupied entirely leaving only a small patio for 
example; it is a very different type of housing. Then, that type of housing 
produces another thing and when you go to set the zoning standards in those 
neighborhoods, no one knows what to institute. Allowing densities of five stories 
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without thinking much beyond that, because you are not going to limit the low-
income sector from doing those things.] 
Lo que pasa con esos sectores, es que tienen unos problemas para hacer la 
norma. Son muy complicados porque la norma que se les aplicaba a los barrios 
que se legalizaron era una norma muy parecida a los otros barrios, que la gente 
no cumplía, ni tienen jardín, ni antejardín, eran normas prehistóricas que nunca 
servían. La gente siguió construyendo como les parecía, ocupando los lotes en un 
100 por ciento. Estos lotes son ocupados en su totalidad con un patio, por 
ejemplo, es un tipo de vivienda muy distinto. Entonces ese tipo de vivienda da 
otra cosa y cuando usted pasa para poner normas en esos barrios, nadie sabe 
bien que poner. Poner normas de densidades de cinco pisos sin pensar mucho 
más allá de eso porque usted no le va a limitar al sector popular hacer esas 
cosas. 
Young also describes how the ideal of a universal humanity without social group 
differences allows privileged groups to ignore their own group specificity and advantages. 
I found evidence of this phenomenon in the Bogotá case, specifically concerning different 
perceptions of the system between people in different strata areas. The dominant groups 
perceive that they live in an egalitarian society and do not notice the conditions of 
disadvantage of the oppressed. Uribe-Mallarino and colleagues found evidence of Young’s 
point in their surveys of people in different strata areas in Bogotá. They affirm (2006, 91):  
[Those in higher strata manifest themselves as egalitarian, well they are convinced 
that everybody has the same opportunities, as much as those in lower strata 
believe that there are not equal opportunities for all, and they conceive the policy 
of Stratification as ‘exacerbating differences and promoting social segregation.’]  
Los estratos altos se manifiestan igualitarios, pues están convencidos de que 
todos pueden tener las mismas oportunidades, en tanto que los estratos bajos no 
creen que haya oportunidades iguales para todos y conciben a la política de 
Estratificación como “exacerbando las diferencias y promoviendo la 
discriminación social.”  
Nevertheless, the data about city development reaffirms that there is a relationship 
between Stratification and urban planning. Figure 29 compares the height limits of each of 
the historical plans since Acuerdo 7 of 1979 aggregated by the Stratification system. The 
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graph shows that Acuerdo 7 allowed higher heights in the areas of strata 3 and 4 and lower 
in the uppermost and lowermost strata. However, later Acuerdo 6 increased heights in the 
higher strata 5 and 6 to reach the levels of the strata 3 and 4, while keeping the restriction 
in heights in the lower strata 1 and 2. Further, the rules of the UPZs largely increased the 
height limits in the areas of strata 4, 5 and 6 and to a lesser extent in strata 2 and 3. The 
UPZs decreased the average height limits for Stratum 1. The results of the graph further 
confirm the social disparities set by the historical planning regulations, which have 
reinforced the difference in the urban form and thus the patterns of social segregation 
between the North and the South, shown in Figure 30.   
I also aggregated the density per block at the stratum level in Figure 31 and Figure 
32. The first graph shows how densities per hectare are very uneven across the different 
stratum. While Stratum 2 has a density that exceeds the average for the city, the higher 
stratum areas are much less dense. For instance, the neighborhoods classified as Stratum 5 
have an average density of about 150 persons per hectare and Stratum 6 of less than one 
hundred persons per hectare. In the same way, Figure 32 shows the uneven indicator of 
built area per person across the strata. While a person living in a neighborhood of Stratum 
6 have on average 802 square meters of built area; a person living in Stratum 1 have an 
area twenty times less, averaging 36 square meters per capita. In order to confirm further 
this relationship and its consequences, in the next chapter I will use data from the building 
permits issued in the period 2010–2015, which I obtained at the SDP, to associate 
statistically the incremental densification with the Stratification system. I will explore these 
unbalances and confirm further the relationship between densification and stratification 
and its consequences in the next chapter. For this purpose, I will use data from the building 
permits granted in the period 2010-2015 obtained at the SDP.  
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Figure 29: Height limits compared aggregated by Stratification 
Source: Official maps Acuerdo 7 of 1979, Acuerdo 6, 1990 and SDP-SINUPOT 
  
Figure 30: The urban form differences between the North and the South 
Source: Photos taken by the author 
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Figure 31: Average population per hectare aggregated by strata in 2011 
Source: Illustration by the author using the 2011 projections of population per block 
based on the census 2005 made by the SDP and the DANE 
 
Figure 32: Average built area per person aggregated by strata in 2011 
Source: Illustration by the author using the 2011 projections of population per block 
based on the 2005 census made by the SDP and the DANE; and the construction 
footprints and heights database obtained from the IDECA. Includes all built area such as 
housing, parking, retail and circulation. 
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Chapter 7: Correlation Stratification, densification and segregation 
The Stratification system is a social equity policy based on existing urban form 
differences across the city. The urban form differences respond to planning policies that 
shaped a system of social segregation based on density and land-use norms from the 1940s 
to the 1970s. Therefore, the Stratification zones are correlated with the different built form 
characteristics of neighborhoods such as architectural typologies, street layout, and supply 
of parks, plazas and open spaces. Specifically, the areas of lower strata, because of their 
informal origin, have less quantity of parks and open spaces, narrower streets and poor 
pedestrian infrastructure. Conversely, the areas of higher strata, because of their formal 
origin, have wider roads, better infrastructure and more quantity of green spaces. While 
Stratification has been an important tool to subsidize the development of utility 
infrastructure for the very poor, the planning history of the city—explained in detail in the 
previous chapters—suggests that local policy makers have not conjoined this system of 
interclass solidarity with the urban planning objectives of the city.  
A better integration of the social Stratification with the planning policies, for 
example, could have led to a better distribution of the value gained by real estate 
development and also reduce socio-spatial segregation. Instead, my analysis suggests that 
policy and local planners downplay the ways in which the patterns of socio-spatial 
segregation—which are embodied in the Stratification system—influence landowners and 
developers and hence determine the location and size of incremental densification projects.  
To explore this point, in this chapter I will explore the statistical relationship 
between densification patterns—i.e. location and size of new densification projects—and 
Stratification. To operationalize this approach, first I will statistically relate the system of 
Stratification with the production of new housing and nonresidential projects in the city. 
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As discussed before, I will not control for other built form variables such as supply of 
parks, roads or the street layout because as the history of planning in the city suggest, these 
may be correlated with the stratum.  
Nonetheless, to cross-validate the results with the perceptions of the local planners’ 
community, I will control for other factors not related to Stratification that they argue are 
shaping developers’ investment decisions. Specifically, I will control for access to the 
newly implemented BRT system (Transmilenio), which since 2000 has been connecting 
areas of different strata and which could potentially be catalyzing new patterns of 
development. Secondly, I will control for parcel (lot) size since this is an important variable 
for developers. Often, planning norms permit larger developments on larger lots, and lot 
sizes are not correlated with the stratum. For instance, older areas of informal development 
in lower strata have actually parcel sizes similar to those of the formal areas in higher strata.  
To perform my analysis, I obtained a database from the Direction of Statistics, 
Cartography and Information of the SDP, which contains information about all the building 
permits granted in the city in the period 2010 to 2015. The GIS database contains the geo-
referenced location of each new project and other information such as the identification of 
the applied zoning ordinance, approved land use, approved area for construction, lot size, 
and approved height. I used this database to identify projects that contributed to 
incremental densification. I did this by selecting 2,060 projects of densification with the 
following criteria: buildings with heights of four stories or more, lot areas between 100 and 
5,000 square meters, and total built areas between 100 and 10,000 square meters. For 
nonresidential land uses—including retail, public services, and office—I selected 236 
permits from the database using the same criteria. I then calculated their distance to the 
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nearest BRT trunk line—a transportation system that is widely used in the city—using the 
function “Near” in ArcGIS.  
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Before conducting the econometric analysis, I used the GIS database to explore the 
recent patterns of development in the city. First, data about the total built area of each 
construction permit for both housing and nonresidential land-use suggests that incremental 
densification is the most used method for urban redevelopment in the city. The ordinances 
introduced by Law 388 and Decreto 190 aimed to discourage incremental densification, 
and instead proposed the use of PPs to ensure that urban growth maintains adequate supply 
of services and infrastructure, such as parks, roads or schools. However, the data shown in 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 demonstrate that densification through PPs in the period analyzed 
only accounted for 6 percent of the densification in housing, and 7 percent of the 
densification in nonresidential land-use. These results demonstrate that incremental 
densification is a well-established, unofficial redevelopment tool, making it a challenge to 
transition to a more formal planning model for larger sections of the city.  
The preliminary analysis shows that private sector-led densification is unevenly 
distributed across strata (Figure 35). For instance, while Stratum 6 accounts for only 7 
percent of the land area in the city, developers located 30 percent of the new housing 
projects and 32 percent of the new nonresidential projects in this stratum. Conversely, 
Stratum 2 accounts for 30 percent of the land in the city, but developers only located 4 
percent of the new housing areas and a mere 2 percent of the new nonresidential areas in 
this stratum. In addition, there were other imbalances related to the relationship between 
housing and nonresidential areas. 
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Figure 33: Housing densification by zoning ordinance 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
 
Figure 34: Nonresidential densification by zoning ordinance 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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For instance, Stratum 4 accounts for 12 percent of the urban land but has a 19 percent share 
of new housing areas. Strata 4, 5 and 6 together account for more than 75 percent of the 
new housing projects, and more than 60 percent of the new nonresidential projects, while 
they represent less than 30 percent of the urban land. 
Figure 36 shows the evolution per year of these new projects by stratum. The graph 
for housing shows how the production in the upper strata 5 and 6 is larger and more elastic, 
in comparison with a more stable and lower production of housing in the lower strata 2 and 
3—and almost zero new housing production in Stratum 1. However, the graph suggests 
some changing trends, specifically about new construction in Stratum 3 for the years 2014 
and 2015. In this last year of the analysis, Stratum 3 surpassed the traditional leader, 
Stratum 6, in new housing area.  
On the other hand, in terms of new nonresidential projects the chart shows how 
developers produce nonresidential almost exclusively in strata 3, 4, 5 and 6, and very few 
areas in the lowermost strata. Production of nonresidential areas is also in general more 
elastic than housing, however also with a large representation in Stratum 6. Finally, the 
graph also identifies a new growing trend of nonresidential areas in Stratum 4 for 2015, 
which also represents a change from previous years.  
The size and location of the incremental densification housing projects vary across 
the city. Figure 37 shows how developers choose to locate the majority of the housing 
projects in the northern localities of Usaquén and Chapinero. Projects within these two 
localities were also overall larger with total approved areas averaging more than 2,500 
square meters. In contrast, the majority of the incremental densification housing projects 
in other localities in the South and West, such as Puente Aranda, Los Mártires, Rafael 
Uribe, Engativá and Fontibón were smaller than 1,000 square meters.  
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Figure 35: Stratification and densification, percentages 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 36: Stratification and densification new built area 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
  
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
New densification housing projects by strata (m2)
6
5
4
3
2
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
New densification nonresidential projects by strata (m2)
6
5
4
3
  
157 
Figure 38 suggests that this pattern relates to the Stratification system. The map in 
the figure overlays the housing densification projects to the Stratification map of the city. 
This shows the correlation between Stratification and incremental densification. While 
densification housing projects are very close to each other in the neighborhoods of the 
Stratum 6, they are more isolated and dispersed in the areas of strata 3, 4, and 5, while there 
are almost no new housing projects in the areas of strata 1 and 2.  
As Figure 39 suggests, the location of the densification housing projects have no 
visual correlation with the public transit system—in this case the trunk lines of the BRT. 
Across the city, the projects locate both within walking distances of less than 1,000 meters 
of the system but also further away. Specifically, along the piedmont of the eastern hills, 
developers choose to locate larger projects further away from the BRT, with distances of 
2,000 meters or more to the nearest trunk line. This motivated me, as next step, to develop 
the scatter plot shown in Figure 40 in order to understand the relationship between built 
areas, the distance to the BRT, and the stratum.  
The scatterplot shows how the projects across the strata have a different relationship 
with the variables in the study. The projects in areas of Stratum 3 are overall smaller, and 
most of them locate within walkable distance to the BRT. In contrast, projects in higher 
strata 4, 5 and 6 are larger, but do not show a definitive location pattern in relation to the 
BRT, both locating close to the trunk lines and also further apart. 
  
158 
 
Figure 37: Location and size of densification housing 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 38: Location and strata of densification housing 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 39: Location and BRT densification housing 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 40: Housing scatter plot of built area, distance to BRT and strata 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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In terms of new nonresidential projects, Figure 41 shows how the projects are 
highly clustered across the city. They cluster mostly in the locality of Chapinero in the 
northeast, with other clusters of much lower scale scattered in Usaquén, Barrios Unidos, 
Teusaquillo, Kennedy, Fontibón and Puente Aranda. Clusters include both large 
nonresidential projects with more than 2,500 square meters of built area, and smaller 
projects with less than 1,000 square meters of size. Furthermore, the map in Figure 42 
overlays the location of the nonresidential projects to the Stratification map. It shows how 
nonresidential land-use is located exclusively in the strata 3, 4, 5 and 6 areas, with the 
largest cluster in the strata 5 and 6 in the Chapinero.  
Figure 43 shows the location of the nonresidential projects in relation to the BRT 
trunk lines. As the map suggests, most of the projects locate within a walking distance to 
the BRT—except for a few isolated small nonresidential clusters in eastern Usaquén and 
in central Kennedy. Figure 44 shows a scatterplot of the relationship between built area 
and distance to the BRT for nonresidential projects. The graph suggests that nonresidential 
location patterns in Stratum 3 are different from Stratum 6. Similarly than in housing 
projects, nonresidential projects in lower strata have less built area than in the higher strata, 
while they tend to locate closer to the BRT trunk lines.   
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Figure 41: Location and size of densification nonresidential 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 42: Location and strata of densification nonresidential 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 43: Location and BRT densification nonresidential 2010-2015 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
  
  
166 
 
Figure 44: Nonresidential scatter plot of built area, distance to BRT and strata 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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As a second step, after determining that there is more development in the upper 
strata areas and observing a visual correlation between the location of projects and the 
stratum, I used the GIS database to assess the relationship between strata with the size of 
each project. In this case, I am using the size of each project as the dependent variable 
because the planning history of the city suggests that construction firms and landowners 
have exerted control over the zoning codes. As a result, they have focused development in 
the wealthier neighborhoods, capturing most of the formal private investment. I wanted to 
assess if this continues to be true under the latest growth management and densification 
policies..   
I chose to control for other physical and locational factors that may influence the 
size of projects based on the interviews with policy makers. Planners at the SDP—as I 
showed in Chapter 6—suggest that access to transit and the size of the lots may be stronger 
variables than the stratum to predict the size of each project. Consequently, the first control 
factor I selected was the distance to the BRT trunk lines, measured in meters. In theory, 
developers may prefer to pursue larger projects in areas within walking distance to the BRT 
trunk lines as the system is widely used. The second control factor is the size of the lot. 
The interviews with both agents in the construction industry and policy makers suggested 
that developers are prone to invest in neighborhoods with larger lots. This facilitates the 
process of acquiring properties for redevelopment and often bring benefits in the planning 
ordinances.13 Finally, I could have used the FAR as a dependent variable. However, this 
indicator would not have allowed me to control for lot sizes, since FAR is determined by 
the built area over the lot size. 
                                                 
13 Many density norms in the UPZs allow building higher when the parcel fronts are wider. 
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The analysis suggests that the effect of Stratification on the size of the densification 
housing and nonresidential projects is larger than the influence of factors related to access 
to transit and the size of the lots. Table 4 and Table 5 provide descriptive statistics of the 
variables selected for housing and nonresidential land-use respectively. The tables show 
that the data of the variables do not follow a normal distribution. In terms of housing, most 
of the projects in the sample have built areas up to about 5,000 square meters within my 
upper limit set at 10,000, while their lot sizes reach mostly 700 square meters, up to the 
limit set at 5,000. Finally, most of the projects are located within 1,000 meters of the BRT, 
with fewer projects located within a maximum of around 4,000 meters. In nonresidential 
land-use, the distribution is even more skewed. Almost all the projects are sized between 
100 and 3,000 square meters up to the maximum of 10,000, with lot areas averaging 500 
square meters, far below the highest limit of 5,000. Most of the projects also have distances 
below 1,000 meters to the BRT with a maximum distance of almost 3,000. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables of housing densification 
Total Built Area (m2) Housing 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
100 648 2,416 2,940 4,500 9,998 
Lot Area (m2) Housing 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
100 175 381 544 730 4,833 
Distance to BRT (m) Housing 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
6 358 703 901 1,299 4,026 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables of nonresidential densification 
Total Built Area (m2) Nonresidential 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
157 556 1,220 2,331 3,372 9,913 
Lot Area (m2) Nonresidential 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
66 237 394 522 705 3,097 
Distance to BRT (m) Nonresidential 
Min. 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max. 
26 239 486 707 994 2930 
 
CORRELATION STRATIFICATION AND INCREMENTAL DENSIFICATION 
Linear models 
Aware of the non-linearity of the variables, I formulated OLS regressions to explore 
the results of predicting the total built area of each project using the stratum, the distance 
to the BRT, and the lot areas, as explanatory variables, for both housing and nonresidential 
land-use independently. Firstly, for housing incremental densification, in equation (F (3, 
2056) = 1126, p < 2.2e-16), with an R2 of .6217, the common logarithm of the predicted 
total built area of each project is equal to -1291 + 514 (Stratum) + 0.15 (Distance to BRT) 
+ 2.62 (Lot Area). All the coefficients are significant predictors at p < 0.001.  
According to the interpretation of the coefficients, if the distance to the BRT and 
the lot area are constant, every increase in stratum results in an increase of 514 square 
meters in the average mean of the built area of each housing project. On the other hand, if 
both stratum and lot area are constant, for every increase of one meter in the distance to the 
BRT, we can expect an increase of 0.15 square meters in the average mean of the built 
area. Finally, if both the stratum and the distance to the BRT are constant, for every one 
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increase of one square meter in the lot area, we expect an increase in 2.62 square meters in 
the average mean of the built area. In this case, the signs of the coefficient for stratum and 
lot area are consistent with the theory, as every increase in these variables translates in an 
increase in size of the projects. However, the distance to the BRT coefficient is very small 
but not consistent with the theory. The results suggest that projects become larger with a 
longer distance to transit. I present the specific results of the regression in Table 6. 
Secondly, for nonresidential incremental densification, in equation (F (3, 231) = 
95.22, p < 2.2e-16), with an R2 of .5529, the common logarithm of the predicted total built 
area of each project is equal to -1289 + 508 (Stratum) - 0.31 (Distance to BRT) + 3.56 (Lot 
Area). All the coefficients are significant predictors at p < 0.001. According to the 
interpretation of the coefficients, if the distance to the BRT and the lot area are constant, 
every increase in stratum results in an increase of 508 square meters in the average mean 
of the built area of each housing project. On the other hand, if both stratum and lot area are 
constant, for every increase of one meter in the distance to the BRT, we can expect a 
decrease of 0.31 square meters in the average mean of the built area. Finally, if both the 
stratum and the distance to the BRT are constant, for every one increase of one square 
meter in the lot area, we expect an increase in 3.56 square meters in the average mean of 
the built area. In this case, the signs of the coefficient for all the variables are consistent 
with the theory, as every increase in these variables translates in an increase in size of the 
projects, except for the distance to the BRT, that suggest that projects are larger closer to 
the mass transit lines. I present the exact results in Table 7. 
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Table 6: R output from linear model for housing 
Call: 
lm(formula = BuiA ~ Stratum + DBRT + LotA) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-11647.0   -544.3   -279.8    213.9   7770.6  
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) -1.291e+03  1.067e+02 -12.099  < 2e-16 *** 
Stratum       5.146e+02  2.595e+01  19.830  < 2e-16 *** 
DBRT         1.581e-01  4.593e-02   3.441  0.00059 *** 
LotA         2.628e+00  5.763e-02  45.601  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 1371 on 2056 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.6217,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6211  
F-statistic:  1126 on 3 and 2056 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Table 7: R output from linear model for nonresidential 
Call: 
lm(formula = BuiA ~ Stratum + DBRT + LotA) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-8137.8  -805.0  -238.5   421.0  7059.8  
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) -1289.6540   372.1741  -3.465 0.000632 *** 
Strata        508.2278   101.4734   5.008 1.09e-06 *** 
DBRT           -0.3106     0.1611  -1.928 0.055106 .   
LotA            3.5690     0.2832  12.603  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 1624 on 231 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.5529,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.5471  
F-statistic: 95.22 on 3 and 231 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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As my next step, I tested both housing and nonresidential linear models for 
heteroscedasticity taking in mind the non-normal distribution of the variables object of the 
analysis. To perform this test, I used the set of graphic diagnostics available in the software 
R. The residual vs. fitted values graphs for both housing and nonresidential models show 
a pattern, suggesting positive heteroscedasticity. I attributed the heteroscedasticity to the 
non-normal distribution in the variables. Therefore as next step, I choose to run the model 
using logarithmic transformations.    
Log-log models 
In order to run the model using logarithmic transformation I performed a log 
transformation for the variables built area, distance to BRT and lot area. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the coefficients I did not transform the variable stratum. Figure 45 show 
the transformations in the housing variables through histograms, and Figure 46 shows them 
for nonresidential land-use. Both figures show that the logarithmic transformations achieve 
a distribution closer to the normal. With these transformations, I ran linear log-log models. 
For housing incremental densification, in equation (F (3, 2056) = 3779, p < 2.2e-16), with 
an R2 of .8465, the common logarithm of the predicted total built area of each project is 
equal to 0.54 + 0.14 (Stratum) - 0.004 log(Distance to BRT) + 1.03 log(Lot Area).   
In this case, stratum and the logarithm of the lot area are significant predictors at p 
< 0.001, while the logarithm of the distance to BRT is again not significant. According to 
the interpretation of the coefficients, if both the distance to BRT and the lot area are 
constant, every increase in stratum results in an increase of 15 percent in the average mean 
of the built area of each housing project.  
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Figure 45: Histograms of variables object of study, housing 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 46: Histograms of variables object of study, nonresidential 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
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On the other hand, if the stratum and the distance to the BRT are constant, for every 
increase of 1 percent in the area of the lot, we will expect an increase in 1 percent in the 
average mean of the total built area, which is consistent with the theory. I present the 
specific results of the regression in Table 8. In nonresidential incremental densification, in 
equation (F (3, 231) = 123.5, p < 2.2e-16), with an R2 of .6159, the common logarithm of 
the predicted total built area of each project is equal to 1.48 + 0.21 (Stratum) - 0.09 
log(Distance to BRT) + 0.90 log(Lot Area). In this case, stratum and the logarithm of the 
lot area are significant predictors at p < 0.001, while the logarithm of the distance to BRT 
is significant at p < 0.01. According to the interpretation of the coefficients, if both the 
distance to the BRT and the lot area are constant, every increase in stratum results in an 
increase of 21 percent in the average mean of the built area of each nonresidential project. 
On the other hand, if stratum and lot area are constant, every increase of one meter in the 
distance to the BRT result in a decrease of 0.09 percent in the average mean of the total 
built area. Finally, if the stratum and the distance to the BRT are constant, for every 
increase of 1 percent in the area of the lot, we will expect an increase in 0.9 percent in the 
average mean of the total built area. All the coefficient signs are consistent with the theory. 
I present the specific results of the regression in Table 9. 
In these cases using logarithmic transformations, the plots of residual vs. fitted 
values—in Figure 47 for housing, and in Figure 48 for nonresidential—suggest that there 
is a lessen incidence of heteroscedasticity. Specifically, the residual vs. fitted values 
scatterplot show a more nuanced pattern for the log-log models. In addition, the Q-Q graphs 
show how the log-log models fit better within a linear prediction line. This suggests that 
the log-log transformations achieve a better fit and predictions using this data.  
 
  
176 
Table 8: R output linear model with log transformation for housing 
Call: 
lm(formula = logBuiA ~ Stratum + logDBRT + logLotA) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-2.72392 -0.18300 -0.04229  0.15747  2.45953  
 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.544672   0.087460   6.228 5.73e-10 *** 
Stratum       0.148792   0.008879  16.757  < 2e-16 *** 
logDBRT     -0.004680   0.010001  -0.468     0.64     
logLotA      1.035749   0.013120  78.945  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.4108 on 2056 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.8465,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8463  
F-statistic:  3779 on 3 and 2056 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Table 9: R output linear model with log transformation for nonresidential 
Call: 
lm(formula = logBuiA ~ Stratum + logDBRT + logLotA) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-1.98385 -0.35953 -0.01454  0.29894  2.90302  
 
Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  1.48447    0.39826   3.727 0.000243 *** 
Stratum       0.21958    0.04378   5.016 1.05e-06 *** 
logDBRT     -0.09011    0.04258  -2.116 0.035391 *   
logLotA      0.90852    0.06381  14.238  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.674 on 231 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.6159,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.6109 
F-statistic: 123.5 on 3 and 231 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
  
177 
 
 
Figure 47: Model diagnostic using scatterplots, housing 
Four above: linear; four below: log-log. Source: Illustration by the author based on the 
building permits database obtained from the Direction of Information, Cartography and 
Statistics - SDP 
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Figure 48: Model diagnostic using scatterplots, nonresidential 
Four above: linear; four below: log-log. Source: Illustration by the author based on the 
building permits database obtained from the Direction of Information, Cartography and 
Statistics - SDP 
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Alternative models: Poisson regression and GWR 
In order to explore other alternative ways to account for the heteroscedasticity in 
the data, I first used a Poisson regression model. This model assumes that the distribution 
in the variables is closer to the Poisson curve than to linear. In addition, it assumes the 
logarithm of the expected value, in this case the built area—a method closer to a log-linear 
model. Consequently, I built the Poisson models using the variables in their original form.  
For housing incremental densification the Poisson regression shows that the 
predicted total built area of each project is equal to 5.99 + 0.29 (Stratum) + 0.0008 
(Distance to BRT) + 0.006 (Lot Area), with all the coefficients significant at p < 0.001. 
According to the interpretation of the Poisson coefficients, if both the distance to BRT and 
the lot area are constant, every increase in stratum results in a growth of 33 percent in the 
average mean of the built area (e0.29 = 1.33). On the other hand, if the stratum and the lot 
area are constant, every increase of one meter in the distance to the BRT will result in a 
growth of 1 percent in the average mean of the built area (e0.0008 = 1.00). Finally, if the 
stratum and the distance to the BRT are constant, for every increase of one square meter in 
the area of the lot, we will expect a growth in 1 percent in the average mean of the built 
area (e0.006 = 1.00). I present the specific results of the regression in Table 10.    
For nonresidential incremental densification the Poisson regression of the predicted 
total built area of each project is equal to 6.24 + 0.25 (Stratum) - 0.0021 (Distance to BRT) 
+ 0.009 (Lot Area), with all the coefficients significant at p < 0.001. According to the 
interpretation of the Poisson coefficients, if both the distance to BRT and the lot area are 
constant, every increase in stratum results in a growth of 28 percent in the average mean 
of the built area (e0.25 = 1.28). On the other hand, if the stratum and the lot area are constant, 
every increase of one meter in the distance to the BRT will result in a growth of 1 percent 
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in the average mean of the built area (e0.0021 = 1.00). Finally, if the stratum and the distance 
to the BRT are constant, for every increase of one square meter in the area of the lot, we 
will expect a growth in 1 percent in the average mean of the built area (e0.009 = 1.00). I 
present the specific results of the regression in Table 11. 
Another approach to explore the heteroscedasticity is to use Geographically 
Weighted Regression (GWR). GWR is a methodology of spatial statistical analysis that 
estimates a different local coefficient for each observation. This method was developed to 
explore a non-stationary relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables 
(Anselin 1995). This means that the sign and scale of the coefficients vary across the city. 
A non-stationary condition in a regression model can be identified by conducting a test of 
spatial autocorrelation of the residuals. In this case, I used Moran’s I to identify any spatial 
autocorrelation within the log-log model—the one that provided the best fit. For the 
housing case, results showed a Moran’s I score of 0.5794, with a z-score of 16.2877 and a 
p-value of 0.0000. These results suggested a clustered pattern in the residuals. Therefore, 
as the theory suggest, I decided to use a GWR to determine the non-stationary effects. 
I choose to run GWR to assess the specific correlation between stratum as a 
dependent variable, and distance to BRT as explanatory variable, because in the other 
housing models the distance to BRT showed no statistical significance. Figure 49 shows 
the results of the GWR model. While the global coefficient from the OLS log-log model 
was -0.004, the local coefficients varied for every observation from -0.2 to 0.2.  This 
suggest that there are places in the city where the size of the projects increases with the 
distance to the BRT while in others the size of the projects decreases with the distance to 
the BRT. 
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Table 10: R output for Poisson regression for housing 
Call: 
glm(formula = BuiA ~ Stratum + DBRT + LotA, family = poisson) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
     Min        1Q    Median        3Q       Max   
-255.404   -23.081   -12.862     9.288   123.926   
 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept) 5.992e+00  1.806e-03  3317.1   <2e-16 *** 
Stratum     2.915e-01  3.611e-04   807.4   <2e-16 *** 
DBRT        8.857e-05  6.469e-07   136.9   <2e-16 *** 
LotA        6.095e-04  4.647e-07  1311.4   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for poisson family taken to be 1) 
Null deviance: 3930537  on 2059  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 1818521  on 2056  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 1837289 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5   
Table 11: R output for Poisson regression for nonresidential 
Call: 
glm(formula = BuiA ~ Stratum + DBRT + LotA, family = poisson) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-133.43   -26.24   -14.46    14.32   119.95   
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  6.240e+00  5.015e-03 1244.35   <2e-16 *** 
Stratum      2.565e-01  1.183e-03  216.76   <2e-16 *** 
DBRT      -2.134e-04  2.200e-06  -96.98   <2e-16 *** 
LotA         9.098e-04  2.377e-06  382.78   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for poisson family taken to be 1) 
Null deviance: 500918  on 234  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 249688  on 231  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 251824 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5 
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I underlay a map showing the strata areas to the map with the GWR coefficients to 
facilitate the interpretation of the GWR results. The map suggests that projects become 
larger in proximity to the BRT in the areas of Stratum 3 in the West of the city. Conversely, 
projects are larger with more distance to the BRT in the areas of strata 5 and 6. The figure 
also shows how correlation is not statistically significant in most of the south of Bogotá. 
These results suggests that in Bogotá developers perceive that transit availability is more 
important to incentivize larger projects in Stratum 3 in the West, than for projects in the 
higher strata areas in the North or for projects in the South.  
I also decided to develop a GWR model for the nonresidential land-use log-log 
model. However, the Moran’s I score of the residuals was 0.001684 with a z-score of 
0.2679, and a p-value of 0.788722. This suggests that the residuals are randomly distributed 
in space and therefore there is no evidence of non-stationarity. This is consistent with the 
results of the OLS models where the distance to the BRT was always significant. These 
results strengthen the point that all across the city developers aim to locate larger 
nonresidential projects close to the BRT trunk lines. Consequently, I did not pursue a GWR 
with the nonresidential data.  
These results are consistent with other studies in the United States. For instance, 
Guerra, Cervero and Tischler (2012) analyzing data from 20 transit agencies, suggest that 
the radius of attractiveness to transit may be different for jobs and population. Results show 
that transit catchment is stronger for jobs within the first quarter of a mile, while for 
population catchment is stronger at the half-mile threshold. This study however does not 
distinguished different levels of transit catchment across the different socio-economic 
groups.  
  
183 
    
Figure 49: GWR results for built area explained by distance to BRT 
Source: Illustration by the author based on the building permits database obtained from 
the Direction of Information, Cartography and Statistics - SDP 
  
Global Coefficient: -0.004 
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Model comparison 
Table 12: Comparative table of regression results 
Dependent Variable = Built Area Housing 
Ind. Variables Linear Log-Log  Poisson 
Stratum1 514.64*** 
(25.95) 
0.148*** 
(0.008) 
0.291*** 
(0.001) 
Distance to BRT 0.158*** 
(0.459) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.0005*** 
(0.003) 
Lot Area 2.627*** 
(0.576) 
1.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 
R2 
2059 
0.62 
2059 
0.84 
2059 
 
Breush-Pagan test 525.33*** 13.885* 525.33*** 
Durbin-Watson test 1.2664*** 1.76*** 1.2664*** 
Dependent Variable: Built Area Nonresidential 
Ind. Variables Linear Log-Log  Poisson 
Stratum1 508.65*** 
(101.47) 
0.219*** 
(0.0437) 
0.256*** 
(0.050) 
Distance to BRT - 0.310 . 
(0.1611) 
-0.090* 
(0.0425) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.000) 
Lot Area 3.569*** 
(0.283) 
0.908*** 
(0.063) 
0.0090 
(0.000) 
Observations 
R2 
234 
0.55 
234 
0.61 
234 
 
Breush-Pagan test 44.56*** 13.38* 44.56*** 
Durbin-Watson test 1.0132*** 1.167*** 1.0132*** 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1;  
(1) Stratum was not transformed in log-log models 
 
Table 12 shows a comparative table of the results of all the different models 
explored in this section. First, the table indicates that the models with the best fit are the 
log-log models, as their scores for the Breush-Pagan, testing heteroscedasticity, have less 
significance, and the Durbin-Watson scores, testing autocorrelation, approach slightly 
more to two. Secondly, the R2 scores suggest that the independent variables explain much 
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better the variability of the size of the incremental densification projects in the case of 
housing than in the case of nonresidential. Finally, all the models suggest that there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between the stratum and the size of the 
incremental densification projects, controlling for the transit access and the size of the lot. 
The R2 suggest that the models are better predictors for the built areas in housing land use, 
than for nonresidential. However, the coefficients for stratum show that the magnitude of 
this relationship is slightly higher for nonresidential than for housing. 
CORRELATION INCREMENTAL DENSIFICATION AND SOCIAL SEGREGATION 
Aware of the relationship between the stratum and the size of the incremental 
densification projects, the next step was testing if these patterns of location and size of the 
projects increase the levels of social segregation across the city. The main challenge to 
conduct such a correlation analysis was the absence of recent socio-economic data for the 
city. The last national census in Colombia was conducted in 2005 and is now more than 
ten years old. As an alternative, I used data from the multipurpose surveys conducted by 
the DANE in 2007 and 2014, which surveyed a representative 10 percent of the population 
of the city. DANE presented the data at the locality scale, which is very large for an analysis 
of the urban form and the strata. However, I found that the database contains the stratum 
information of every observation. Taking advantage of this, I was able to perform the 
segregation analysis at a scale of every stratum area inside each locality.  
Consequently, I divided each locality into its strata areas, referring to each of these 
sub-regions as a “dominion,” following other previous studies (SDP and UNAL 2007, 
2013). Bogotá has 61 dominion: 9 dominion of Stratum 1, 16 dominion of Stratum 2, 18 
dominion of Stratum 3, 10 dominion of Stratum 4, 5 dominion of Stratum 5, and 3 
dominion of Stratum 6. The localities with more dominions are Chapinero, Usaquén and 
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Suba in the North, which contain neighborhoods of almost all strata. The Localities with 
least dominion are Puente Aranda in the center that only has Stratum 3 areas, and Usme in 
the South, with only areas of strata 1 and 2.  
My next step was to use the multipurpose surveys of the DANE to obtain the socio-
economic data for each of the 61 dominion. Following previous studies in the region 
(Aguilar and Mateos 2011), I decided to rely on levels of education as a proxy to assess the 
levels of social segregation in each of the dominion. Figure 50 on the left shows the 
different levels of education of the population aged eighteen or above for each dominion 
in Bogotá. The graph shows that in strata 1 and 2, the majority of the population had only 
elementary or high school education; in Stratum 3, there is a fair share of persons with 
different levels of education; and in strata 4, 5 and 6, the majority of the population have 
undergraduate and graduate university degrees.  
This graph also shows that the Stratification system, although determined by the 
built form, is somewhat correlated with the education levels of the population at a large 
scale. However, as the graph suggests there is not a big difference between the distribution 
of the levels of education in strata 1 and 2; and between the strata 4, 5 and 6. Based on this, 
I suggest that in term of education levels, Bogotá roughly has only three different strata. 
An area with majority of population with university degrees, an area of diversity of levels 
of education—that corresponds with Stratum 3—and an area with majority of population 
with only basic elementary or high school levels. Figure 50 on the right shows a map of 
dominions colored by the share of population with a university degree or higher, illustrating 
how these differences are spatially distributed.  
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Figure 50: Education levels and Entropy by stratum and locality for 2014 
Source: Illustration by the author using the results of the EM-2014 
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Also, the map shows how the localities of Usaquén, Chapinero, and Suba in the North have 
the largest share of population with higher levels of education. Conversely, in all the 
localities in the South, less than a quarter of the population have university degrees. The 
West of the city is an area of social diversity, with dominions where either the majority or 
the minority of the population hold university degrees. 
As my next step, I analyzed the education levels by dominion for the year 2007, 
calculating how much education levels have changed over time and thus assessing the 
levels of residential segregation across the city. I used the software Geo-Segregation 
Analyzer (Apparicio et al. 2014) to determine the multi-group Entropy levels of each 
Dominion. 
Historically, The Dissimilarity Index (D) has been the most common method to 
measure segregation in urban areas. D is as the percentage of population of one of the two 
groups included in the calculation that would have to move to other geographic areas in 
order to produce a distribution that matches that of the larger area. However, D has two 
problems: first, it does not account for the spatial pattern of segregation inside a territory 
and second, it only works for measuring two dichotomous groups, or to balance a minority 
against all the other groups. Consequently, other formulas evolved to address the problems 
of D. Theil (1972) proposed the Entropy index—also called the information index or the 
Theil index (H). Entropy index measures the departure from evenness by assessing each 
unit´s departure from the pattern of the whole city. It reaches maximum of 1 when groups 
in a district have an equal share division than that of the city, and it has been widely used 
in literature about residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1988; Iceland 2004). 
Figure 51 shows the change in the education levels’ Entropy index for each of the 
dominion in Bogotá between 2007 and 2014. Negative values in a dominion means a 
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decrease in the Entropy index, suggesting that in this dominion the distribution of education 
levels is growing apart of that of the whole city, and this can be interpreted as an increase 
in social segregation. Conversely, positive values means that the distribution of the 
education levels approaches to that of the city, suggesting that levels of segregation are 
decreasing. The graph on the left shows how segregation is changing within the dominion, 
increasing in both the Stratum 1 and the strata 5 and 6. This means that in the period 
analyzed more low skilled population are clustering in the low-income neighborhoods, 
while individuals that are more educated are increasingly arriving to the traditionally higher 
income areas. Opposite, the graph shows how the middle strata areas are becoming more 
diverse in education levels, suggesting that in these areas the social segregation is 
decreasing. Figure 51 in the right show the changing Entropy index across the city. The 
map shows how segregation is increasing mostly in the North, specifically in the localities 
of Usaquén, Suba, and Chapinero, while across the rest of the city, segregation is 
decreasing. 
The next question is, How are the patterns of incremental densification related to  
these changing levels of segregation? To respond to this question I aggregated the data of 
square meters of densification in new housing projects from the SDP with the socio-
economic data obtained at the DANE for 2007 to 2014 at the dominion level. It is important 
to recognize an important limitation of this method as the data in the SDP database are only 
from permits given in 2010 and later. Consequently, to relate them to the social data of 
period 2007 to 2014, I subtracted all the permits given after 2013 that do not influence the 
social data of 2014, acknowledging that I compared change in social data of 2007 to 2014 
with building permit data only from 2010 to 2013.  
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Figure 51: Entropy education level change 2007-2014 by stratum and locality 
Source: Illustration by the author using the results of the EM-2014 and EMB-2007 
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In order to analyze how the patterns of incremental densification relate to changing 
levels of segregation, I conducted a correlation scatterplot analysis, shown in Figure 52. I 
sought to correlate the total area of incremental densification, normalized by the 
dominion’s area in hectares, with the Entropy segregation score change of each dominion. 
The graph suggests that in the middle strata 3 and 4 areas with less densification per 
hectare, segregation levels decreased. Conversely, in the higher strata 5 and 6 where there 
was more incremental densification per hectare, the segregation levels increased. The 
correlation curve suggests that up to 150 new square meters of new housing projects per 
hectare for each dominion, the levels of segregation tend to decrease, but after that number, 
they tend to increase. The p value suggest that this curve is significant with 95 percent of 
confidence, but the R2 score of the curve is low at .15. This suggests that there is a large 
unexplained relation between incremental densification and segregation levels. I attribute 
this phenomenon to the movement of the population in the market of rental units and 
existing developments, which I did not address in this research due to limitations in the 
data sources.  
In summary, this chapter suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the Stratification system and the patterns of incremental densification in the city 
for the period 2010-2015. Controlling for the size and location of a lot in relation to the 
BRT system, we can expect an increase of 15 percent in the area of housing projects and a 
20 percent increase in case of nonresidential projects, for every increase in stratum. 
However, these incremental densification patterns, affected by the policy of Stratification, 
had only a marginal effect of about 15 percent in the change of segregation levels between 
2007 and 2014.  
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Built Area per Ha. 2010-2013 and Entropy Change Curve Fit Plot 
 
F (3, 57) = 3.431, p<0.02286      R² = 0.153 
∆ Entropy = 0.0152 - 0.1729 Built Area per Ha. + 0.0355 Built Area per Ha2 + 0.1305 
Built Area per Ha.3 
 
Figure 52: Entropy education level change 2007-2014 and total built area 
Source: Illustration by the author using the results of the EM-2014 and EMB-2007 
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In the middle strata areas 3 and 4, this limited effect translates to decreasing segregation. 
On the other hand, in both the lowermost strata 1 and 2 and the uppermost strata 5 and 6, 
densification—or the absence of it—leads to increasing segregation. 
Additionally, although this was not the purpose of this chapter, this econometric 
analysis found that the distance to the BRT system is a complex and changing variable in 
terms of predicting the size of the incremental densification projects. New nonresidential 
projects tend to be larger the closer they are to transit. For housing, however, this 
relationship depends on the stratum. While projects in Stratum 3—specifically those in the 
locality of Engativá in the West—tend to be larger the closer they are to the BRT, in the 
upper strata 5 and 6, densification projects are actually smaller with a closer distance to 
transit. This illustrates the challenge that the city faces if they seek to use the BRT to 
incentivize transit-oriented developments in higher strata areas.  
However, the different mechanisms that lead to these relationships between 
Stratification and densification are unclear. In the next chapter, therefore, I will explore the 
reasons and drivers of these relationships through the analysis of interviews with 
developers, policy makers and scholars, in addition to a review of local real estate literature. 
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Chapter 8: Stratification in private sector and housing markets 
In this chapter, I will introduce evidence from thirteen in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and several informal conversations with various agents of urban development 
in Bogotá and then triangulate the findings with the results of the quantitative part of this 
study. The objective of the interviews was to understand how the social Stratification 
system in Bogotá influences the attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies of agents of urban 
development, and thereby affects the spatial patterns of incremental densification in the 
city. First, the interviewees emphasized the local effects of the social characteristics of the 
population that inhabit a neighborhood on its land values. Members of the general public 
associate social characteristics with the Stratification system, and as a result, the private 
sector has informally adopted them as a parallel, unwritten system of exclusionary spatial 
planning.  
Secondly, through conversations with private developers who work at different 
scales and in different areas of the city, I learned that their practices and perceptions of 
Stratification differ depending on whether they are working in older larger firms, or if their 
practice is newer, rooted in a community, or mostly empirical. While larger firms tend to 
perpetuate the traditional exclusionary planning system, newer and smaller firms are more 
willing to take risks and challenge established practices by investing in areas of lower 
strata. Finally, I will highlight comments made in the interviews and passages from the real 
estate literature that illustrate the role of the real estate sector for planning and production 
of affordable housing. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN SETTING LAND VALUES 
I wanted to understand how the Stratification policy influences the incremental 
densification patterns in the city. In the interviews I conducted, mainly with private 
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planning and real estate consultants, I found that the social divisions of Colombian society 
explain in large part the relationship between Stratification and urban development. This 
point is evident in the fact that all interviewees acknowledged that there is a social order 
that is not written anywhere, but that rules the behavior of local urban development agents 
who shape how the city is transformed. This regulation is informal and mainly enforced 
through developers’ attitudes, interests, and behaviors. For instance, a private urban 
planning and real estate consultant with extensive experience Bogotá explains that this 
traditional social divide is a fact, accepted by all as intrinsic to Colombian identity:  
[Should projects represent the identity or social conception of communities? I 
would say yes. Finally what we wonder is whether we are a society that is 
interested, or which has lived the experience of social mixture, as we are all 
jumbled inside the country. And it turns out that no, our identity is one in which 
the different social groups, social strata, or conditions separate us from each other. 
Even in small towns, there are those two blocks where the important people of the 
village live and there is another block where the least important people live. 
Important in what? Politically, socially, culturally or economically…it does not 
matter, but let us say that from the start we tend to be a segregated society…]  
¿Los proyectos deben representar o deben responder lo que es la identidad o lo 
que es la concepción social de las comunidades?, yo diría que sí. Finalmente lo 
que nos preguntamos es si en el país somos una sociedad que está interesada o 
que ha vivido su experiencia de mezcla social, como que todos estamos revueltos. 
Y resulta que no, resulta que nuestra identidad es una identidad en donde las 
diferentes categorías sociales, grupos sociales, estratos sociales o condiciones 
sociales se separan y viven separados unos de otros. Incluso en los pueblos 
pequeños existen aquellas dos manzanas donde viven los importantes del pueblo, 
y en otra manzana donde viven los menos importantes del pueblo. ¿Importantes 
en qué? en lo político, social, cultural o económicamente, no importa, pero 
digamos que de entrada tenemos tendencia a ser una sociedad segregada… 
Private consultants are not alone in indicating that a system of social and spatial 
division directs urban development. Evidence shows that large sectors of civil society also 
view the social divide as part of the local context and opposed to any change in the patterns 
of spatial separation. A well-known example is the strong opposition to former Mayor 
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Petro’s policies of inclusionary zoning, proposed in 2014. These new ordinances 
transgressed the socio-spatial order of the city as they sought to relocate families living in 
lower strata areas into new affordable housing projects in public lands located in areas of 
higher strata. Petro argued that this was a strategy to tackle the traditional socio-spatial 
segregation in the city. However, as a consultant in urban planning explained: 
[In the review process of the POT, that was done last year and the year before 
with the administration of (Mayor) Petro, he sought that, in this exceptional 
modification of the POT, the mixture of uses would be made on site, and that 
within areas of higher strata, there were islands of affordable housing. The social 
reaction against this was overwhelming from the first moment. First, in the sense 
that the upper strata are not going to want social groups of lower strata coexisting 
in the same territory with them. They argue security issues, which is suspicious 
because no one tells me that the localities of lower strata are more unsafe than the 
others. We could look at the data, and maybe they are not. Second, groups of 
lower strata may not find it pleasant to live in areas of higher strata where public 
services are certainly more expensive, and they will surely be seen in a less 
pleasant way “as flies in a glass of milk.” Therefore, the (social) coexistence will 
not be assured, and this is no good for either group. This corresponds to my initial 
idea that culturally we are not used to living together.]  
En el proceso de la revisión POT [Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial] que se hizo 
el año pasado y antepasado con la administración de [el Alcalde] Petro se buscó 
en la modificación excepcional del POT que esa mezcla de usos se hiciera en el 
propio sitio, y que en sectores de estrato alto existieran islas de viviendas de 
interés social. La reacción social fue contundente en el mismo momento, primero 
en el sentido de que pues los estratos altos no van a querer que grupos sociales 
de estratos más bajos estén conviviendo en el mismo territorio con ellos, así 
argumentan temas de seguridad, lo cual es sospechoso porque nadie me dice que 
aquellas localidades de estratos bajos son más inseguras que otras, de pronto 
podríamos mirar los resultados y no lo es tanto. Segundo para los grupos de 
estratos populares tampoco les resulta agradable vivir en estratos más altos, 
donde yo qué hago viviendo en sectores de estratos más altos donde los servicios 
públicos son seguramente más caros, donde seguramente seré visto de forma 
menos agradable, “como mosco en leche,” y seguramente la convivencia no va a 
estar asegurada por tal motivo, por lo tanto esto no agradaba ni a unos ni a 
otros, y eso responde a mi primera idea de que culturalmente no estamos 
acostumbrados a vivir mezclados.  
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Newspaper articles also reflect the stark opposition of sectors of civil society to the 
inclusionary zoning ordinances and the idea of de-concentration of poverty that was 
introduced during the Petro administration. When I reviewed newspaper articles from 2014 
that addressed the development of affordable housing in areas of high strata I found a great 
deal of opposition to the initiative, even from individuals living far from the proposed 
projects in areas of lower strata. Here I present anonymous quotes extracted from the 
commentaries section of the newspaper article titled “Social housing in Chicó in Bogotá” 
(El Tiempo 2014). Chicó is a traditional upscale neighborhood where the municipality 
owns a set of properties, now used as parking lots, which the new ordinance seeks to 
transform into affordable housing: 
[Are they placing a house with hoodlums in front of the Andino (upscale shopping 
mall in Chicó) and at the foot of the European embassies? How nice, now there 
will not be anything to show in Bogotá.]  
[I do not live in these areas because I cannot buy there (I do not have the money). 
It is also an interference with nature. It is only natural that if one is born, grows 
up, is educated, works, and earns good, lives there. We must not give these 
privileges to those who  have not earned them with their sweat.] 
[I am Stratum 3, falling into 2, and as the popular adage says “every parrot on his 
stake.” The properties that the IDU (city’s urban development agency) has in 
these areas should be used for free parking, so (to use) when one goes there with 
his “pichirilo” (car) for work or other duties…]  
¿Van a colocar una vivienda con maleantes al frente del Andino y al pie de las 
embajadas Europeas? Qué bonito, ahora si ya no hay que mostrar en Bogotá. 
Yo no vivo en esos sectores porque no he podido comprar allá (no tengo el 
dinero). […] También es una interferencia con la naturaleza. Es natural que uno 
nace, crece, se eduque, trabaja y si gana bien viva en esos sectores. No debemos 
regalar eses privilegios a quienes no los han ganado con su sudor… 
Soy Estrato 3 tirando a 2, y como dice el adagio popular “cada loro en su 
estaca,” estos lotes que tiene el IDU [Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano] en estos 
sectores deberían de utilizarlos para parqueaderos públicos gratis, cosa que 
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cuando uno vaya a este sector con su “pichirilo” [auto] ya sea por trabajo o 
hacer una diligencia… 
In 2015 a judge repealed Mayor Petro’s initiative, accepting a class action lawsuit 
against the project filed by fifteen residents of Chicó and supported by a city council 
member. The judge blocked the project, arguing that the development of affordable 
housing in Chicó will make the city lose public money. The judge argued that because the 
market value of the public lots was 30 billion Colombian pesos, each proposed apartment 
would have a value of 850 million or 1,153 minimum monthly wages. This value greatly 
exceeds the upper legal limits set for an affordable apartment, which is roughly 100 million 
pesos or 135 minimum monthly wages. As a consequence, the city will lose money if it 
offers the apartments at a lower-than-market price to a limited number of families. 
This ruling, however, raises a set of questions. According to the judge’s rationale, 
the city cannot use such properties for any public use that does not generate a higher 
monetary revenue than does selling it off to developers. Therefore, the citizens could block 
any kind of project on these sites, including schools, parks, hospitals, or fire or police 
stations, by arguing that it makes more economic sense to sell the highly valued properties 
for private development, and provide services elsewhere where land is cheaper. In reality, 
however, this economic rationale may not be the main reason that residents initiated the 
class action suit. The real concern of the neighbors to this project was the devaluation of 
their properties that might result from the presence of lower income groups in the 
neighborhood, which may be attributed to NIMBYsm or, as Mangin would call it, “New 
Exclusionary Zoning” (2014). An anonymous comment on a news article about the 
lawsuits (Reina Romero 2015) illustrates this point:  
[I find it very good (the rule of the judge), I am not of high stratum, but you 
cannot mix up people like that, that brings grave social implications. On the other 
hand, the people that have invested so much in their properties, this must be 
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because they have worked for it, and they do not deserve for their properties to be 
devalued.]  
Me parece muy bien, yo no soy estrato alto, pero no se puede revolver así a la 
gente, eso trae implicaciones sociales graves. De otra parte, la gente que ha 
invertido mucho en sus viviendas, pues será porque lo ha trabajado y tampoco 
merecen que les devalúen sus predios. 
This episode highlights the importance of market values as a driver behind both 
public and private interventions in the city. What variables determine land values set in 
Bogotá, and are these land values related in any way with Stratification, as both the 
affirmations of planning consultants and the class suit against inclusionary housing 
suggest? In the United States, for instance, the social conditions in neighborhoods are 
important in the appraisal of a property. According to the United States Appraisal Institute, 
the social characteristics relevant for determining the desirability of a neighborhood 
include the population density; the occupants’ skill levels, age levels, and employment 
status; the presence of crime and litter; and the availability of public services and 
neighborhood associations (1992, 176). In the Colombian context, members of the public 
and the development sector perceive that Stratification is a proxy for such individual socio-
economic variables even though the system is premised exclusively on built form. 
Economist Oscar Borrero-Ochoa (2000), the founding father of land appraisal in Colombia, 
explains this phenomenon in his book about real estate values. He argues that in Colombian 
cities, unlike cities in other parts of the world, land is not valued exclusively in relation to, 
for instance, the distance from the city center as a proxy for accessibility to employment 
and services. Instead, land is valued depending on which social group occupies it (Borrero-
Ochoa 2000, 18):  
[However, it is not true that only the lower strata are located in the periphery. This 
is only partially valid. The value of the land depends on the social strata that 
occupy it. The experience of our cities indicates that the higher strata lead 
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development. Around them tend to cluster the middle strata. The planning system 
then, segregates the popular levels (lower strata) from the high and middle 
strata… Intermediate cities also have this segregation, but less marked, as the 
upper and middle strata live mixed, but only separated from the popular level by a 
few blocks. That is the case of Manizales, Pereira, and Bucaramanga, where from 
the apartment towers in middle and upper class neighborhoods people can see the 
nearby popular areas. However, there is no road access between them to allow 
separation and prevent devaluation… In this way, the land is valued according to 
the social level that occupies it, and as the middle level approaches the upper 
strata, the land will increase in value.] 
Sin embargo, no es cierto que en la periferia se ubiquen únicamente los estratos 
bajos. Esto es sólo parcialmente válido. El valor de la tierra va dependiendo del 
nivel social que la ocupe. La experiencia de nuestras ciudades indica que quien 
jalona el desarrollo es el estrato alto. A su alrededor tienden a agruparse los 
estratos medios. El sistema de planeación ubica a los niveles populares 
segregándolos de los estratos alto y medio… Las ciudades intermedias también 
presentan esta segregación, pero menos marcada, ya que los estratos altos y 
medio viven mezclados, separándose únicamente del nivel popular por escasas 
cuadras de distancia. Así sucede con Manizales, Pereira o Bucaramanga, en 
donde desde las torres de apartamentos de clase media y alta se ven los barrios 
populares a corta distancia, pero no hay acceso vial entre unos y otros para 
permitir la separación y prevenir la desvalorización… De esta manera la tierra 
vale de acuerdo con el nivel social del que la ocupe y en la medida que los niveles 
medios se acerquen al estrato alto, la tierra se valorizará.  
Ultimately, my interviews with planners and the discourse of real estate 
professionals reveal that Stratification plays a key role in shaping perceptions of different 
areas of the city. In so doing, Stratification in effect acts like a planning policy that shapes 
the process incremental densification and hence the urban development of Bogotá. As a 
result, the system of Stratification may also be having an effect on the housing markets, as 
I will explain in the next section.  
MARKET FAILURES IN THE HOUSING PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO STRATIFICATION 
As developers build out the few remaining empty lots located within the urban 
limits, the provision of affordable housing becomes more challenging. According to the 
  
201 
former chair of the city’s Housing Department, María Mercedes Maldonado (2016), the 
production of affordable housing has reached an unprecedented low. She cites the latest 
data from the DANE for the period between January and August 2016 to argue that only 
forty-two units of the most affordable housing type, Vivienda de Interés Prioritario (VIP), 
were built in the city. Currently, the city has a housing backlog that surpasses 300,000 units 
(SDHT 2016). The geographic characteristics of the city restrain the supply of land suitable 
for urbanization since mountains surround the city in both the east and the south, and the 
administrative limits of the city are constrained by the Bogotá River in the west. As a 
response, unruly developments of affordable housing are spilling all over the savanna 
outside the city.  
Local developers and policy makers have been attributing the cost of housing to a 
market failure caused by the limited supply of urban land. However, other scholars have 
been relating this market failure with the speculative practices of large-scale property 
owners (Borrero-Ochoa 2016; Araque-Solano and Caballero-Quintero 2009). In this 
section, I will explain how the Stratification policy relates to market failure in the housing 
sector in Bogotá, based on the evidence from the interviews I conducted. The evidence I 
collected in the interviews suggests that the Stratification policy is related to the rising cost 
of housing in the city. 
The construction industry in Bogotá has traditionally been one of the main bases of 
the city’s economy. A handful of large-scale construction firms dominates the real estate 
market. These firms, some associated with important local families, others with 
businesspersons or banks, have grown exponentially and have influenced the planning of 
the city, mostly through the close relationships they maintain with the local administration 
by supporting the political campaigns of the mayors or of key city council members. The 
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growth of most of the firms was enabled by the national housing policy reforms of the 
1970s and 1980s, which introduced the UPAC mortgage system and eliminated 
government involvement in housing production. These policy reforms channeled large 
public funds to the private development of large-scale multifamily housing compounds. As 
a result, a handful of firms specialized in the construction of these compounds, later 
diversifying into building shopping malls and, more recently, single-house gated 
communities in the periphery. These large firms became big critics of the planning policies 
of former Mayor Petro. He aimed to restrict urban growth in the peripheries, but these firms 
argued that the limited supply of urban peripheral lands is the main reason for rising 
housing costs. An owner of a large construction firm explains: 
[The most important of governments, what they said in the congress of 
CAMACOL (national association of construction companies) is that it has been 
demonstrated that a government that does not offer land or that does not produce 
zoning on new land, is a city government that will see the (housing) production 
costs rise. As in the case of Petro, there was no offer of new land, there was no 
new zoning for these sectors. The zoning inside the city turned very difficult, that 
made it such that land was not offered the way we would have wanted, and as a 
result the price of land increases. As a consequence, twelve years of the same, in 
which there was not any available land, well that caused an increase in the cost of 
housing that was absurd. The official entities do have an important role in the 
regulation, whether it be with the city on urban renewal projects or in the 
periphery.]  
Lo más importante de los gobiernos, lo que dijeron en el congreso de CAMACOL 
es que está demostrado que gobierno que no ofrezca tierra y que no produzca 
normatividad sobre tierra nueva es un gobierno de una ciudad al que se le van a 
subir los costos de producción. Como en el caso de Petro, no hubo oferta de 
tierra nueva, no hubo normatividad nueva sobre sectores. La normatividad dentro 
de la ciudad se puso muy difícil, eso hizo que no se ofertara tierra como nosotros 
hubiéramos querido, y por consiguiente se sube el precio de la tierra. Por 
consiguiente, 12 años de lo mismo, que no hubo oferta de la tierra pues causó un 
incremento de costo de la vivienda que fue absurdo. Las entidades oficiales si 
tienen un rol importante sobre la normatividad ya sea con la ciudad en proyectos 
de renovación urbana o en los bordes. 
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On the other hand, scholars point out that the city’s current affordable housing 
policy is not reaching the very poor, not just because of a limited supply of affordable units, 
but also because the cost of the units is simply too great and the requirements for accessing 
mortgages are unrealistic for individuals working in the informal economy. As Borrero-
Ochoa explains, the problems with the housing policy and the limited supply of land set 
aside by the city planning authorities makes illegal development the only housing option 
for the very poor (2000, 20–21):   
[Families that have been living in the city for some time, paying to lease rooms 
(tenements), are unable to buy in the governmental market. The cheapest house 
costs today in our large cities between 15,000 and 20,000 US dollars, and requires 
three to four times the minimum monthly salary to access financing. Lots with 
services are very few and overly expensive. The only alternative left to them is 
going to the pirate market: buying a property with neither permits nor 
infrastructure, outside the city limits. Pirate developers buy large plots of land, 
divide them into small lots, and sell them cheap. A pirate lot of 72 square meters 
can cost around 3,000 US dollars today. The community solves the lack of 
utilities by putting pressure on local politicians who will force utility companies 
to provide water and energy in exchange for votes...  
The problem with this mechanism is the additional cost generated for the city and 
utility companies. It would have been better to provide sufficient popular land, 
gradually expanding the urban perimeter and achieving growth that is planned and 
at a lower social and economic cost... When urban planning is done contrary to 
social needs and market laws, it generates more urban chaos. Planning should go 
before the demand to channel needs. The direct opposition (to expansion) from 
behind a desk creates a social discontent that only politicians can solve by 
violating the rules they themselves adopted in the City Council].  
Las familias que llevan un tiempo viviendo en la ciudad, pagando cuartos de 
arrendamiento (inquilinatos), tienen la imposibilidad de comprar en el mercado 
gubernamental. La vivienda más barata cuesta hoy en nuestras grandes ciudades 
entre 15,000 y 20,000 dólares y requiere entre tres y cuatro salarios mínimos 
legales mensuales para poder acceder a la financiación. Los lotes con servicios 
son muy reducidos y exageradamente costosos. Les queda sólo la alternativa de 
acudir al mercado pirata: comprar lotes de terreno sin permisos ni obras de 
infraestructura, fuera del perímetro urbano. El urbanizador pirata compra 
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grandes globos de terreno, lotea y vende a bajo precio. Un lote pirata de 72 
metros cuadrados puede costar hoy alrededor de 3,000 dólares. El problema de 
los servicios será solucionado por la comunidad y la presión de los políticos que 
obligarán a las empresas de servicios a dotar de acueducto y energía a cambio de 
votos populares…  
El problema de este mecanismo es el sobrecosto que generan a la ciudad y a las 
empresas de servicios. Habría sido mejor dotar de terrenos populares suficientes 
ampliando gradualmente el perímetro y obteniendo un crecimiento planificado y 
a menor costo social y económico… Cuando la planeación urbana va en contra 
de las necesidades sociales y las leyes del mercado, genera un mayor caos 
urbano. La planeación debe ir delante de la demanda encauzando las 
necesidades. La oposición frontal desde un escritorio crea un malestar social que 
sólo los políticos pueden resolver violando las normas que ellos mismos 
aprobaron desde el Concejo Municipal. 
Newer evidence suggests, however, that there is a complex relationship between 
the supply of urban land and housing prices in Colombia. In a study of nineteen Colombian 
cities, Borrero-Ochoa (2016) discovered that the supply of urban land could only explain 
50–60 percent of housing costs. Borrero-Ochoa attributes the other unexplained 40–50 
percent to monopolistic practices by landowners that are aggravated by the Stratification 
system. He found that, as expected, housing is more expensive in more affluent cities such 
as Bogotá or Medellín, since these have higher demand for housing in strata 4, 5, and 6, 
and limited supplies of peripheral land. However, according to the author, the evidence 
shows that housing prices are not actually lower in poorer cities that have larger supplies 
of peripheral land, such as Ibagué or Montería. He claims that this responds to behaviors 
of local property owners and construction firms. In order to maximize their profits from 
urbanization projects, landowners and construction firms tend to restrict the development 
of land only until the areas are suitable for building for buyers in the higher strata 4, 5 or 
6. This argument is convincing taking into account the characteristics of the real estate 
markets in such cities. The largest share of housing demand is often within the informal 
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sector. As a result, the formal market is very small and easily monopolized by a small 
number of landowners and construction companies.   
Araque Solano and Caballero Quintero (2009) found similar contradictory results 
following changing housing prices in Bogotá in recent decades. They argue that in Bogotá 
the supply of urban land did not have much effect on reducing new housing costs; on the 
contrary, they found evidence that new housing prices actually increase when the city 
expands. The authors argue that this responds to the coexistence of a formal and an informal 
real estate market and to the strong socio-spatial segregation in the city. On one side, the 
patterns of social segregation restrict the choice of location for families in the northern, 
western or southern peripheries. On the other, the very poor qualities of the housing stock 
in the informal areas increases the demand for new housing with better characteristics.  
  My interviews also suggest that the socio-spatial segregation operationalized in 
the Stratification policy serves to decrease housing affordability, regardless the supply of 
urban land. I infer from my conversations with developers that the Stratification policy 
causes a segmentation of the housing market and thus an increase in housing prices. A 
developer in a large firm confirmed this point: 
[Yes, (Stratification) is important because the strata have different tastes for the 
real estate business. Then for example, a Stratum 6 in Chicó is in oversupply, then 
that is a stratum that does not interest me. A Stratum 3 in Barranquilla or Bogotá 
is in high demand. Then yes, the stratum because given the conditions of the 
sector it can be in great demand, then we do look at the stratum. But in the same 
way in Chicó it can be in oversupply, there can be a lack of availability of a 
Stratum 6 elsewhere].  
Si (la Estratificación) es importante porque los estratos tienen diferentes apetitos 
por el negocio inmobiliario. Entonces por ejemplo un Estrato 6 en el Chico ya 
está sobre ofertado, entonces ese es un estrato que no me interesa. Un Estrato 3 
en Barranquilla o en Bogotá está altamente demandado. Entonces sí, el estrato 
porque dadas las condiciones del sector puede estar altamente demandado, 
  
206 
entonces sí miramos el estrato. Pero así en el Chicó como puede estar sobre 
ofertado puede haber falta de oferta de un Estrato 6 en otro lugar. 
This statement suggests that there is a segmentation of the market, producing a bias 
for development in higher strata areas. Market segmentation is a strategy used to divide 
customers into sub-groups and then identify higher yield segments. Leishman (2001) has 
pointed out that segmentation in a housing market is related to the absence of competition. 
If suppliers have a monopolistic position in a growing market, they will tend to attend to 
only the niche of customers that yield the most profit. In this case, the segmentation 
resulting from Stratification encourages construction firms to develop projects that 
exclusively target higher strata areas, disincentivizing the production of affordable 
housing. In the Colombian case, affordable housing units receive demand-side subsidies 
that are calculated depending on the costs of the units. Vivienda de Interés Social (VIS) 
programs subsidize units costing up to 135 times the minimum monthly salary, and 
Vivienda de Interés Prioritario (VIP) subsidizes units costing up to 70 times the minimum 
monthly salary. An urban planning consultant working for private developers explains:  
[But the interesting thing about the VIS and VIP market is that (a unit) sells very 
quickly but the profitability margins are low. If you do not build according to 
schedule, with the budgeted materials and costs, you start to lose the return on 
your investment. Instead, in the higher strata market, those returns are minimal (in 
importance) because if you spend 200 million pesos on an apartment, but you sell 
it for 800 or 700 million, because it depends on where it is located, if it is in a 
good area, or if not I won’t pay it.]     
Pero lo interesante del mercado VIS y VIP es que se vende muy rápido pero el 
margen de rentabilidad es bajo. Si no construyen con el tiempo previsto, con los 
materiales previstos y con los costos previstos empieza a perder la rentabilidad. 
En cambio, para los estratos altos esos rendimientos son mínimos porque si tú le 
gastas 200 millones de pesos a un apartamento pero lo venden en 800 o 700 
millones de pesos porque depende de donde esté localizado, si está en un buen 
sector o sino no lo pago.    
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The interviews suggest that developers use various mechanisms to tailor their 
developments for higher strata areas. One of them is increasing the size of the apartments. 
Larger apartments yield more profit for the developer, while raising the prices for the 
public. A developer in a large firm mentioned that they increase the areas of the apartments 
depending on the stratum, but also depending on the site: if the site is in high demand or 
located in a high strata area, they will increase the square footage of the apartments in order 
to raise the prices: 
[We have clear standards for maximum areas. For example in Barranquilla we 
started to build Stratum 3 with 78 square meters. In Stratum 5 we put 85 meters 
and two rooms. The same happens in Bogotá, however it is also different, we 
have larger projects. We built the largest project in Salitre,14 we built apartments 
with more than 125 square meters on average. This was in the year 2008, they 
were the largest areas that had been built in that sector.]  
Hay especificaciones claras sobre áreas máximas. Por ejemplo en Barranquilla 
comenzamos a hacer estrato 3 con 78 metros cuadrados, en estrato 5 metemos 85 
metros y dos habitaciones. Lo mismo pasa en Bogotá, aunque si es diferente, 
tenemos proyectos más grandes. Fuimos el proyecto más grande de Salitre, 
hicimos apartamentos con más de 125 metros cuadrados área en promedio. Esto 
fue en el año 2008, fueron las áreas más grandes que se hayan construido en ese 
sector. 
Other studies have also shown that building housing only for the higher strata is 
more profitable. Borrero-Ochoa and Duran (1996) found that the annual increase in 
property prices in inner city higher strata areas skyrocketed in the period from 1970 to 
1990, and even surpassed the increase of prices for offices and retail land-use. The increase 
even continued through the moderate economic downturn that occurred in the country 
during the 1980s. In areas of middle strata, there were also continuous increases in prices; 
however, these were moderate, but larger in the areas close to the higher strata. In 
                                                 
14 Salitre is a planned neighborhood developed firstly during the 1990s as an area for affordable housing, 
delineated as Stratum 3. However recently property values there have exponentially increased. 
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comparison, the annual increase in prices for the middle-low and low strata was meager 
and there was development activity only during the economic downturns.  
The Stratification system also causes market segmentation in central city 
redevelopment areas through regulations designed to incentivize incremental densification. 
As with peripheral lands, larger construction companies preferentially develop higher 
strata areas to yield the highest profitability at the same time that they divest from areas of 
lower strata, despite the fact that those lower strata areas may be well connected to services, 
transportation, and jobs. The successive increases in the height restrictions set by the 
zoning ordinances respond to this phenomenon. In the inner city, the local height and FAR 
limits are the tools used to expand or restrict the supply of space for incremental 
densification.  
There is evidence that the construction firms influenced the drafting of these 
specific land development codes. For instance, I asked a planning officer at the SDP if the 
private sector has influenced the development of the UPZs created in the POT 2000, and 
he responded: 
[Yes probably, I think for example in the case of UPZ Chicó-Lago-Refugio 
(predominantly Stratum 6). We had not finished establishing  code for a hundred 
and something UPZs, and it had already been established four times, they fixed it 
four times, that is  a sign of pressure, but where is this pressure coming from? 
Partly from the markets, the markets pressure…] 
Sí probablemente, yo creo por ejemplo que ese caso de las UPZ Chicó-Lago-
Refugio. Ciento y pico de UPZs no las habíamos terminado de reglamentar y ya 
esa la había reglamentado cuatro veces, la arreglaron cuatro veces, eso es una 
señal de presión; ¿pero de que deriva la presión? Parte del mercado, los 
mercados presionan… 
Other planning scholars who participated in the processes confirm how the creation 
of the UPZs, which were designed to increase citizen participation in planning, disrupted 
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the propositions of the larger plan, Decreto 190, at the lower scale. More importantly, the 
creation of the UPZs facilitated the influence of the construction firms on the city 
regulations related to density and land-use. For instance, they increased the height limits in 
the North in areas designated for higher strata housing developments. A planning scholar 
explains:  
[If you talk with T. Q. (a planning policy maker) who was the one who did all 
that, he will always tell you: ‘We messed up with the UPZs, those one hundred 
and something went a little out of our hands, many of the UPZs do not comply 
with the planning ideas that were set in the original plan… M. (a planning 
consultant and scholar) made like twenty UPZs, I told him, ‘I believe in you, I do 
not see you giving in to J. U. (a developer) to give more density to a property.’ 
Moreover, they were all those properties in the North. He told me ‘Yes, but there 
were difficulties in certain things, regulating the UPZs is more difficult…but with 
a city of this size how else do you do it? There is not much more to do.’]   
Si usted habla con T. Q. quien fue el que hizo todo eso, él siempre le va a decir: 
La embarramos con las UPZs, se nos salieron un poco de las manos esas ciento y 
pico, muchas de las UPZs no cumplen las ideas de planeación que se habían 
hecho en el plan original… M. hizo como 20 UPZs, le dije “yo creo en usted, no 
lo veo a usted cediendo ante J. U. para darle mayor edificabilidad a un predio,” y 
eran todos esos predios en el norte. Me dijo “sí, pero había dificultades en ciertas 
cosas, regular las UPZs es más difícil… pero con una ciudad de este tamaño 
¿usted como más lo hace? No hay mucho más que hacer.” 
[The regulations that they gave the UPZs, on the contrary, inhibited the adequate 
development of the central areas as hubs of economic activity as was hoped. They 
also blurred a little bit the sectors that we wanted them to continue occupying, and 
moreover they dispersed those central areas. So there was a failure in how the 
participatory process in regulation did not come together with the larger 
objectives of the plan.] 
Las normas que dieron las UPZs al contrario inhibieron el desarrollo adecuado 
de las centralidades como aglomeraciones de actividad económica como se 
esperaba. Desdibujaron un poco también los sectores que propiamente queríamos 
que siguieran ocupando y más bien las dispersaron. Entonces hubo allí con un 
desencuentro en lo que fue el proceso participativo de la norma con los grandes 
propósitos del plan. 
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The segmentation of the market facilitated by the Stratification policy ultimately 
contributes to the broader market failure in housing production. This failure has reduced 
the affordability of housing in the city and it might have decreased the standards of quality 
of life for the overall population. Policy makers also commented on this. One said: 
[In North America, the person that lives downtown lives in a small space, and the 
person who lives far (from the downtown) lives in a larger space. Here, the person 
who lives far lives in a poorer space, this breaks up the structure, the decisions of 
families. There is a market failure because the decision of a poor family is distinct 
because ‘I live wherever I can,’ there is not anything available either in the small 
downtown or in the bigger periphery.] 
En Norteamérica el que vive en el centro vive en poquito espacio y el que vive 
lejos, vive en mayor espacio. Aquí el que vive lejos vive en peor espacio, esto 
rompe completamente la estructura, las decisiones de las familias. Hay una falla 
del mercado porque la decisión de la familia pobre es distinta porque “yo vivo 
donde pueda,” no hay oferta en el centro chiquito ni en la periferia grande. 
She continued: 
[That is what economists call poorly developed markets. Remember for instance 
that you live there (North America). The “gringo,” the Colombian, and the 
Canadian supermarket are different. This makes explicit the conditions of 
sophistication of a market. Of this jelly here [(in a Colombian supermarket), you 
find ten (marmalades) there. You can find there fifty marmalades of every flavor. 
There starts to be sophistication in an offer, because it is a market that punishes 
you if you do not have quality (goods). This (here in Colombia) is a market so 
precarious that a person pays fifty million pesos per square meter in a close-by 
place, even if there is no daylight.]   
Eso lo llaman los economistas que son mercados poco desarrollados. Acuérdate 
por ejemplo que estás viviendo allí. El supermercado gringo, colombiano y 
canadiense es diferente. Explicita las condiciones de sofisticación de un mercado, 
de esta mermelada aquí, tú consigues diez mermeladas allá. Tú consigues 
cincuenta mermeladas de todos los sabores. Empieza a haber una sofisticación en 
una oferta porque es un mercado que te castiga si tú no tienes calidad. Este es un 
mercado tan precario que uno paga cincuenta millones de pesos por metro 
cuadrado en un lugar cercano, así no tenga luz de día. 
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A final dimension of the market failure appears to be the location of jobs. As the 
offices of corporations and service providers concentrate in specific neighborhoods of the 
city, people will pay more and sacrifice living conditions for easy-access to jobs. A policy 
maker at the SDP explains that this has nothing to do with the stratum; however, in 
response, I argue that part of the market failure is caused by the fact that firms prefer to 
locate in areas of higher strata in the first place: 
[The real estate sales potential in a square meter has skyrocketed in the area, 
(Chicó) and for many reasons that do not have to do only with the strata. This is 
an area that is very well equipped, it has many parks, but above all the land prices 
respond to connectivity. That is to say, it is the residential area closest, let’s say, 
to employment areas, that reduces people’s commute time. Everybody in Bogotá 
is now playing to sacrifice quality of life in terms of space in order to try to 
reduce their commute. So again we say the obvious, that is the history of 
humanity, who can pay more for their square meter, let’s say that obviously 
depends on the greatest purchasing power].    
El potencial inmobiliario de venta del metro cuadrado está disparadísimo en la 
zona, y por muchas razones no tiene que ver sólo por estratos. Una zona muy 
bien dotada, tiene muy buenos parques, pero ante todo los precios de la tierra se 
mueven durísimo por la conectividad. Es decir, es la zona residencial más 
cercana digamos a zonas de empleo, que reduce los tiempos de movimiento de las 
personas. Todas las personas en Bogotá están jugando a sacrificar calidad de 
vida en términos de espacio por tratar de reducir su viaje. Entonces nuevamente 
digamos lo obvio, eso sí es historia de la humanidad, quién puede pagar más por 
su metro cuadrado, digamos que obviamente depende de la mayor capacidad 
adquisitiva. 
DIFFERENT DEVELOPERS AND DENSIFICATION MARKETS ACROSS THE STRATA 
I selected the developers I interviewed according to the contact information 
included in the database of construction permits provided by the SDP. The database 
showed that the companies that worked in incremental densification projects were mostly 
smaller firms, while those involved in larger scale infill or peripheral development were 
mostly larger and older construction firms. The different scale of capital required to do 
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incremental densification, or infill/expansion projects, explains this trend. While 
incremental densification projects require one scale of capital and human resources, large 
housing projects require much more up-front investment and logistical coordination, but 
also can generate much higher profits. A developer working on an incremental 
densification project relies on the current characteristics of a neighborhood for the sales—
including the social perceptions that are created by the stratum of an area. Conversely, 
larger firms pursue projects where they can develop whole neighborhoods, build shopping 
malls, and design green spaces, thus minimizing their risks.   
Based on my initial findings, I classified the development firms into large 
companies working mostly on infill and expansion development, and small firms working 
on incremental densification projects. I was more interested in the firms working on 
incremental densification projects because presumably for them, the stratum of a 
neighborhood would be of bigger concern. Nevertheless, to confirm my assumptions I 
conducted an interview with the owner of a large construction firm. I asked him about the 
criteria they use to determine the locations of their projects, and from that conversation, I 
learned that incremental densification is outside of their business model. They prefer to 
work in areas with large greenfields, and if these are scarce, as they are in the case of 
Bogotá, they prefer to work in the peripheral municipalities of the savanna. He suggested:  
[We are interested in working in areas that have the possibility of continuity. This 
means that there are enough lots so that at the end of a project we can move on to 
build another one. In this way, we can expand our offerings in the same area so 
that the (previous project) becomes our best advertising mechanism benefiting us 
for many years. 
(I ask) the city also grows through buying two-story houses and transforming 
them into condominiums. Do you have experience doing that? Or do you prefer 
building projects where there are large tracts of greenfields? 
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Do you talk about the experience of buying complexes of houses? It all depends 
on the expected profitability and the demand from those sectors. 
(I clarify) I am referring to sectors that were before at the margins of the market, 
do you participate in such trends? It is like what you say, maybe Stratum 6 is 
saturated which leads you to move to other parts of the city, the question is if you 
are doing that? 
Of course, in Cajicá (municipality in the savanna), outside the city.] 
Nos interesa trabajar en sectores que tengan posibilidad de continuidad. Eso 
significa que haya lotes suficientes para que al finalizar el proyecto podamos 
hacer otro proyecto después, para que podamos ampliar la oferta en el sector 
para que el referenciado es nuestro mejor mecanismo de publicidad que funcione 
por muchos años. 
[Yo pregunto] La ciudad también crece a través de comprar casas de dos pisos y 
hacer edificios, ¿ustedes tienen experiencia haciendo eso? ¿O ustedes prefieren 
más como estructurar proyectos donde tengan grandes zonas de tierra? 
¿Usted habla de la experiencia de comprar varios conjuntos de casas? Todo 
depende de la rentabilidad esperada y la demanda por esos sectores. 
Me refiero a sectores que estaban antes al margen del mercado, ¿participan 
ustedes en ese tipo de tendencias? Es como lo que usted dice, tal vez el Estrato 6 
está saturado entonces lleva a moverse a otras partes de la ciudad, la pregunta es 
¿si ustedes están haciendo eso? 
Si claro, en Cajicá fuera de la ciudad. 
The lack of interest on the part of larger firms to pursue incremental densification 
projects conflicts with the current planning objectives of the city. While the projects that 
larger firms develop in the savanna are mostly sprawling gated communities of single-
family housing, the vision of planners in Bogotá has been, and continues to be, one of 
restricting urban sprawl into the savanna. The municipality can achieve this by limiting 
growth inside the city, as former Mayor Petro proposed, or by encouraging controlled 
growth in large-scale projects with high densities, as current Mayor Peñalosa suggests. I 
consider that for both strategies the small and medium size firms working in incremental 
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densification are important, as they are the major contributors to the densification and 
revitalization of the central areas of the city.  
Larger firms produce the bulk of housing supply for strata 4, 5, and 6, and they 
dominate the subsidized affordable housing supply since they have achieved the scale and 
specialization that markets with such low returns require. Figure 53 shows a large 
densification project by a large construction firm in the North. As a consequence, smaller 
firms focus on both the very high end and the lower end of the demand. At the very high 
end are small luxury complexes tailored to the rich who seek to live in the central city. 
Projects are located in the most desirable areas of the city—areas that locals call “Stratum 
8”—where land prices are sky-high. These small firms generally belong to architects who 
are well connected to those in power, and they custom build their apartments for specific 
clients. However, I found that firms working on mid-sized projects in unexplored areas of 
strata 3 and 4 are key to the planning objectives of the city, as they foster compact 
densification and revitalization of the central city. Figure 54 shows an example of such a 
project of incremental densification in the South. These smaller and medium sized firms 
use the Stratification system to identify investment opportunities in underserved areas with 
high demand. 
There are two categories of such small and medium-sized firms pursuing 
incremental densification in the central city. The first group is composed of companies led 
by professionals in engineering and architecture who are exploring underexploited areas of 
the city, mostly those at the borders between Stratum 3 and Stratum 4 areas in the North, 
and in areas in the central city. The second groups of developers working on incremental 
densification are grassroots community developers, most often located in the South of the 
city. 
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Figure 53: Incremental densification in the North 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
 
Figure 54: Incremental densification in the South 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
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I interviewed representative of the first group, which was most receptive to my 
investigation. For example, a project manager in a new firm confirmed that they are not 
very concerned about Stratification or land use in the area. If the area is well connected, 
they are willing to invest: 
[We do not immediately reject it when we become aware of a lot located in an 
area I don’t know, in a sector that is purely commercial and depressed, and 
(where) at night there are a number of dance clubs. We think it is attractive 
precisely because of that, to change the vocation of the sector. We have built on 
13th Avenue... the neighborhood does not frighten us, we look first at the urban 
regulations, whether the city will let us do a profitable project, that the standards 
are beneficial and that we can develop to a decent height, six floors, eight floors.] 
No tenemos ese rechazo instantáneo que cuando llega un lote donde no tengo ni 
idea, en un sector que es puramente comercial y es deprimido, y por las noches 
hay una cantidad de discotecas. Nosotros pensamos que es atractivo 
precisamente por eso, para cambiarle la vocación al sector. Nosotros hemos 
construido sobre la 13… El sector no nos asusta, miramos primero pues la 
normativa urbana, que nos dejen hacer un proyecto rentable, que las normas 
sean beneficiosas y que podamos en crecer a una altura decente, 6 pisos, 8 pisos. 
 
In my conversations with such small and medium-sized developers, they also 
indicated that they are not concerned with the social stigma associated with the 
Stratification of a site. Instead, they are using it as a method to assess the market. If the 
sales are poor in a stratum, they migrate to projects in other strata that may have 
underdeveloped markets. Currently in Bogotá, several firms are moving from working in 
higher strata 4, 5 and 6 to Stratum 3 in a response to the slowdown in the Colombian 
economy in 2016. This move to invest in lower class areas, often of informal origin, has 
been called “new-built gentrification” by scholars, and has been identified in other Latin 
American cities (López-Morales 2016; Janoschka and Sequera 2016). Here are extracts of 
conversations with developers where they discussed these trends: 
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[We are open to any site as I said; it is not easy to get land, so we have moved to 
different strata and into different areas. At the moment, we are looking into strata 
3 and 4; we have worked in 5 and 6. We are now finishing one project in Stratum 
6, but we have realized that sales are a little more complicated there in those 
higher strata. The (Stratum) 3 is selling very well, we are about to start a project, 
it sold very well in the South in Barrio La Fragua near Barrio Restrepo.] 
Estamos abiertos a cualquier sitio por lo que le decía, no es fácil conseguir 
terrenos, entonces nos hemos movido en diferentes estratos y en diferentes zonas. 
En este momento tendemos a los estratos 3 y 4, hemos trabajado en 5 y 6. 
Precisamente ahora estamos terminando uno en Estrato 6, pero nos hemos dado 
cuenta que las ventas están un poquito más complicadas en esos estratos altos. El 
3 se está vendiendo muy bien, estamos por iniciar un proyecto, se vendió muy 
bien hacia el sur en el Barrio la Fragua cerca al Barrio Restrepo. 
[We are in another project that is in Ciudad Jardín del Norte, at 129th Street down 
Las Villas Avenue. That sector initially began as a working class area, then it 
started to have small industries and we bought several houses there. We are doing 
a front of about half a block. It is a very well located sector, that project is in 
process and it has gone well for us, it is stratum 3 or 4.] 
Estamos en otro proyecto que queda en Ciudad Jardín del Norte, en la 129 abajo 
de la avenida Las Villas. Ese sector inicialmente comenzó como un sector obrero, 
luego pasó a tener como unas industrias pequeñas y compramos ahí varias casas. 
Estamos haciendo un frente como de media manzana. Es un sector muy bien 
ubicado, ese proyecto está en proceso y nos ha ido bien, es estrato 3 o 4. 
Developers argue that such densification projects in underexplored areas are 
addressing the local housing need. They suggest that people who work in the area and do 
not want to move elsewhere—where their commute will be longer—are buying most of 
the apartments in these projects: 
[It is the first time that we have worked in the South, we have always been 
towards the North... Well, in the 17th South project, where we are located, there is 
not a lot of projects being offered. We see that this is a very interesting area to 
continue exploiting because there are very few developers around, so we think 
that’s why it is going well for us. Initially many people in the sector bought from 
us, a sector that has an area with industrial warehouses, where they have their 
factories and people from the sector... It may be that some people invest to lease 
(the condominium), but a good part bought to live there, because if those people 
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move within the sector, it will be much easier to live, it will be much easier to go 
from work to their homes.] 
Es la primera vez que trabajamos en el sur, siempre habíamos estado hacia el 
norte… Pues en el proyecto de la 17 sur donde estamos ubicados no hay mucha 
oferta de proyectos. Vemos que es una zona muy interesante para seguir 
explotando porque hay muy pocas constructoras alrededor, entonces creemos que 
por eso nos va bien. Inicialmente nos compraron muchas personas del sector, un 
sector que tiene una parte industrial de bodegas, que tienen sus fábricas y gente 
del sector… puede ser que algunas personas inviertan para arrendar, pero buena 
parte es para vivir, porque si esa gente se mueve dentro del sector, le será mucho 
más fácil vivir, les queda mucho más fácil ir del trabajo a la vivienda. 
However, developers also point out the challenges of working in areas of informal 
origin. Owners have incrementally expanded the houses and introduced mixed uses to the 
properties, which increases prices and complicates negotiations. In addition, often the 
densification ordinances only allow heights up to five floors in areas where the people have 
built up to three or four floors through self-help expansion.  
[For us the sector is not important, but what happens with those (self-help) 
houses? For example, we have tried to do many projects, but those are productive 
houses, that they started with a floor and then they moved on to the second, and 
on the first floor, they put a business. Then one ends up buying a three-story 
house because they have been expanding it, where they (the city) allows building 
only five. Then if we buy it, we would have to buy it as a commercial (property). 
Therefore, many times in the negotiation I have to say to the owner that I will get 
him an 18-month lease, but the person does not want that because s/he has a 
business there where people always look for them, so it makes these types of 
negotiations more difficult. 
A nosotros no nos importa el sector, pero ¿qué pasa con esas casas? Por ejemplo 
hemos tratado de hacer muchos proyectos, pero son casas como productivas, que 
empezaron con un piso y luego se pasaron al segundo, y en el primer piso 
pusieron una cosa. Entonces termina uno comprando una casa de tres pisos 
porque la han ido ampliando, donde dejan hacer cinco. Entonces nosotros si la 
compramos tocaría comprarla como comercial. Entonces muchas veces en la 
negociación me toca decirle yo le consigo un arriendo para que se vaya 18 
meses, pero la persona no le interesa porque tiene su negocio donde la gente 
siempre lo busca, entonces hace que este tipo de negociaciones sean más difíciles. 
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Other developers addressed increasing conflicts with local communities over the 
heights of the new buildings, in addition to speculation of land prices, especially in 
neighborhoods of informal origin. The following story extracted from my field notes 
illustrates this: 
Soon someone showed up and asked us if we needed help. I asked him if we 
could see the apartments. He said ‘Sure,’ however, at that same moment a woman 
with a small kid also showed up at the entrance. The guy nodded at her, a little 
irritated, and said ‘Yes, I will help you, give me a moment.’ Later he told us that 
they were people from the neighborhood. He said, annoyed, ‘They always come 
to see the apartments, but they are not going to buy anything.’ I thought that is, of 
course, unusual for the people of this neighborhood of self-built houses to see 
these new buildings around with fancy apartments. 
As the person was showing us the apartment I asked if they were affordable 
housing (VIS). I noticed he disliked my comment and told me, ‘No, they are not, 
this is an apartment as any other, this one costs 260 million.’ The price was a little 
higher than I expected, so then I asked him if he was the developer. He told me 
that he is the partner of the developer, who is an architect; he is in charge of sales. 
They are a two-person firm. As he got a little more confident about me, he told 
me more details about the project, ‘Two years ago we bought seven houses in this 
neighborhood for 1,500 million to do this project, everybody in the neighborhood 
freaked out. They complained much about the height (which is just a couple of 
floors higher than the self-built homes) and they were all angry. However, now, it 
became impossible to do another project in this neighborhood, now each neighbor 
is asking for 1,500 million for each house.’ 
As we went out of the building, I asked the person if he and his partners would be 
interested in giving me a longer interview for my research. He looked at me a 
little angry and said finally, ‘No, here came people from the city, from the DANE, 
from everywhere, we are very clear, we are not talking to anyone about this 
project.’  
However, other developers are part of the communities in which they work. Often 
these firms have grown through family efforts at the margins of the formal system of 
financing and without access to technical knowledge. They have attained the necessary 
permits and build to required standards, thus representing the formalization of the 
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incremental self-help model of densification. I will end this section with my field notes of 
an informal conversation with one of these developers in the Bravo Páez neighborhood in 
the South of Bogotá. This conversation illustrates the characteristics of the firms, their 
building, and the sites: 
The Bravo Páez neighborhood is a place I have never visited in Bogota. As the 
taxi moved through the streets of the South, we left behind the places I knew and 
where I felt safe. We were driving following the GPS of my cell phone that 
showed the new projects listed in the database I obtained in the planning office. 
As we left the main roads, the houses became all self-built, many looked very old. 
There were fewer people in the streets, and the cars, although many, were mostly 
old models. 
I have learned to fear the South, especially because the groups of youngsters 
between 16 and 22 years old gathered on the corners as we got into the cab. They 
dress in particular ways, with wide pants and jackets, and caps, sometimes also 
with dark glasses. They usually meet in groups of four or five at the corners where 
they talk and smoke. Sometimes they are accompanied by young women, then I 
fear less, but if they are men, two or three and I meet them walking anywhere in 
the city, I feel very afraid. People looking similarly have mugged me several 
times in the past. We middle and higher class Bogotanos call them “ñeros,” they 
in turn call us “gomelos,” and we are enemies. That is why I feel scared in these 
neighborhoods, despite being inside a taxi approaching the red dot on the map on 
my phone. 
Finally, I see a new building amongst the houses of self-construction. I am sure 
this is the one that is indicated in my phone. I got out of the taxi and suddenly felt 
very unsafe, in the corner I see groups of youngsters, this is their territory, they 
have a pit-bull dog barking at us, they shout ‘shut up Killer!’ Older people also 
walk on the street, which calms me a little. The building is very different from the 
surroundings. It stands out for its height of seven floors, the glass façade and the 
paint. There is not any sales office in sight; there is just a notice in the door that 
advertises apartments with a phone number. I call the number and pretend that I 
am interested in buying an apartment. A young man answers me and tells me to 
wait five minutes for him to arrive. Although it is daytime, I feel that even waiting 
here five minutes is scary. 
A few minutes later, a car approaches the parking lot of the building. A young 
man of approximately twenty-five to twenty-eight years descends. He greets me 
and invites me to continue to see the apartments on the second floor. Upstairs 
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there is a couple which also seem to be potential clients, they are with a man 
whom I presume is the caretaker of the building. I look at this young couple. By 
their looks, I presume they are not people such as those I see in the North. I 
assume they are people who also live in the South, I am happy to think that they 
have just gotten married and are searching for their first home. 
The young man begins to show us one of the apartments, the floor is white tile, 
the kitchen and bathrooms look good. As an architect, even though everything is 
clean and has good materials, I do not like the design. The layout of the spaces is 
a bit strange, you lose a lot of space in the corridors and the rooms, they are also 
very small and dark. Although there is scarce daylight, I am sure the building 
minimally adheres to the building standards of the city. The guide tells us ‘this 
building has a concrete structure.’ Almost all the buildings in the North have 
concrete structures and we take it for granted, but I guess this is an important 
point for people that live in self-built structures. I ask for the price of the smallest 
apartment, about sixty-five square meters and two rooms, the young man tells me 
160 million. It seems to me that it is cheap for the usual prices in Bogotá, I am 
sure that the apartments in the towers of the big developers are more expensive. In 
the North, an apartment with a similar area will exceed 350 million. However, it 
is also not affordable housing, whose maximum price is about 79 million. 
I began to talk with the young man and asked him if he is an architect, he 
responded, ‘Architects? No! All this has been done with no architects.’ He then 
adds that he is the builder, or rather he is part of the family that is building these 
types of buildings in the neighborhood. He said, ‘We grew up in this 
neighborhood, my father had a fabric business, but now we have moved on into 
construction.’ I asked him if the social stratum is important for them in selecting 
the sites where they build. He tells me no, although he knows that the sector is 
Stratum 3. He then tells me that they have several projects in the neighborhood, 
one of them reaching ten floors. He said, ‘That was thanks to Petro, he gave us 
that benefit, however we had to pay a lot of money (to the city).’ 
Finally, I asked about the type of people who buy the apartments and he tells me 
that people come from all over, especially from Madelena (further south), where 
they ‘cannot stand the smell anymore.’ Madelena is a neighborhood farther south 
that borders the river Tunjuelo, which is heavily polluted.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Through a spatial-statistical analysis and an analysis of interviews with agents of 
city development, this dissertation has shown that the Stratification policy has shaped the 
patterns of incremental densification in Bogotá from 2010 to 2015. Over time, this 
relationship between densification and Stratification has been influenced by planning 
mechanisms and by the decision-making processes and practices pursued by developers. 
In terms of housing development, my statistical analysis indicates that, controlling for the 
physical characteristics of the property and its access to mass transit, every increase in 
stratum results in an increase of roughly 15 percent in the average mean of the total built 
area of each new densification project. On the other hand, for nonresidential land-uses—
such as offices, retail businesses and services—controlling for the physical characteristics 
of the property and its access to transit, every increase in stratum results in an increase of 
roughly 20 percent in the average mean of the total built area. While stratum and the 
physical features of the lot explain more than 80 percent of the built area of residential 
developments, other, unexplained factors may determine the location of nonresidential 
developments.   
Two mechanisms explain why the Stratification policy shapes the redevelopment 
patterns of housing and nonresidential areas. The first mechanism stems from the inertia of 
historical growth management regulations. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, the city 
established a system of social segregation based on the spatial separation of people of 
different income levels using different building typologies. Detached suburban housing 
with full provision of services was built for the upper classes, while self-help housing on 
very small parcels with only basic infrastructure was built by the lower classes. This 
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separation ultimately laid the foundation for the Stratification policy introduced in the 
1980s.  
Later on, the city changed the system of social segregation through density and 
land-use norms with the introduction of Acuerdo 7 in 1979. This was a new model for 
growth based on a USB and the introduction of policies meant to incentivize the 
incremental densification of the central areas. Nonetheless, an analysis of the current 
morphological patterns of the city indicates that social segregation persists through a 
process of incremental densification. In the last thirty years, the suburban detached housing 
has been transformed into high-rise condominiums, while the self-help low-income houses 
have densified informally.  
The analysis suggest that a recent policy change in the early 2000s intended to 
discourage incremental densification in the POT only marginally altered urban 
redevelopment practices in Bogotá. The data analyzed show that between 2010 and 2015, 
roughly 90 percent of areas of new development were built using the incremental 
densification approach, while less than 10 percent of the new area was produced using the 
newly introduced planning tools, PPs or PPRUs. These were created to impose a fairer 
distribution of the value added from real estate development between the public and 
landowners and developers, and to guarantee that densification maintains adequate supply 
of open space and infrastructure.  
The second mechanism is associated with local practices in urban governance, 
which also became an important variable in the survival of the exclusionary system through 
successive changes in growth management approaches. I found evidence in the interviews 
I conducted that developers influenced the drafting of local UPZ regulations in order to 
increase their profit from the incremental densification processes. Although planning 
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policies were changed in the 2000s to limit the control of the private sector in urban 
development, at the same time, the introduction of the system of UPZs diminished the 
public sector’s role in setting incremental densification patterns. This made it easier for the 
private sector to modify the large-scale objectives of growth management at the local scale.  
Even though Stratification is a key variable for developers’ investment decisions, local 
policy makers often ignore or downplay Stratification as an important driven for 
incremental densification. This suggests that there is a disconnection between policy 
makers and the rationale of the private sector.  
The influence of Stratification on patterns of incremental densification is important, 
because it has led to a disproportionate distribution of private investment in new housing 
and nonresidential areas across the city. For the period from 2010 to 2015, the areas of the 
upper-most strata, 5 and 6—which together account for only 4 percent of the population 
and 13 percent of the urban area of the city—received almost 60 percent of the investments 
made in new areas for housing. These strata also accounted for more than 60 percent of the 
investments made in new nonresidential areas. These figures suggest a real estate market 
segmentation, which reduces the supply of housing for the lower strata increasing housing 
prices for the population with the lowest income. 
Finally, I explored the effects of the current patterns of incremental densification 
on the social segregation patterns in Bogotá. Based on my statistical analysis, in the period 
2007-2014—using as a proxy the education levels of the population, and strata and locality 
as scale of analysis—I found that incremental densification has a limited and nuanced 
effect on social segregation patterns. Incremental densification relates to increasing 
segregation in the areas of higher strata 5 and 6, while it relates to decreasing segregation 
in strata 3 and 4. My maps and field surveys suggest that these effects may respond to the 
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numerous, recently developed projects of a smaller scale, especially in areas of Stratum 3 
in the West and South. I have shown that these changing patterns of development are due 
in part to an emerging class of grassroots or young developers, who are working in 
incremental densification at the margins of a class of legacy large-scale developers. 
These findings inform first, a larger theoretical debate about densification policies 
in urban design and planning brought to Colombia from other countries in the 1970s. The 
discourses that focused on normative ideas of good city form influenced the development 
of Acuerdo 7 in 1979, which sought to phase out the system of social segregation through 
density and land-use norms, and control city sprawl. However, the experience in Bogotá 
suggests that while these policies were effective in terms of densification—making Bogotá 
one of the densest cities in the world—they failed to address the continuing problems 
related to socio-spatial segregation. As other empirical studies suggest, I attribute this 
failure to a normative approach to urban policy, which inadequately incorporates the 
“procedural” characteristics of the local context, including stark differences in ethnicities, 
income levels, and places of origin, that are translated into stark differences in architectural 
typologies. 
Secondly, this work addresses the current gap in literature about growth patterns in 
Latin American cities, specifically literature concerning zoning codes and social 
differences. Local scholars have claimed that Latin American literature on urbanism often 
fails to address the local social characteristics of the region, such as social segregation and 
poverty. Urban sociologists, on the other hand, have developed a large body of theory about 
the relationship between social segregation and urban growth in the region and explored 
its social, political, and economic causes and consequences. However, these studies have 
not evaluated specific planning regulations and explored their roles within these systems. 
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My research associates these two bodies of theory by addressing the gaps in both of them 
and providing a study that explores how specific normative policies in planning often 
reproduce the social segregation patterns in cities.  
My research also contributes to literature on urban governance in the Global South 
by suggesting that a combination of both normative and procedural urban planning 
models—introduced to the city by foreign practitioners and consultancy firms—have 
shaped the evolution of Bogotá’s planning policy over time. Nonetheless, in the local 
context, the relationship between the public and the private sectors in urban governance 
does not actually follow either of these models. Instead, this research demonstrates that in 
Bogotá, as in many other cities in the Global South, the private sector exercises influence 
over public policy in order to maximize profits from land and housing markets. In the 
Bogotá case, there has been an ongoing alteration of larger planning objectives though the 
density and land-use regulations at the lower scale. Instead of the larger structure defined 
by the comprehensive plans, the city’s densification has followed the residential 
segregation patterns embodied in the Stratification system. These practices have been 
identified previously by Koch (2015), who coined the term “Arranged Urbanism.” I argue 
that the practice of urban planning within these constraints becomes difficult, making urban 
development difficult to predict.  
However, my research also points to an emerging change of paradigms within the 
older settlements of informal origin and other areas traditionally at the margins of real 
estate development. A rising class of younger grassroots developers is altering the 
segregationist landscape of the city through piecemeal interventions. I found that their work 
is at least partially contributing to decreasing social segregation levels in the West and the 
South of the city. This points to recent literature that addresses the increasing social 
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fragmentation that is occurring in the peripheries of many Latin American cities. While 
this work does not address the positive or negative social consequences of this trend, it 
explores the motivations and characteristics of the new proximity between social classes.   
This dissertation also informs the practice of urban planning in Bogotá. As of this 
writing in 2017, the mayoral administration of Enrique Peñalosa is in the process of 
formulating a new comprehensive plan. The empirical findings provided regarding land-
use and density norms and urban governance will contribute to the development of smarter 
policies that can lead to a more sustainable and also socially just city. For instance, based 
on these findings, I call for a better articulation between large-scale normative planning 
visions and social policy using the Stratification system. The Stratification system should 
be considered an urban planning and development tool as much as a utilities cross-subsidy 
system.  
In particular, this research suggests that the Stratification system may be a good 
tool to cross-distribute the income from the plusvalía [capital gains] tax. This tax, 
introduced via Ley 388 and Decreto 190, forces developers to share a portion of their profits 
from redevelopment allowed by upgrades in density limits. Although the plusvalía has been 
an important innovation in Latin America, it has been controversial in Bogotá because 
developers do not agree with the formulas by which the tax is calculated. Also, it is unclear 
how these plusvalía funds are spent by the city administration, and the bureaucratic 
procedures have become very complicated (Redacción Bogotá 2011; Smolka 2013). The 
Stratification system is currently used to calculate the tax assessment, but it is not used 
directly to determine the distribution of the earnings from the plusvalía. Currently the 
plusvalía funds are spent on new affordable housing projects mostly in the periphery 
instead of on improvements in the lower strata areas located in the consolidated city. 
  
228 
Because the Stratification zones serve to distinguish between areas of formal and informal 
origin, Stratification could be used to facilitate the distribution of plusvalía earnings from 
developments in higher strata to subsidize improvement in the built form in the lower strata 
areas. With this logic, these funds may subsidize the activity of small and grassroots 
developers in the lower strata areas. Most importantly, since citizens and developers alike 
embrace the Stratification system, such an adoption of the Stratification for the distribution 
of plusvalía earnings will be very simple. 
Finally, my findings have reaffirmed that, as history suggests, land markets are 
dependent on the specific social, political and economic context of a site. If planners 
understand these variables embedded in the local context, they will be more capable to 
implement innovative policies that benefit the whole population, as Hirt (2014, 179) quoted 
from Light:  
National land-use regimes do not arise in response to universal laws of the market 
that exert the same influence at any location on the planet. Rather, land-use 
regimes differ from country to country. They are embedded in a complex, 
historically developing framework of ideology, law and culture. If land-use 
controls regulate the physical shape of the communities we live in, then it is 
history itself that regulates what kind of community we view as wholesome, 
normal and desirable –our ideas of what “the city” and “the good city” mean. 
(1999, 577) 
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